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INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception in 1941, broadcast television1 has 
exerted an unparalleled influence in the shaping of American 
culture, identity and values. At its best, television is an 
equalizer and educator.  It serves as a point of common focus; a 
bridge between people of different races, religions, cultures, 
and socioeconomic classes.  Television has brought us together 
to experience momentous historical events as one nation.  Some 
of those televised experiences, like the 1969 Apollo moon 
landing, were engrossing moments of national pride whose 
black-and-white images are etched in the American psyche.  
Other shared broadcast experiences, such as the events of 
September 11, 2001, were powerful for very different reasons, 
but television still helped us to survive them as a united people. 
At its worst, television is what former Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Newton Minow 
famously described as “a vast wasteland,”2 littered with 
exploitative programming that does more to pollute than enrich 
our democracy and culture.  Television has, at times, broadened 
the perspectives of some of the most isolated of viewers by 
serving as a “window on the world”  by presenting different 
ideas, and showing new traditions.3  But television has at other 
times transmitted a distorted reflection of our nation and its 
communities and cultures, inhibiting the democratic system of 
self-government it was intended to promote.4 
Congress was aware of the potential power and influence of 
broadcasting when it reserved for broadcast licensees a 
uniquely privileged status among federally regulated 
                                                          
 1. My focus in this article is on free, over-the-air commercial television, 
as distinguished from cable, satellite and other fee-based subscription 
television services and non-commercial, educational (“public”) broadcast 
television, which are subjected to different federal regulations.  For an 
examination of the different television services, see generally HOWARD J. 
BLUMENTHAL & OLIVER R. GOODENOUGH, THIS BUSINESS OF TELEVISION (2d 
ed. 1998). 
 2. Newton N. Minow, Address to the National Association of 
Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), reprinted in NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. 
LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT, app. 2 at 188 (1995). 
 3. See JERRY MANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF 
TELEVISION 192-94, 263-70 (1978) (positing that by presenting selective and 
biased perspectives, television “dims the mind” and provides viewers with an 
artificial view of the world.). 
 4. See id. 
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communications industries.  Broadcasters are considered 
“public trustees.”5  In exchange for the exclusive right to 
broadcast over a “channel” of publicly owned radio frequency 
spectrum in a community of license (typically a major 
metropolitan area), broadcasters enter into social contract of 
sorts with the American people, which creates an attendant 
obligation to broadcast in furtherance of the “public interest, 
convenience and necessity.”6 
Congress implemented this “public trustee doctrine,” which 
is alternately referred to as the “public interest standard,” in 
the recognition that broadcasting held the promise of fostering 
a more deliberative democracy by cultivating, through locally 
produced and directed programming, a politically informed and 
engaged citizenry.7  In exchange for the quid of a television 
license capable of generating great power and profit, 
broadcasters as public trustees are expected to deliver the quo 
of locally oriented “public interest” programming that informs 
and enriches viewers. 
Although the FCC has vacillated over time on the 
definition of “public interest” programming, and whether it 
encompasses a defined set of mandatory minimums for the 
broadcasting of such programs, it has consistently deemed 
locally oriented political campaign coverage, local public affairs 
programs, educational and cultural programming, and 
programs targeted at children and other special communities, 
as public interest programming consistent with the 
programmer’s role as public trustee.8  The Supreme Court 
                                                          
 5. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (noting that “very early the licensee’s role developed in 
terms of a ‘public trustee’ charged with the duty of fairly and impartially 
informing the public audience”); see also STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW & POLICY 118 (3d ed. 2001); 3 HARVEY L. 
ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 115-226 (3d ed. 1999). 
 6. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, §§ 
301, 302a, 303, 309, 318 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (2000)) 
(requiring that licensing and Commission enforcement decisions be made in 
furtherance of “public interest, convenience and necessity”). 
 7. See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCAST FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL 
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS 21 (Dec. 18, 1998) (noting that broadcast 
regulation “sought to cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic 
dialogue, [and] diversity of expression”), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 
2004). 
 8. Congress has consistently characterized the local origination and 
targeting of programming as “[a] primary objective and benefit of our Nation’s 
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repeatedly has upheld the public trustee doctrine against First 
Amendment challenges on the grounds that the broadcast 
spectrum is a scarce, publicly owned resource.  In 1969’s Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,9 the Court characterized this 
“scarcity rationale” as founded in the notion that “there are 
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than 
there are frequencies to allocate.”10  Because of spectrum 
scarcity, “the Government is permitted to put restraints on 
licensees” in order to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”11  Although 
broadcasters, scholars and dissenting judges have subjected the 
Red Lion scarcity rationale to withering criticism, Congress 
and the courts continue to regard it as valid. 
Despite its lofty aspirations, the public trustee doctrine has 
been a failure since its inception.  Broadcasters have 
successfully opposed nearly all efforts by Congress and the FCC 
to define, quantify and enforce the public interest standard.  
Over the last twenty-five years, the FCC has repealed almost 
all of its substantive public interest regulations, relying instead 
on marketplace forces in the individual television markets to 
guide broadcasters’ decisions concerning the nature and 
content of all of their programming.  The few remaining vague 
public interest rules, such as requiring that broadcasters air 
“programming that responds to the issues of concern to the 
community,”12 are virtually ignored by broadcasters and 
unenforced by the FCC.  In fact, the FCC has not penalized a 
television licensee for failure to satisfy its public interest 
                                                          
system of regulation of television broadcasting.”  See Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 
Stat. 1460, 1461 (1992) (requiring cable systems to carry the signals of local 
television stations on their basic tier of service). 
9. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).  
 10. Id. at 388. 
 11. Id. at 390. The Court reasoned that “it is the right of . . . listeners, not 
the right of broadcasters, which is paramount.” Id.; see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 
453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981), quoting Office of Communication of United Church 
of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“A licensed broadcaster 
is ‘granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the 
public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable 
public obligations.”). 
 12. See Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 
Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial 
Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1077 (1984) (Report and Order) 
[hereinafter TV Deregulation Report and Order], recon. denied, 104 F.C.C.2d 
358 (1986), aff’d in part and remanded in part sub nom., Action for Children’s 
Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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obligations in over twenty-five years. 
The typical commercial television broadcaster today airs 
very little locally oriented public affairs programming, coverage 
of local and regional political campaigns, children’s educational 
and informational programs, or other public interest 
programming.  For example, a 2003 study of forty-five local 
television stations in seven media markets found that less than 
one-half of one percent of the average station’s programming 
schedule is devoted to public affairs programming.13  Another 
study found that in the seven weeks preceding the November 
2002 midterm elections, more than half of the evening news 
broadcasts aired in the top fifty media markets did not include 
any coverage of political campaigns.14  Viewers of those 
television stations were more apt to receive their political 
information from slanted campaign advertising than from what 
is ostensibly “objective” news coverage.15  More recently, 
viewers without access to subscription cable, satellite television 
networks, and broadband Internet service received little 
coverage of the Democratic and Republican presidential 
nominating conventions, with the three major commercial 
television networks airing only three hours total of live 
coverage for each of the conventions.16  In addition, although 
the public trustee doctrine incorporates the duty to “serve[] the 
                                                          
 13. ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, BUT YOU 
WOULDN’T KNOW IT BY WATCHING LOCAL TV (2003) [hereinafter ALL POLITICS 
IS LOCAL], available at http://www.ourairwaves.org/reports/ 
display.php?ReportID=12 (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).  The study found that 
the surveyed stations aired three times as many reruns of the situation 
comedy “Seinfeld” than local public affairs programs.  Id. 
 14. MARTIN KAPLAN, ET AL., LOCAL TV NEWS COVERAGE OF THE 2002 
GENERAL ELECTION 1, available at http://www.learcenter.org/pdf/ 
LCLNAReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004). 
 15. Id. (noting that despite the absence of political campaign coverage, 
eighty percent of those local broadcasts aired at least one paid political 
advertisement and more than half aired three or more ads).  Another study by 
the Alliance for Better Campaigns concluded that despite broadcasters’ 
unwillingness to cover political campaigns, they view political candidates as 
lucrative advertising clients.  It suggested that in the two months preceding 
the November 2002 elections, broadcasters raised their advertising rates for 
candidates by 53 percent.  See ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, 
PROFITEERING ON DEMOCRACY: HOW THE TELEVISION INDUSTRY GOUGED 
CANDIDATES IN CAMPAIGN ’02 (2003), available at 
http://www.bettercampaigns.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=11 (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2004). 
 16. See Joanne Ostrow, Party Confabs Falling to Cable, DENVER POST, 
July 22, 2004, at F-03. 
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educational and informational needs of children,”17 some 
television licensees have considered such animated comedy 
programs as “The Jetsons” and “The Flintstones” and game 
shows, such as “Wheel of Fortune,” as satisfying that duty.18  
As public interest programming has become scarce on 
broadcast television, advertising of all sorts has skyrocketed, 
with prime time advertising on major network affiliates up 
thirty-six percent between 1993 and 2003.19 
Although television broadcasters typically attack the 
constitutionality of the public trustee doctrine when the 
government tries to enforce it, they are quick to don the mantel 
of public trustees when it is politically expedient.  For example, 
when then-Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) and Senator John 
McCain (R-Ariz.) demanded in 1996 that television 
broadcasters pay fair market value for new digital television 
(DTV) channels by means of competitive bidding (i.e., auctions), 
broadcasters launched a massive lobbying campaign claiming 
that their status as public trustees exempted them from paying 
for spectrum, unlike many other FCC digital licensees who 
have paid in excess of $20 billion in spectrum fees since 1994.20  
The broadcasters prevailed in what was called the “lobbying 
coup of the decade,”21 winning additional digital channels 
estimated to be worth $70 billion, at no cost to them. 22  Soon 
                                                          
 17. Children’s Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2000). 
 18. See Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, 
Revision of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, 11 
F.C.C.R. 10,660, 10,661-62  (1996) [hereinafter Children’s Television Order]; 
Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming Revision, 8 
F.C.C.R. 1841, 1842 (1993) (Notice of Inquiry). 
 19. Steve McClellan, Ad Clutter Keeps Climbing, BROADCASTING & 
CABLE, Dec. 22, 2003, at 13 (noting that 17 minutes out of each hour of prime 
time network broadcasting is now devoted to advertising), available at 
http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/BroadcastingCable/2003/12/22/340933 (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2004). 
 20. See Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 103d 
Cong., 304-15 (1994) (statement of Edward Fritts, President & CEO of the 
National Association of Broadcasters); see also Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid 
Pro Quo: What Broadcasters Really Want, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 686, 692-95 
(1997) (detailing the many benefits broadcasters have wrested from Congress 
and the FCC based on their claims of public trustees); Henry Geller, Public 
Interest Obligations of Broadcasters in the Digital Era: Law and Policy, in 
DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 39 n.9 (1998), available 
at http:// www.ciaonet.org/conf/asp06/asp06c.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004). 
 21. Paul Taylor, Superhighway Robbery, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 
20. 
 22. Id.; see Paul Farhi, Broadcast Executives Say Dole Vented Anger at 
Them, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at F1. The new digital channels have 
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after their legislative victory, broadcasters reverted to 
attacking the constitutional foundations of the same public 
trustee doctrine they used to justify their demand for free 
digital spectrum.  In 1999, the FCC initiated a proceeding to 
determine whether it should impose more substantial public 
interest requirements upon television broadcasters that were 
by then beginning to exploit the benefits of the new digital 
spectrum, including the “multicasting” of various pay-per-view 
and subscription subchannels as well as “datacasting” 
services.23  Broadcasters quickly attacked the constitutionality 
of any new public interest requirements.  For example, CBS, 
like almost all of its fellow broadcast licensees, argued that the 
Red Lion scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation is no longer 
valid “in light of the explosion in the number and type of media 
outlets.”24  CBS went so far as to dispute the government’s 
claim that broadcast airwaves are a publicly owned resource.25  
The FCC’s proceeding on new public interest duties is still 
open, with no new specific public interest requirements on the 
horizon.26 
In light of the apparent shortcomings in broadcast 
regulation, it is necessary to examine how and why United 
States television broadcast regulation has reached its current 
state of dysfunction and incoherence.  This article analyzes the 
causes of the public trustee doctrine’s failure and identifies 
what can be done to redeem it so that the American people are 
no longer shortchanged and disserved by the television 
licensees entrusted to serve their interests. 
                                                          
been characterized as “priceless” to broadcasters because of their profit 
making potential. Louis Jacobson & Bara Vaida, Broadcast Blues, 35 NAT’L J. 
2560, 2561 (2003). 
 23. See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 14 F.C.C.R. 
21,633, 21,633 ¶ 3 (1999) (Notice of Inquiry) [hereinafter FCC 1999 Digital 
Public Interest Programming Proceeding]. 
 24. Comments of CBS Corp., Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast 
Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at v (filed Mar. 27, 2000). 
 25. Id.  CBS contends that “electromagnetic spectrum is not a thing which 
can be owned . . . [but] exists only by virtue of electromagnetic radiation, 
which is produced by a radio transmitter sending energy through space, and 
can only be utilized through broadcasters’ investment of capital and 
initiative.”  Id.  
 26. See Second Periodic Review of the Commission’s Rules and Policies 
Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television, Report and Order, MB Docket 
No. 03-15, FCC 04-192 (August 4, 2004) (Statement of Commissioner Michael 
J. Copps) (urging resolution of the still-pending 1999 proceeding with the 
promulgation of heightened public interest requirements for television 
broadcasters). 
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Section I of this article traces the origins and history of the 
public trustee doctrine, starting with its conception following 
the dawn of radio and its codification in the 1927 Radio Act and 
the 1934 Communications Act, continuing through the FCC’s 
many failed attempts at interpreting and enforcing public 
interest requirements, and concluding with the contemporary 
era of deregulation and the contentious transition to digital 
television. 
Section II examines why the public trustee doctrine has 
failed.  It identifies and studies the three irreconcilable 
contradictions upon which the public trustee doctrine was 
precariously premised, and which doomed it from its inception: 
the First Amendment tensions inherent in the public trustee 
doctrine that have rendered it unworkable, the myth of 
broadcasters as politically agnostic entities at journalistic arms’ 
length from government, and the economic and marketplace 
demands that make broadcasting in the “public interest” a 
commercial impossibility.  This section concludes with an 
analysis of how the increasing consolidation of media 
ownership has further eroded the public trustee doctrine. 
Section III examines a number of existing proposals for 
reforming television regulation, and presents a new proposal to 
require television broadcasters to subsidize access to broadband 
Internet connections in low-income and underserved 
communities.  The Internet has created the “uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas” that television and the broadcast public 
trustee doctrine failed to create. Yet, as more middle-class and 
upper-class Americans rely on the Internet for political and 
electoral information and activism, news, employment, 
education, community organization, and basic communication, 
lower income Americans and all Americans in underserved 
parts of the country continue to encounter barriers blocking 
their access to America’s “electronic town square.”  This section 
concludes with a discussion of how a television-to-Internet 
cross-subsidy would be consistent with Congress’s and the 
FCC’s existing programs dedicated to promoting universal 
access to telecommunications and access to the Internet by the 
poor and marginalized.  I also explain how this proposal may 
avoid a number of the political, economic and constitutional 
obstacles that have blocked or stalled previous attempts at 
reforming the public trustee doctrine. 
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I.  THE MYTHOLOGY OF TELEVISION BROADCASTERS 
AS PUBLIC TRUSTEES 
A.  THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION 
The first attempt by the United States to regulate radio 
broadcasting was President Theodore Roosevelt’s formation on 
July 12, 1904, of an interdepartmental board including 
representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, 
Commerce, Labor, Navy, and War, which was charged with 
developing a radio regulation policy for the United States.27  
The Interdepartmental Board recommended charging the Navy 
with regulating ship-to-shore radio communications, 
authorizing the Army to erect radio stations that would not 
interfere with maritime communications, and asking Congress 
to pass legislation preventing monopoly control of radio 
communications.28  On January 23, 1908, the world witnessed 
the lifesaving utility of broadcasting when the ocean liner 
Republic summoned nearby vessels after having collided with 
the Italian ship Florida.29  The new technology of radio was 
credited with averting what surely would have been a 
catastrophic loss of life.30 
In 1912, Congress returned to radio regulation, enacting 
the 1912 Radio Act as part of its obligations under the 
international treaty the United States signed at the Third 
International Wireless Conference in London.31  Virtually 
                                                          
 27. MARVIN BENSMAN, THE BEGINNING OF BROADCAST REGULATION IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4 (2000) (citing Radio Service Bulletin No. 117, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Navigation, at 26 (December 31, 1926)). 
 28. See id. at 4-5 (citing LINWOOD S. HOWETH, HISTORY OF 
COMMUNICATIONS — ELECTRONICS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY 76-77 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963)). 
 29. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 6. 
 30. Id.  Shortly after the disaster, President Roosevelt urged Congress to 
pass legislation requiring the outfitting of all oceangoing vessels with radios.  
Id. Congress heeded his call and passed the Wireless Ship Act of 1910, placing 
jurisdiction over radio regulation in the Departments of Commerce and Labor. 
Pub. L. No. 61-262, 36 Stat. 629-30 (1910) (forbidding any steamship carrying 
or licensed to carry fifty or more individuals to leave any seaport in the United 
States unless equipped with radio equipment and a crewmember trained to 
use it). 
 31. Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912). The 1912 Radio Act 
empowered the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor to grant radio station 
licenses upon request, allocated certain frequencies for government use, 
adopted standardized distress signals, and imposed certain technical 
requirements. Id. Congress articulated two principal purposes in enacting the 
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anyone who requested a broadcast license received one as 
broadcast spectrum was bountiful at the time the 1912 Act was 
passed.32  Interference problems seldom surfaced because the 
number of radio stations in existence was much smaller than 
the number of available broadcast “channels” in the major 
metropolitan areas, and radio was still viewed principally as a 
navigation aid and novelty. 
World War I catalyzed the development of the broadcasting 
industry.  The American and European militaries experimented 
with the use of low-powered radio equipment for battlefield 
communications and for communicating between ground 
stations and war ships, submarines, and airplanes.33  By 1918, 
the United States Navy had integrated radio communications 
into its tactical arsenal.34  President Wilson’s Secretary of the 
Navy, Josephus Daniels, forcefully advocated the 
nationalization of the radio industry as a national defense 
system, and lobbied unsuccessfully for Navy Department 
control of all broadcasting.35  Still, by 1920, there were only 272 
land radio stations licensed in the United States.36 
On November 2, 1920, Westinghouse’s pioneering radio 
broadcast station KDKA in Pittsburgh demonstrated the 
civilian utility of radio broadcasting by reporting the Harding-
Cox presidential election results as soon as they were released 
by the voting authorities.37  The success of this broadcast 
resulted in a sharp increase in requests for broadcast licenses 
from the Department of Commerce.  On September 15, 1921, 
the Department’s Bureau of Navigation Radio Service licensed 
                                                          
1912 Radio Act.  The first was “to promote safety of life and property at sea 
and to promote commerce by facilitating the dispatch of ships.”  Hearings on 
Legislative, Executive, Judicial Appropriation Bill for 1922 Before the 
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 66th Cong. 1218 (1920).  
The second stated purpose of the new statute was “to secure by the fullest use 
of radio communication by federal regulation, made necessary by the fact that 
in the present state of the art the unregulated use by interference would 
impair or prevent almost all use.”  Id. 
 32. See CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ANOTHER LOOK  41 (2000) (stating that the 
“number of licensed broadcasters grew to exceed spectrum’s capacity to 
provide all with a clear signal.”). 
 33. See BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 11-12. 
 34. See PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF 
MODERN COMMUNICATIONS 224-25 (1994). 
 35. See id. 
 36. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 14. 
 37. Id. at 29; see also STARR, supra note 34, at 328. 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.  [Vol. 6:1 
 
the first “limited commercial stations.”38 
Between December 1, 1921, and December 1, 1922, the 
total number of U.S. radio stations rose from 23 stations to 570 
stations, with the total number of radio receivers in use in the 
United States numbering between 500,000 and 1,000,000.39  
Commentators predicted that broadcasting would “perfect 
democracy” by creating an electronic town square accessible to 
everyone, everywhere.40  As Americans’ standard of living and 
average salaries rose, so did their demand for access to radio 
programming.  As the demand for radio station licenses 
increased, the sales of radio receivers also increased 
dramatically.41 
Concerned that the burgeoning broadcasting industry 
needed more federal oversight, then Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover attempted to use the limited statutory 
authority granted to the Department of Commerce in the 1912 
Act to deny applications from stations for potential interference 
and to revoke licenses from stations causing interference.42  In 
1923, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that the Secretary lacked the authority to use 
potential interference as a reason for denying or revoking a 
broadcast license.  Furthermore, a federal district court  in 
Illinois held three years later that the Secretary had no 
authority under the 1912 Act to impose any restrictions on 
frequency, transmitter power, or hours of operation.43  Unable 
to regulate, Secretary Hoover embarked on a mission to foster 
self-regulation in the broadcast industry.44 
                                                          
 38. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 29 (citing Letter from William Downey to 
Kenneth Gapen 40 (May 8, 1932) (on file with National Archives Record 
Group)). The Bureau initially allocated only one frequency, 832.8 kHz, for use 
by all commercial radio stations.  Id. The increase in the number and 
transmitter power of stations depleted that allocation almost immediately, 
and the Bureau allocated a second frequency (618 kHz) to accommodate the 
overwhelming demand.  Id. 
 39. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 30. 
 40. See STARR, supra note 34, at 331. 
 41. BENSMAN, supra note 27, at 31. 
 42. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1004 (1923). 
 43. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. at 1006-07; United States v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926). 
 44. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 10-12 (St. 
Martin’s Press 3d ed. 1982).  In 1922, Secretary Hoover convened the first of 
four industry conferences devoted to discussing the federal response to the 
need for increased radio regulation.  Id. At the First Radio Conference, 
attendees decided unanimously that self-regulation would not be enough to 
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1. The Growing Cacophony 
Almost 600 commercial radio stations were on the air by 
the end of 1925, and because most of these stations were based 
in major metropolitan areas, the lack of comprehensive federal 
regulations governing frequency use, transmission power, and 
hours of operation resulted in unacceptable levels of 
interference.45  By that time, the federally allocated spectrum 
was already depleted and stations, aware that the federal 
government had no real enforcement authority, changed their 
frequencies and boosted their transmission power in the hopes 
of drowning out any newcomers.  As the Supreme Court noted 
in 1943, “With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.”46  
The broadcast industry was in such chaos that President 
Calvin Coolidge addressed the issue in his December 7, 1926, 
message to Congress: 
Due to the decisions of the courts, the authority of the Department [of 
Commerce] under the law of 1912 has broken down; many more 
stations have been operating than can be accommodated within the 
limited number of wave lengths available; further stations are in 
course of construction; many stations have departed from the scheme 
of allocations set down by the department, and the whole service of 
this most important public function has drifted into such chaos as 
seems likely, if not remedied, to destroy its great value.47 
Despite the President’s call for legislation, and the growing 
demand from industry participants themselves for more federal 
oversight, Congress was unable to agree on how best to 
structure a federal regulatory regime.48  It was not until 1927 
                                                          
facilitate the efficient and effective growth of broadcasting.  Id.  At the Third 
National Radio Conference in 1924, Secretary Hoover noted that the radio 
broadcasting industry “is probably the only industry in the United States that 
is unanimously in favor of having itself regulated.” Id. at 11 (citing quotation 
in SYDNEY W. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF TELEVISION 
AND RADIO, 126 (1976)). 
 45. Id. at 11. 
 46. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).  
It added: “Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its development as 
traffic control was to the development of the automobile.”  Id. at 213. 
 47. H.R. DOC. NO. 69-483, at 10 (1927). 
 48. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 12. The majority-Republican House 
of Representatives favored granting more expansive licensing and regulatory 
authority to the Secretary of Commerce, whereas the Democratic Senate 
wanted an independent and permanent commission dedicated to the 
regulation of the industry. Id.  Senator Clarence C. Dill (D-WA), chairman of 
the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, argued that the power and 
influence of radio broadcasting militated against the delegation of regulatory 
authority to the Secretary of Commerce alone, asserting that “[t]he exercise of 
this power is fraught with such possibilities that it should not be entrusted to 
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that the House and Senate agreed to create the independent 
Federal Radio Commission (FRC).49 
B.  CONGRESSIONAL CODIFICATION OF BROADCAST PUBLIC 
TRUSTEESHIP 
1. The 1927 Radio Act 
The Radio Act of 1927 created the FRC to serve for an 
initial trial period of one year and to adjudicate applications for 
station licenses, renewals, and certain technical permits.50  
Sections 9 and 11 of the 1927 Radio Act state that “the 
licensing authority . . . [shall] determine that the public 
interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the 
granting [of a broadcast license].”  Congress failed to define 
what it meant by “public interest” in either the statutory text 
or the legislative history.  This led one commentator to posit 
that the phrase meant “as little as any phrase that the drafters 
of the Act could have used and still comply with the 
constitutional requirement that there be some standard to 
guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing authority.”51 
The FRC not only was hampered by its temporary status; 
its work was impeded by the failure of Congress to appropriate 
any money for its operations.52  The effectiveness of the FRC 
                                                          
any one man nor to any administrative department of the Government.  This 
regulatory power should be as free from political influence or arbitrary control 
as possible.” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-772, at 2 (1926)). 
 49. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927); see also KRASNOW ET AL., 
supra note 44, at 12 (asserting that  most of the language of the final enacted 
version of the 1927 Radio Act originated in a bill introduced by Representative 
Wallace H. White of Maine in 1923, authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to 
serve as the “traffic cop of the air”). 
 50. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 12-13.  The nascent FRC was 
comprised of five members appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.  Id. at 13.  The Department of Commerce retained the 
power to assign station call letters and prescribe qualifications for licensees.  
Id. 
 51. Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or 
Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930), 
quoted in Mark Fowler & Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to 
Broadcast Regulation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 207, 214-15 (1982). 
 52. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 13. The FRC was, however, 
permitted to spend any unspent funds earmarked in the Department of 
Commerce budget for communications regulation. Id.  Congress allowed the 
FRC to hire a staff of twenty employees, including support staff and engineers, 
to assist the commissioners with building a regulatory structure to address a 
burgeoning industry in 1927 in which there were 732 stations with 129 of 
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was also limited by the vagueness of the 1927 Radio Act, which 
although stronger and clearer in its treatment of broadcast 
regulation than the 1912 Radio Act, still provided scant 
guidance to the regulators about the scope of their authority.53 
This state of affairs persisted through the change in 
presidential administrations.  In 1933, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt commissioned Daniel C. Roper, then Secretary of 
Commerce, to prepare a report proposing a new legislative and 
regulatory response to the broadcasting industry.54  The Roper 
Commission’s January 1934 report recommended the creation 
of a “new or single regulatory body, to which would be 
committed any further control of two-way communications and 
broadcasting.”55 
One of the Roper Commission’s points of deliberation 
involved the question of whether the United States should 
follow the lead of the United Kingdom and regulate 
broadcasting as a state-controlled, nonprofit enterprise funded 
with public money, or whether it should remain a private, 
commercial enterprise.56  Perhaps as its first lobbying coup, the 
newly formed National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) 
entered into an agreement with the American Newspaper 
Publishers Association in which the broadcasters agreed not to 
compete directly with the newspapers in the provision of news 
if the publishers would support the broadcasters in their efforts 
                                                          
those stations broadcasting on unauthorized frequencies that interfered with 
other stations’ signals. Id. (quoting LLEWELLYN WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO: 
A REPORT ON THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 
COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 200 (1947)); see also BENSMAN, supra 
note 27, at 200. 
 53. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 13-14.  The annual reauthorization 
statutes necessary for prolonging the FRC’s uncertain existence became a 
means of legislative retooling that threatened to further hamper the 
Commission’s effectiveness.  Id. at 14.  An example of Congress’s tinkering 
was the Davis Amendment to the1928 renewal act, which required the FRC to 
allocate radio station licenses evenly across all of the nation’s regions and 
states. Id.  The Davis Amendment passed on account of the suspicions of 
legislators from the South, West, Midwest who perceived the FRC as favoring 
high-powered stations in the North and East.  Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 14-15 (quoting STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS BY AN 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. 73D CONG. 144 (1934)).  The Report urged the 
consolidation of the communications regulatory functions of the FRC, 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Department of Commerce and the 
Postmaster General into the new comprehensive agency. Id. at 14. 
 56. See STARR, supra note 34, at 340-46. 
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to keep broadcasting private and commercial.57  The deal held 
and the Roper Commission decided against recommending the 
emulation of the British broadcasting model. 
2. The 1934 Communications Act 
After listening to demands for more expansive regulation 
from the Roper Commission, regulators, broadcasters and 
citizens alike, Congress enacted the Communications Act of 
1934 (1934 Communications Act), which established a 
permanently funded and staffed Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) with broad authority over all forms of 
telecommunication.58  The 1934 Communications Act 
incorporated most of the contents of the 1927 Radio Act, 
abolished the FRC, and directed that the new FCC make 
licensing decisions – specifically, decisions concerning grants of 
initial licenses as well as license renewals – in accordance with 
“public interest, convenience, or necessity.”59  The Act provides 
that all radio frequency spectrum in the United States is 
publicly owned.60  In that respect, broadcast radio frequencies 
can be likened to other valuable public resources, such as 
national forests and wildlife, over which the federal 
government and its delegates also serve as public trustees.61  
                                                          
 57. Id. at 40-41. 
 58. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (2000)). 
 59. 47 U.S.C. § 303.  The 1934 Communications Act specified a three-year 
term for broadcast licensees.  In 1981, the license term was extended to five 
years for television stations and seven years for radio stations.  Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1241(a), 95 Stat. 736 
(1981).  The broadcast license terms were extended once again, to eight years 
for television stations, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996  Pub. L. No. 
104-104, § 203, 110 Stat. 56, (1996). 
 60. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (“provid[ing] for the use of such channels, but not the 
ownership thereof”). 
 61. For an excellent history of the public trust doctrine in the 
environmental area, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).  
The public trust doctrine has its roots in the legal digests of the Sixth Century 
Roman Emperor Justinian, and specifically his concept of jus natural, or 
“natural law.”  See Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life 
into the Public Trust in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 31-32 (2000); 
see also Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust 
Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 728 (1989).  
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s leading and still binding case in this area, 
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) provides that the 
government must guard against the privatization of public trust resources and 
specifically:  
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Like its 1927 predecessor, the 1934 Communications Act did 
not define the term “public interest” nor elaborate on the 
obligation of broadcasters to be public trustees, instead 
delegating implicit authority to the FCC to interpret these 
obligations.62 
                                                          
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the 
whole people are interested . . . so as to leave them entirely under the 
use and control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its police 
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of 
the peace. 
Id. at 453. 
 62. See Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too 
Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L. J. 427, 447 (2001).  
According to Randolph J. May, senior fellow and Director of Communications 
Policy Studies at The Progress and Freedom Foundation, this delegation may 
violate the nondelegation doctrine, which requires Congress to make 
important policy choices itself and not delegate those decisions to agencies 
without providing those agencies with adequate guidance. Id. at 429, 434-35.  
May writes that the public interest standard of broadcast regulation “has 
proven so indeterminate that, in adopting it, Congress passed off to the new 
agency the power to make law in a way that would surely shock [John] Locke 
and the founders of our nation.”  Id. at 428.   
More than three hundred years ago, in the second of his famous Two 
Treatises, John Locke wrote that the legislature ‘cannot transfer the 
[p]ower of [m]aking [l]aws to any other hands.  For it being but a 
delegated [p]ower from the [p]eople, they, who have it, cannot pass it 
over to others.’ 
Id. at 427-28 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 380 
(Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1970) (1690)).  May acknowledged that the 
nondelegation doctrine has been dormant since its heyday in the 1930s, where 
the Supreme Court applied it to strike down delegations of authority in the 
National Industry Recovery Act, a New Deal law, in Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  Id. at 435-38.  He posits, nevertheless, that the 
public interest standard is so vague and devoid of statutory meaning that it 
fails to satisfy the contemporary nondelegation doctrine requirement that 
legislative delegations provide an “intelligible principle” to guide agency 
action.  Id. at 442-43. He concedes, however, that the current Supreme Court 
has upheld delegations of authority with little guidance, citing to the public 
interest standard as a constitutional delegation.  Id. at 443.  In Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’n, 51 U.S. 457, 474 (2001), Justice Scalia, writing for a 
unanimous Court, upheld delegations of legislative power in the Clean Air Act 
to the EPA by citing to the public interest standard as one example of a broad 
delegation of authority sustained by the Court.  Id. at  443-44.  And in 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) Justice Scalia noted that the 
Court would be hard pressed to strike down any delegation as “too vague to 
survive judicial scrutiny” when the Court has upheld the public interest 
standard.  Id. at 443 (citing 488 U.S. 361, 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  May’s 
argument is undermined by the fact that in the Schechter Poultry case, the 
Supreme Court expressly distinguished the Interstate Commerce Code, which 
itself contained vague delegation language – empowering the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to regulate railroads as “the public convenience and 
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C.  EARLY ATTEMPTS TO INTERPRET THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
STANDARD 
In its short seven-year existence, the FRC never issued a 
coherent definition of the public interest standard.  Instead, it 
made case-by-case determinations of individual station 
practices that satisfied the standard.  In May 1927, it allowed 
stations to increase daytime transmitting power when 
broadcasting “service programs,” which it defined as “those of 
educational and religious institutions, civic organizations, and 
distributors of market and other news.”63  The following year 
the FRC denied sixty-two stations permission to continue 
broadcasting because the stations had aired programming that 
was contrary to the public interest by containing false 
statements, personal attacks, and the excessive reliance on 
phonograph recordings to the detriment of local service.64  In 
announcing these decisions, the FRC declared that the primary 
interests at stake were not those of the broadcasters, but rather 
that “emphasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the 
convenience, and the necessity of the listening public.”65  The 
FRC interpreted the public trustee doctrine as requiring that 
broadcast stations “be operated as if owned by the public.”66  
Specifically, the FRC asserted that “[i]t is as if people of a 
community should own a station and turn it over to the best 
man in sight with this injunction: Manage this station in our 
interest. . . . The standing of every station is determined by 
that conception.”67 
In Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.,68 the FRC adjudicated a 
                                                          
necessity may require” – which served as a source of the vague “public 
interest, convenience and necessity” language in the 1934 Communications 
Act. See MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 2, at 4.; see also Louis G. Caldwell, The 
Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Radio Act 
of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930) (“‘Public interest, convenience or 
necessity’ means about as little as any phrase that the drafters of the [Radio] 
Act could have used and still comply with the constitutional requirement that 
there be some standard to guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing 
authority.”). 
 63. 1 F.R.C. 14 (1927). 
 64. 2 F.R.C. 16, 151-62 (1928). 
 65. Id. at 170. 
 66. The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service Responsibility 
of Broadcast Licensees, 11 FED. COMM. BAR J. 5, 14 (1950) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 67. Id. 
 68. 3 F.R.C. 32 (1929), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). 
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conflict among three Chicago area radio stations for a “clear 
channel” frequency.69  It determined that its selection of the 
prevailing station would be determined by the station with the 
best public interest broadcasting performance, defined as 
meeting the: 
tastes, needs and desires of all substantial groups among the 
listening public . . . in some fair proportion, by a well-rounded 
program, in which entertainment, consisting of music of both classical 
and lighter grades, religion, education and instruction, important 
public events, discussions of public questions, weather, market 
reports, and news, and matters of interests to all members of the 
family find a place.70 
In its decision, the FRC emphasized the importance of 
broadcasters’ duty to create a “marketplace of ideas” for the 
public, declaring that “the public interest requires ample play 
for the free and fair competition of opposing views” and “that 
[this] principle applies . . . to all discussions of issues of 
importance to the public.”71 
The FRC also asked about programming and public 
interest content in initial station applications and license 
renewals, including the requirement that applicants list the 
amount of weekly programming aired in six categories 
classified as “entertainment,” “religious,” “commercial,” 
“educational,” “agricultural,” and “fraternal.”72 
                                                          
 69. A “clear channel” is a frequency that is reserved nationally for only 
one station or a very small number of stations located far apart.  Clear 
channels prevent any risk of distant channel interference caused by 
atmospheric conditions.  See STARR, supra note 34, at 349. 
 70. Great Lakes Broadcasting, 3 F.R.C. at 34. 
 71. Id. at 33. 
 72. Jurisdiction of Radio Comm’n Hearings on H.R. 8825 Before the House 
Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-26 
(1928).  The FRC also applied a broad definition of public interest in denying 
renewals to licensees whose programming contravened public health and 
safety.  For example, in 1930 the FRC denied the license renewal application 
of KFKB, a station in Milford, Kansas, because its operator, Dr. John 
Brinkley, operated the station exclusively for his own commercial interest and 
not that of the public.  KFKB Broadcasting Ass’n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 672 
(D.C. Cir. 1931).  Dr. Brinkley apparently treated the station as a means of 
building his experimental “goat gland” medical practice.  The main 
programming on the station consisted of three daily programs featuring Dr. 
Brinkley answering medical questions from his listeners. Id. Noting that the 
doctor’s answers usually included a recommendation for pharmaceuticals that 
he marketed himself, it concluded that the licensee’s practice of diagnosing 
patients over the radio, in the absence of any in-person examination, was 
contrary to the public health and therefore not public interest programming. 
Id. 
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Although the FCC’s birth in 1934 fostered a more 
comprehensive federal approach to communications regulation, 
it did not result in a more precise articulation of the public 
interest standard.  In the FCC’s first decade, devising a 
workable, standard definition of public interest programming 
was not a priority.73  To the contrary, although its predecessor 
had reviewed station programming for public interest content 
in license renewal proceedings, the FCC discontinued that 
practice, instead approving license renewal applications in 
groups, essentially rubberstamping the recommendations of the 
FCC’s engineering, legal, and accounting departments, which 
performed a content-neutral review of station performance.74 
Some early FCC licensing decisions did, however, contain 
references to the importance of the public trustee doctrine in 
educating the electorate on pressing issues of public concern.  
For example, in Mayflower Broadcasting Corp.,75 the 
Commission clarified that the statutory duty to broadcast in 
the “public interest” imposed on licensees the obligation to be 
“sensitive to the problems of public concern in the community 
and to make sufficient time available, on a non-discriminatory 
basis, for the full discussion thereof.”76  Similarly, in 
Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp. (WMBQ),77 the FCC 
instructed that a licensee had “a recognized duty to present 
well-rounded programs on subjects which may be fairly said to 
constitute public controversies of the day within the framework 
of our democratic system of government.”78 
1. The “Blue Book” 
Facing criticism for its piecemeal approach to defining 
what duties were required of broadcast public trustees, the 
FCC finally turned to clarifying the public interest 
programming requirements for broadcasters under the 1934 
Communications Act in the early 1940s.  FCC Commissioner 
Clifford J. Durr began abstaining from voting upon station 
license renewal applications, reasoning that the renewal 
                                                          
 73. See Bill F. Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Flow: The 
FCC’s Weak Track Record in Interpreting the Public Interest Standard, 60 N.C. 
L. REV. 1057, 1061-62 (1982). 
 74. See id. 
 75. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).  
 76. Id. at 340. 
 77. 8 F.C.C. 577 (1941). 
 78. Id. at 577. 
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applications did not contain enough information on whether 
and how the licensees had been offering public interest 
programming to their listeners.79  In response to Commissioner 
Durr’s demands, the FCC in 1946 released a staff report 
entitled “Public Service Responsibilities of Broadcast 
Licensees,” which became widely known as the “Blue Book” 
because of its blue cover, and which served as the FCC’s first 
policy statement explaining the 1934 Communications Act’s 
public interest standard.80 
The Blue Book specified that licensees were required to 
devote an “adequate” amount of broadcast time to the coverage 
of local, national and international issues of public concern.81 It 
instructed broadcasters that they were expected to air a 
“reasonable” number of “sustaining” programs, meaning 
programs not sponsored by commercial advertising but funded 
by the broadcaster itself, and local live programming.82  It 
warned licensees that they should limit advertising to “a 
reasonable amount” of overall programming time.83  A new 
FCC broadcast license renewal form required applicants to 
report on their program offerings in six categories: education, 
entertainment, news, religion, discussion and talks.84 
Broadcasters fought the Blue Book vehemently.85  Soon 
after its release, NAB President Justin Miller waged a three-
month lobbying campaign, attacking the Blue Book’s 
articulation of public interest programming preferences as 
invalid under the 1934 Communications Act and the First 
Amendment.86  Growing weary of the NAB’s intensifying 
lobbying, the FCC distanced itself from the Blue Book’s 
programming requirements.  For the next fourteen years, the 
FCC rarely addressed public interest programming and seldom 
invoked the Blue Book requirements.  Although the license 
                                                          
 79. See Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1062, n.20 (citing CENTER FOR THE 
STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION IN A FREE SOCIETY 7 (1959)). 
 80. FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 
(1946) [hereinafter Blue Book]. 
 81. Id. at 12-39. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 40-47. 
 84. Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1063 n.24 (citing FCC, BROADCAST 
APPLICATION, § IV at 1 (1947)). 
 85. Id. at 1063 n. 25 (citing Richard J. Meyer, Reaction to the “Blue Book,” 
6 J. BROADCASTING 295 (1962)). 
 86. Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1063 n.25. 
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renewal forms still required the information on public interest 
programming addressed in the Blue Book, those disclosures 
were largely ignored by the Commission’s application 
reviewers.87 
By the late 1950s, several FCC Commissioners and much 
of the viewing public had grown frustrated with the FCC’s 
failure to elucidate and actually enforce the public interest 
standard.  The quiz show scandals in 1958 and 1959, which 
involved the very high-profile rigging of highly rated television 
quiz shows, and the radio disc jockey “payola” controversy, 
where disc jockeys accepted money from record promoters in 
exchange for playing their records on the air, also motivated a 
number of watchdog groups, private citizens, and elected 
officials to demand that the FCC impose and enforce more 
meaningful public interest standards on broadcasters.88 
2. The 1960 Programming Statement 
The Commission attempted again to articulate coherent 
and meaningful public interest programming requirements in 
the “1960 Programming Statement.”89  Unlike the Blue Book, 
and perhaps to avoid the lobbying frenzy that the Blue Book 
                                                          
 87. Id. at 1064 (citing ERIK BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN 
THE UNITED STATES: THE GOLDEN WEB 228, 292-93; Address by Commissioner 
K. Cox, “Public Services Responsibilities of Broadcast Stations,” to Boston 
Federal Executive Board (Sept. 9, 1965)).  An example of the laxity of the 
FCC’s approach to evaluations of the quality and quantity of public interest 
programming was its treatment of the license renewal application of station 
WOAX, which had refused to air any public interest programming.  A senior 
officer of the licensee’s parent corporation, in fact, had directed that public 
interest programming should not be broadcast on the station.  6 Rad. Reg. (P 
& F) 1101, 1101-03 (1950).  Despite warnings from the FCC that the station 
needed to improve its public interest record, the Commission did not take 
action against the licensee’s license, although it did reprimand the station’s 
management and refused to grant permission for expanded facilities.  See 15 
F.C.C. 270, 271 (1950); see also 6 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1101, 1101 (1950).  For 
additional examples of the FCC’s lax enforcement of the Blue Book standards, 
see Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1064 n.28. 
 88. See Commission Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2303-05 
(1960) (en banc); see also THOMAS A DELONG, QUIZ CRAZE: AMERICA’S 
INFATUATION WITH GAME SHOWS 218-26 (1991); HALBERSTAM, DAVID, THE 
FIFTIES 643-66 (1993).  The quiz show scandals received so much press 
attention that Congress held hearings on the matter.  See Hearings on 
Television Quiz Shows Before a Special Subcomm. on Legislative Oversight of 
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1959) (pt. 1). 
 89. See generally Commission Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 
(1960) (en banc). 
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sparked, the 1960 Programming Statement noted that the First 
Amendment required that licensees be given broad latitude and 
discretion in meeting their public interest duties.90  Whereas 
the Blue Book threatened to deny renewal of broadcast licenses 
in the absence of a record of compliance with the public interest 
requirements, the 1960 Programming Statement made no such 
explicit warning.  Instead, it attempted to balance the First 
Amendment right of licensees to decide the content and nature 
of their own programming with the statutory duty of 
broadcasters to air public interest programming.91  The 
Statement clarified that although the First Amendment 
forbade the Commission from dictating programming content, 
the licensee was bound by the 1934 Communications Act to 
broadcast in the public interest in exchange for its free use of 
broadcast spectrum. 
The 1960 Programming Statement prescribed that the 
FCC would grant broadcast license applications only to those 
licensees who had demonstrated that they had been operating 
their stations in the public interest.92  The 1960 Statement also 
provided a nonexhaustive, nonexclusive list of fourteen “major 
elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs 
and desires of the community in which the station is located.”93  
Those elements were: 
(1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use 
of local talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) 
educational programs, (6) public affairs programs, (7) editorialization 
by licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) agricultural programs, (10) 
news programs, (11) weather and market reports, (12) sports 
programs, (13) service to minority groups, and (14) entertainment 
programs.94 
                                                          
 90. See id. at 2306-08, 2311-14, 2316. 
 91. See id. at 2308, 2314. 
 92. See id. at 2309, 2310, 2315.  It stated that the “principal ingredient” of 
a licensee’s public interest broadcasting compliance was a “diligent, positive 
and continuing effort . . . to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs and desires of 
his service area.”  Id. at 2312.  It emphasized that the licensee was required to 
proactively ascertain the public interest programming most needed by the 
members of the station’s viewing audience, and not depend on the FCC to 
prescribe a certain public interest formulation. Id. at 2314. The Statement 
clarified that the “honest and prudent judgments” of the licensee in 
determining community public interest programming needs would “be 
accorded great weight by the Commission.”  Id. 
 93. Commission Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. at 2314. 
 94. Id. In propounding this list, the Statement warned that they are 
“neither all embracing nor constant . . ..  [T]hey do not serve and have never 
been intended as a rigid mold or field formula for station operation.” Id. The 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
24 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.  [Vol. 6:1 
 
The 1960 Statement did not define these various public 
interest programming elements, nor instruct stations or the 
FCC application reviewers themselves on what amount or 
combination of these elements would satisfy the broadcaster’s 
public interest programming requirements under the 1934 Act.  
The list was so broad that broadcasters were hard-pressed to 
find programming that could not be characterized as fitting at 
least one of the enumerated categories of public interest 
programming. 
The 1960 Statement also directed broadcasters to 
determine the needs, tastes and desires of their communities of 
license in order to air programming responsive to those needs.  
This resulted in the FCC’s adoption of formal “ascertainment” 
rules, which required broadcasters to document interviews with 
community members in a variety of different areas.95 
3. FCC Reluctance to Enforce the 1960 Statement 
The FCC rarely cited the Statement in reviewing 
broadcasters’ license renewal applications.  For nearly two 
decades, the FCC’s Broadcast Bureau, the division of the FCC 
to which the Commissioners delegated authority to review and 
recommend a grant or denial of renewal applications, rarely 
recommended denial of license renewal applications on the 
grounds that the licensee had failed to satisfy its public interest 
                                                          
1960 Policy Statement also dispensed with the Blue Book’s preference for 
“sustaining” (licensee-underwritten) instead of commercially sponsored 
programming. The 1960 Statement clarified that commercial sponsorship may 
enable viewers to have access to more public interest programming.  See id. at 
2315. 
 95. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast 
Applicants, Report and Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 656-58 (1971).  The 
Commission enforced the 1960 Statement by means of a revised license 
renewal form that took the Commission over four years to draft and adopt. See 
Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1066.  The revised form required that the 
licensee document its efforts to ascertain and meet the “needs and interests of 
the public served by the station.”  Id. at 1066 n. 44.  The form instructed the 
applicant to detail its efforts in three principal programming categories: 
“public affairs,” “news” and “all other programs, exclusive of Entertainment 
and Sports.” Id. at 1067 n. 45.  The form defined “public affairs” programs as 
including “talks, commentaries, discussions, speeches, editorials, political 
programs, documentaries, forums, panels, round tables, and similar programs 
primarily concerning local, national and international affairs.” Id.  “Political 
programs” were “those which present candidates for public office or which give 
expression (other than in station editorials) to views on such candidates or on 
issues subject to public ballot.” Id. 
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programming requirements.96  The Broadcast Bureau would 
perform an apparently superficial review of renewal applicants’ 
public interest programming representations, and would then 
recommend license renewal to the Commissioners in large 
groups of sometimes hundreds of applications at a time.97  
Although individual Commissioners would, from time to time, 
protest the laxity in the Commission’s application (or lack 
thereof) of the 1960 Statement, their protests were unheeded 
by colleagues.98  For the two decades following the 1960 
Statement, the Commission rarely investigated a station’s 
compliance with its public interest broadcasting 
requirements.99  When it did, it almost always approved the 
renewal of the license, with no penalties, despite a record of 
minimal or no public interest programming.100 
                                                          
 96. See Chamberlin, supra note 73, at 1068-69. 
 97. See, e.g., Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for Indiana, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee, 1973, 42 F.C.C.2d 900 (1973) (approving the renewal, en masse, of 
374 license renewal applications). 
 98. For example, in 1967, the Commission granted en masse the license 
renewals of 265 stations in Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee over the 
objections of Commissioners Kenneth Cox and Nicholas Johnson, who found it 
unacceptable that 39 of these stations had devoted less than 1% of their 
weekly programming schedule to “public affairs” programming, and 12 had 
proposed less than 5% news programming.  See In re License Renewals in 
Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee, 10 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 944, 944-46 (1967) 
(Cox and Johnson, Comm’rs, dissenting).  Six years later, the Commission 
approved the renewal of 374 licenses en masse over the dissent of 
Commissioner Johnson, who took issue with the majority having “approv[ed] 
the behavior of yet another batch of stations, some good and some bad, without 
its ever enunciating any criteria by which to judge whether the licensees’ 
performance serves the public interest.”  Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for 
Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee, 1974 342 F.C.C. 2d 900, 900 (Johnson, 
Comm’r, dissenting); see also Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for Arkansas, 
Louisiana & Mississippi, 42 F.C.C.2d 3, 3 (1973) (Johnson, Comm’r, 
dissenting). 
 99. See, e.g., Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal 
Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 27 F.C.C.2d 580, 
586-87 (1971) (Notice of Inquiry). 
 100. See e.g., Titanic Corp., 34 F.C.C.2d 501 (1972) (approving the license 
renewal of Duluth, Minnesota FM radio station WGGR despite station’s 
adoption of an “all-music” format with regularly commercial advertising and 
little or no news or public affairs programming).  In rare cases where the 
Commission penalized the station by, for example, renewing the license for a 
shortened term (e.g., 18 months instead of the standard 3-year license term), a 
station’s failure to provide adequate public interest programming was usually 
coupled with serious violations of the Commission’s technical or operational 
rules, which are not related to programming content. See, e.g., Application of 
WSER, Inc., Elkton, MD for Renewal of License, 29 F.C.C.2d 441 (1971) 
(granting short-term license renewal as penalty for FCC rule violations 
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4. The Codification of the Fairness Doctrine 
In addition to issuing its 1960 Statement, the FCC in the 
early 1960s attempted to clarify the requirements of the 
fairness doctrine, which until that point had existed as a 
scattered series of statements in a number of decisions and 
orders spanning the previous three decades.101  Congress 
codified the “standard of fairness” in its 1959 Amendments to 
the Communications Act of 1934, where it reminded 
broadcasters of their “obligation . . . to operate in the public 
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion 
of conflicting views on issues of public importance.”102 
As ultimately interpreted by the FCC, the fairness doctrine 
consisted of two interrelated obligations:  First, broadcasters 
were required to cover vitally important controversies in their 
communities; and second, in doing so, broadcasters were 
required to provide a reasonable opportunity for the 
presentation of contrasting viewpoints.103  The U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine in 
1969’s Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, where it emphasized the 
important role of broadcasters in promoting “an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas.”104 
                                                          
involving improperly licensed personnel, falsification of station operating logs, 
improper transmitter operating power and, as an incidental element, the 
broadcasting of “public affairs” programming accounting for only 1.11 percent 
of the station’s programming schedule). 
 101. For example, in 1929, the FRC declared that the public trustee 
doctrine required broadcasters to devote “ample play for the free and fair 
competition of opposing views . . .  [on] all issues of importance to the public.” 
See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. 32, 33 (1929), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).  In 
1949, the FCC again declared that the public trustee doctrine required 
broadcasters to cover issues of public importance, and it characterized as 
“paramount” the “right of the public to hear a reasonably balanced 
presentation of all responsible viewpoints” during such coverage.  
Editorializing by Broadcasting Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1258 (1949). 
 102. 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2584; 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000); see also Jerry V. 
Haines, Political Broadcasting Amendments to the Communications Act of 
1934, in THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAJOR 
AMENDMENTS 1934-1996 176 (Max D. Paglin, ed., 1999). 
 103. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 110-11 (1973); see also The Handling of Public Issues Under the 
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications 
Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 1-3 (1974) (Fairness Report), recon. denied, 58 
F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. 
FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 104. 396 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
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D.  DEREGULATION AND THE DE FACTO DEATH OF THE PUBLIC 
TRUSTEE DOCTRINE 
The 1980s ushered in a sea of change in the FCC’s 
regulatory approach.  The FCC was now led by political 
appointees steeped in the Chicago School’s sanctification of free 
markets as the infallible purveyors of the public interest.105 
Abandoning any pretense of enforcing the public trustee 
doctrine, in the 1980s the FCC embarked on a “private 
marketplace” approach to broadcast regulation.  The reoriented 
FCC viewed its role as regulating only when marketplace 
competition failed.  Mark Fowler, the FCC Chairman appointed 
by President Reagan, made his deregulatory philosophy clear 
by declaring that “television is just another appliance, it’s a 
toaster with pictures.”106  In a 1982 Texas Law Review article 
co-authored with Daniel Brenner, Fowler asserted that in the 
new media marketplace, “traditional broadcasting is just one of 
many information delivery systems.”107  Accordingly, Congress 
and the FCC needed to “focus on broadcasters not as fiduciaries 
of the public, as their regulators have historically perceived 
them, but as marketplace competitors.”108  Fowler argued that 
in prescribing “public interest” programming, the FCC violated 
both the First Amendment and Section 326 of the 
Communications Act (which forbids government censorship of 
broadcast licensees).109  Speaking to a broadcast industry 
association early in his tenure as chairman, Fowler encouraged 
a marketplace approach to regulation: 
I believe that we are at the end of regulating broadcasting under the 
trusteeship model . . . . Under the coming marketplace approach, the 
Commission should, so far as possible, defer to a broadcaster’s 
judgment about how best to compete for viewers and listeners because 
this serves the public interest.110 
Fowler’s marketplace approach to regulation prevailed and 
the Commission eliminated many of its broadcast regulations, 
                                                          
 105. See e.g. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators 
Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962). 
 106. Bernard D. Nossiter, Licenses to Coin Money: The FCC’s Big Giveaway 
Show, 241 NATION 402 (1985) (quoting a radio speech delivered by Mark 
Fowler). 
 107. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 51, at 210. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 217-18. 
 110. Mark S. Fowler, The Public’s Interest, Address at a Meeting of the 
International Radio and Television Society (Sept. 23, 1981), in 4 COMM. & L. 
51, 52 (Winter 1982). 
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including the requirements to ascertain community 
programming needs, maintain program logs, air minimum 
amounts of public affairs programming and limit advertising 
time.111  It announced that it would “no longer routinely review 
a licensee’s programming in the uncontested renewal 
context”112 because the marketplace itself would correct the 
deficiencies of individual television stations in airing public 
interest programming. 113  The FCC eliminated many of its 
public trustee requirements for license renewals114 and 
instituted a “postcard renewal” mechanism, whereby renewal 
applications are filed by means of a small postcard form which 
virtually guaranteed renewal without any meaningful review of 
a licensee’s performance.115  It also increased the term of 
television licenses from three to five years116 and increased the 
total number of stations one entity could own from twenty-one 
to thirty-six stations (twelve each in television, AM radio, and 
FM radio).117  The FCC’s sweeping deregulation efforts also 
                                                          
 111. See TV Deregulation Order, supra note 12, at 1099; see also 
Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 977-90 (1981), aff’d in part and 
remanded in part sub nom. Office of Communications of the United Church of 
Christ v. FCC, 709 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 112. 98 F.C.C.2d at 1093. When a station’s license renewal application is 
contested by means of a Petition to Deny filed by, for example, an aggrieved 
citizen taking issue with the licensee’s failure to air programming responsive 
to local needs and issues, the Commission declared that the station “should be 
able to respond by pointing not only to its own programming that may have 
addressed such issue, but also to other television stations available in the 
community that could reasonably have been relied upon to address such 
issues.”  Id. at 1094. 
 113. See id. at 1087 (“It appears . . . that the failure of some stations to 
provide programming in some categories is being offset by the compensatory 
performance of other stations.  In this respect, market demand is determining 
the appropriate mix of each licensee’s programming.”). 
 114. See 47 U.S.C. 309(k) (2000).  The FCC may also impose a forfeiture 
sanction (i.e., a fine) for violations of specific rules. Forfeiture Proceedings, 62 
Fed. Reg. 43,474, 43,475 (Aug. 14, 1997) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 1.1-1.8004 
(2001)).  The FCC may also grant a shortened license renewal term as a quasi-
probationary period for licensees with concerning public interest records.  See 
Children’s Television Order, supra note 18, at 10,662-63. 
 115. See Revision of Applications for Renewals of License of Commercial 
and Non-Commercial AM, FM and Television Licensees, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & 
F) 740, 741 (1981). 
 116. See Amendment to Section 73.1020 of t he Commission’s rules: Station 
License Period, 88 F.C.C.2d 355, 355 (1981).  Congress authorized the 
extension of license terms by means of the 1981 appropriations law, Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). See id. 
 117. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple 
Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,877, 
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included its elimination of the fairness doctrine in 1987, 
reasoning that it contravened the First Amendment by chilling 
the speech of broadcasters.118 
The evisceration of the public trustee doctrine continued 
into the 1990s.  In 1993, the FCC ruled that licensees of “home 
shopping” broadcast television stations “are serving the public 
interest, convenience and necessity.”119  The FCC made this 
decision despite a record showing that these stations devote 
virtually all of their airtime to product advertising and sales 
programming delivered by satellite uplink, with almost no 
airtime devoted to the airing of local public interest 
programming.120 
On the heels of such sweeping deregulation, it is no wonder 
that the FCC’s broadcast license renewal system is a “farce.”121  
Absent serious technical, ownership, or criminal violations, 
license renewals today are essentially “rubber-stamped” 
                                                          
para. 5 (August 9, 1984).  The “seven station” rule had prohibited an 
individual from holding a cognizable ownership interest in seven television, 
seven AM radio and seven FM radio stations.  The revised rule allowed for a 
total of 12 stations in each service.  The FCC also shut down a proceeding 
initiated in 1977 to designate a common standard for AM Stereo broadcasting 
by refusing to specify a standard, claiming that “a reliance on market forces . . 
. is the most prudent course to follow.”  See Radio Broadcast Services, AM 
Stereophonic Broadcasting, 47 Fed. Reg. 13,152, 13,155 (Mar. 29, 1982).  The 
FCC proclaimed that its reliance on marketplace forces to determine a 
broadcast standard “is a bold, new step for the Commission to take.”  Id. at 
13,158.    Marketplace forces never coalesced around one AM stereo standard, 
and AM stereo never became a viable medium.  See Bruce C. Klopfenstein & 
David Sedman, Technical Standards and the Marketplace: The Case of AM 
Stereo, 34 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 171, 181-85 (1990). 
 118. See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station 
WTVH, Syracuse, New York, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049-50 (1987), recon. denied, 3 
F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), aff’d sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 
654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). 
 119. Implementation of Section 4(g) of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 5321, 5328 para. 36 (1993) 
(Home Shopping Station Issues). 
 120. Id. In light of the Commission’s declaration, cable systems were 
required to treat home shopping channels the same as all other local television 
channels in carrying them on the basic cable subscription tier in compliance 
with the “must carry” provisions of section 4(g)(2) of 1992 Cable Act. Id. at 
para. 37. 
 121. Todd Shields, Copps Criticizes Broadcast License Renewals, 
WWW.MEDIAWEEK.COM, 23 July 2003 (quoting FCC Commissioner Michael 
Copps).  Copps also quipped, “It’s not called ‘postcard renewal’ for nothing.”  
Molly Peterson, North Carolinians Air Complaints About FCC Media Rules, 
CONGRESS  DAILY, Oct. 27, 2003, at 6. 
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regardless of the applicant’s record as a public trustee.122  
There has been no revocation of a television station license for 
failure to satisfy the public interest standards in a half century, 
and the Commission has renewed licenses of stations with 
absolutely no local news and public affairs programming.123  
Speaking of the FCC’s deregulatory era, Reed Hundt, FCC 
Chairman under President Bill Clinton, declared that “[t]he 
FCC essentially dismantled the public interest standard in the 
early 1980s by conflating the ‘public interest’ with anything 
sponsors will support.”124 
                                                          
 122. Commissioner Copps has been quoted as saying, “We’ve strayed too 
far from the rigorous licensing process that we used to have.  Now, unless 
you’re a wife beater or a child molester or something like that, you can pretty 
much count on getting your license by just filing some papers.” Edmund 
Sanders, FCC to Scrutinize License Renewals, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 30, 
2003, at C9; see also David Ranii, Media Activists Feeling Feisty, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 4, 2003, at D1. 
 123. See Henry Geller, Mass Communication Policy: Where We Are And 
Where We Should Be Going, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 290, 304 
(Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990); see also Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigm for 
Broadcast Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 527, 533 (1996) (noting that “the 
Commission for at least fifteen years has not taken away a single one of the 
approximately 1,500 Television licenses or 10,000 radio licenses in this 
country for failure to serve the public interest”).  Although private citizens can 
review their local station’s public inspection file to review their claims of 
public interest programming, the FCC does not require those claims to be 
specific.  Andrew Schwartzman the President of the Media Access Project, 
says: “Nobody looks at these files because they are pointless and not specific 
enough to be able to make a public interest assessment.”  Sallie Hofmeister, Is 
Broadcast TV Worth Saving?, CHICAGO TRIB. (June 8, 2003), at 4.  In its 
Comments submitted in the 2000 Public Interest Obligations Proceeding, 
People for Better TV quoted Helen Grieco, President of California NOW, in 
describing her experience reviewing two public inspection files: 
Earlier this month I visited two stations, KTVU-TV and KRON-TV.  
While these stations provide a standard list of community issues, it is 
clear from the program reports to the FCC that this list isn’t worth 
the paper it’s printed on.  Not only are their lists so generic as to be 
unhelpful, it’s clear that they don’t change from quarter to quarter 
(quite unlike the challenges in our very diverse community). 
Comments of People for Better TV, Public Interest Obligations of TV 
Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket 99-360 at 17-18 (filed Mar. 27, 2000).  People 
for Better TV also quotes other community leaders who attempted to review 
their local stations’ public inspection files and were refused and turned away, 
one station in South Carolina recommending that the viewer file a Freedom of 
Information Act request. Id. at 27-28. 
 124. Reed E. Hundt, The Public’s Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest 
Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1094 (1996).  In 
arguing for the promulgation and enforcement of clearer public interest 
requirements, Hundt reasoned: 
[I]t is clear that Congress meant to require broadcasters to do more 
than what they would do anyway in order to compete in the video 
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1. Telecommunications Act of 1996 
Media deregulation continued into the 1990s, reaching its 
apex in the 1996 Telecommunications Act (1996 Act), the most 
sweeping and complex reform of federal telecommunications 
law since 1934.125  A central purpose of the 1996 Act was the 
elimination of many significant cross-market barriers that 
prohibited market players in one industry from providing 
service in other sectors. 126 
The Act further deregulated the broadcast industry, 
eliminating all restrictions on the total number of radio 
stations owned by one company or individual at one time127 and 
ending the national television station ownership cap.128  The 
Act raised the limit of common ownership of television stations 
to thirty-five percent of the U.S. population, up from twenty-
five percent (set in 1985),129 and directed the FCC to revisit the 
issue of the caps on the common ownership of television 
stations in one local market (known as the television duopoly 
                                                          
marketplace for audience and for advertising revenue.  There would 
be no need for the Commission to determine whether a licensee is 
serving the public interest if all that means is that the broadcaster is 
in business competing against other broadcasters and other providers 
of video programming . . . . Clearly, broadcasters are subject to 
distinct public interest obligations not imposed on other media. 
Id. at 1090. 
 125. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)) (amending the 
Communications Act of 1934). 
 126. For example, subject to a showing of competition in the local telephone 
marketplace, the “Baby Bell” regional telephone companies were allowed to 
enter the long distance and cable marketplace, long distance companies could 
offer local service, and cable television companies – whose rates were 
deregulated – could offer telephone service. 
 127. See 47 U.S.C § 253(a) (establishes that no rule or regulation “may 
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide 
any interstate commerce or intrastate telecommunications service”).  
Supporters of the elimination of the radio ownership cap, such as Senator 
Conrad Burns (R-Mont.), reasoned that with 11,000 radio stations and an 
average of 25 stations in each market, there was sufficient diversity and 
competition in American radio and that ownership limits were superfluous.  
Senator Burns declared that “[r]adio operators are ready to . . . operate 
without stifling ownership rules.  They need total deregulation to allow them 
to compete in the new digital marketplace.” S.R. REP. NO. 104-23 at 65 (1995). 
 128. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(c)(1)(A) (eliminates 
“restrictions on the number of television stations that a person or entity may 
directly or indirectly own, operate, or control, or have a cognizable interest 
in”). 
 129. Id. § 202(c)(1)(B) (increases “the national audience reach limitations 
for television stations to 35 percent”). 
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rule).130  It also ordered the FCC to review all of the broadcast 
ownership rules biennially to determine “whether any of such 
rules are necessary in the public interest as a result of 
competition” and to “repeal or modify any regulation it 
determines to be no longer in the public interest.”131 
Despite its deregulatory impetus, the 1996 Telecom Act 
encompassed a number of new directives justified, in part, by 
the public trustee doctrine.  Recognizing that “television 
influences children’s perception of the values and behavior that 
are common and acceptable in society,” the 1996 Telecom Act 
incorporated the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 
which required all new television sets with screens larger than 
13 inches to be equipped with “V-chips” that allow parents and 
guardians to block programs with graphic sex or violence not 
suitable for children.132  The Telecom Act also directed the FCC 
to develop a television ratings code in the event the broadcast 
industry failed to develop and adopt its own system.133 
E.  VERY LITTLE QUID FOR LOTS OF QUO: BROADCASTERS’ 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE SURVIVING PUBLIC INTEREST 
REQUIREMENTS 
Today, television and radio broadcasters still enjoy the 
privileges of their status as public trustees, but there is little 
public service required of them.  Several of the requirements 
imposed on television licensees, justified by the public trustee 
doctrine, include the duty to provide equal employment 
opportunities, to not discriminate on the basis of any federally 
protected status, and to incorporate into their station signals 
closed captioning for the deaf and a video description service for 
the blind.134 
                                                          
 130. Id. § 202(c)(2).  In the Conference Report for the 1996 Telecom Act, 
Congress directed the FCC to “revise the rule as is necessary to ensure that 
broadcasters are able to compete fairly with other media providers while 
ensuring that the public receives information from a diversity of media voices.”  
142 Cong. Rec. H 1145 (1996). 
 131. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h).  
 132. Id. §§ 551(a)(1), 551(c). 
 133. Id. § 551(b)(1). 
 134. See Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of 
Broadcast Licensees, Report and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 226, 229-30 (1976); FCC 
Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. pt. 79 (2003); Television Decoder Circuitry 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-431, 104 Stat. 960 (1990) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§303(u)); Closed Captioning and Video Description of Video Programming, 
Implementation of Section 305 of the Telecommunications Act of 1997, Video 
Programming Accessibility, 11 F.C.C.R 19,214 (1996) (Report). 
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1. Locally Responsive Programming 
Perhaps the most important of the remaining public 
interest programming requirements is that broadcasters air 
“programming that responds to issues of concern to the 
community”135 and maintain and make publicly available 
quarterly reports documenting such programming.136  The FCC 
continues to recognize that such programming is important to 
maintaining an informed electorate and promoting deliberative 
democracy. 
Despite the core importance of localism to the public 
trustee doctrine, recent studies demonstrate that commercial 
television broadcasters are airing little or no locally-oriented 
public interest programming.  In a January 2000 two-week 
study of the programming schedules of 142 commercial 
broadcast stations across twenty-four television markets, 
Professor Philip M. Napoli concluded that broadcasters aired 
an average of only 1.1 hours of local public affairs programming 
per station, with an average overall total of only 6.52 hours of 
local public affairs programming per television market (i.e., 
metropolitan area).137  Of the 47,712 hours of broadcast 
programming on the surveyed stations, a mere 156.5 hours or 
0.3% were devoted to local public affairs programming, and 
1.06% was devoted to both local and non-local (regional or 
national) public affairs programming.138  These figures 
contrasted sharply with the 4.6% of local public affairs 
programming broadcast between 1973 and 1979.139  Napoli 
concluded that broadcasters devote very little broadcast time to 
public affairs programming and that marketplace incentives 
have failed to motivate the provision of such programming.140 
                                                          
 135. TV Deregulation Order, supra note 12, at 1077. 
 136. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.3526 (2004); FCC 
Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. 73.3527 (2004). 
 137. PHILIP M. NAPOLI, MARKET CONDITIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
PROGRAMMING: IMPLICATIONS FOR DIGITAL TELEVISION POLICY, REPORT 
PREPARED FOR THE BENTON FOUNDATION 9 (2000).  Napoli applied the FCC’s 
own definition of “public affairs programming,” which includes: “programs 
dealing with local, state, regional, national or international issues or 
problems, documentaries, mini-documentaries, panels, roundtables and 
vignettes, and extended overage (whether live or recorded) of public events or 
proceedings, such as local council meetings, congressional hearings and the 
like.”  Id. at 4 (citation omitted). 
 138. Id. at 9. 
 139. TV Deregulation Order, supra note 12, at 1081. 
 140. Napoli, supra note 137, at 15.  He writes: 
[A]lthough larger markets provide a greater aggregate amount of 
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An October 2003 study of forty-five commercial television 
stations in seven media markets found that less than one-half 
of one percent of total programming was devoted to local public 
affairs.  It concluded that “there is a near blackout of local 
public affairs [programming]” on commercial television.141  By 
contrast, 14.4% of the surveyed stations’ programming 
consisted of home shopping and “infomercial” shows, 9.9% 
consisted of reality and game shows, and 7.9% consisted of 
sporting events.142  These findings, and similar findings by 
other researchers,143 contradict the fundamental justification 
for the FCC’s sweeping 1984 deregulation order which posited 
that broadcast licensees “will continue to supply informational, 
local and non-entertainment programming in response to 
existing as well as future marketplace incentives.”144 
Some broadcasters have argued that their local news 
programming – some of which includes several hours each 
weekday in some larger markets like New York, Los Angeles 
and Washington, D.C. – encompasses significant local public 
affairs (and therefore, public interest) coverage.  These claims 
are contradicted, however, by a 1999 study by the Project for 
Excellence in Journalism, which examined the local news 
                                                          
local public affairs programming, individual stations do not respond 
to increasingly competitive market conditions by producing more 
public affairs programming.  Nor, for that matter, do they respond by 
reducing the amount of local public affairs programming they provide 
. . . . Thus, the provision of local public affairs programming appears 
highly resistant to economic influences. 
Id. 
 141. See ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, supra note 13; see also Jennifer Harper, 
Study Finds ‘Near Blackout’ of Local Public Issues on TV, WASHINGTON 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2003, at A10. 
 142. See ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, supra note 13. 
 143. See, e.g., MEDIA ACCESS REPORT AND THE BENTON FOUNDATION, 
WHAT’S LOCAL ABOUT LOCAL BROADCASTING (April 1998), available at 
http://www.benton.org/publibrary/television/whatslocal.html (last visited 
October 14, 2004).  The report revealed that in a two-week programming 
survey of five television markets (Chicago, IL, Phoenix, Ariz., Nashville, TN, 
Spokane, WA and Bangor, ME), the forty commercial broadcasters provided 
only 46.5 hours (out of 13,250 total programming hours), or 0.35% of the total 
programming schedule, of local public affairs programming, which it defined 
as “programs devoted to local issues of governance or civic affairs.”  In three of 
the surveyed markets – Nashville, TN, Spokane, WA, and Bangor, ME – there 
was no local public affairs programming aired at all during the two-week 
survey.  Thirty-five percent of the stations surveyed provided no local news 
programming whatsoever and 25% offered no local programming at all, 
offering only national network or satellite syndicated programming.  See id. 
 144. TV Deregulation Order, supra note 12, at 1080. 
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offerings of the top-rated commercial broadcast stations in 
twenty cities over a two-week period.145  That study found that 
most news stories are low quality, “superficial and reactive.”146  
In addition, it is now common practice for network affiliate 
stations to devote significant portions of their already scarce 
local news programs to the promotion of network programming, 
network entertainment celebrities, as well as the recent 
releases of affiliated enterprises, like motion picture studios.147 
An important form of locally responsive programming is 
coverage of political campaigns and elections.148  A 2002 study 
of 10,000 local news broadcasts on 122 stations in the top fifty 
markets concluded that less than half (44%) of local television 
news broadcasts devoted any coverage at all to political 
campaigns in the seven weeks leading up to the November 
2002 elections.149  Fifty-six percent of broadcasters provided no 
political campaign coverage whatsoever.150  Of the forty-four 
percent of stations that aired any political campaign coverage, 
less than fifteen percent were about local campaigns, including 
races for the U.S. Congress.151  The average political story 
lasted less than ninety seconds, and fewer than thirty percent 
of the campaign stories featured candidates speaking for 
themselves.152  Of those, the average candidate sound bite was 
                                                          
 145. See Tom Rosenstiel et al., Local TV News, What Works, What Flops 
and Why, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, Jan/Feb 1999, available at 
http://archives.cjr.org/year/99/1/pej/main.asp. 
 146. Id.; see also Jim Upshaw, Network Profit Motive Cheats Voters Out of 
Information, THE OREGONIAN, December 17, 2000, at F1 (“Stressed by daily 
ratings data, many newsrooms tailor coverage more to the hour’s hot cultural 
buzz than to long-term social concerns”).  Network news programs also have 
tailored much of their programming to sensationalistic, tabloid-like fare in 
order to draw more viewers and keep them tuned in throughout the entire 
broadcast.  See id. 
 147. ROBERT MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDIA 85-86 (Monthly 
Review Press) (2004) (citing multiple examples, like CBS affiliates’ regular 
“reports” on contestants on the “Survivor” reality program and ABC affiliates’ 
promotion of Disney’s 2001 motion picture “Pearl Harbor”). 
 148. See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 14 F.C.C.R. 
21,633, 21,647 (1999) (Notice of Inquiry) (“The Commission has long 
interpreted the statutory public interest standard as imposing an obligation 
on broadcast licensees to air programming regarding political campaigns”). 
 149. THE LEAR CENTER LOCAL NEWS ARCHIVE, LOCAL TV NEWS COVERAGE 
OF THE 2002 GENERAL ELECTION 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.localnewsarchive.org/pdf/localTV2002.pdf. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 5. 
 152. Id. at 4. 
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only twelve seconds long.153  In 2000, the Center for Media and 
Public Affairs documented that seventy-one percent of the 
network news election coverage focused not on the substance of 
the campaigns, but on the “horserace” elements (i.e., which 
candidate was ahead in the polls and by how much).154  It also 
reported that network evening news coverage of the 
presidential candidates dropped from forty-three seconds in 
1968 to less than eight seconds in 2000.155 
Of all political coverage, perhaps the most important to our 
democracy is coverage of the Democratic and Republican 
presidential nominating conventions.  Here too, broadcasters 
have cut their coverage significantly.  In 1972, ABC, CBS and 
NBC devoted 180 hours of total airtime to both party 
conventions.156  In 2000, that figure plummeted to a scant 
twenty-two hours total.157  In 2004, the party conventions were 
almost absent from free commercial television.  Each of the 
three major broadcast networks aired only three hours of live 
programming for each of the conventions.158  At 8:05 p.m. on 
July 26, 2004, the opening night of the Democratic National 
Convention, Al Gore, former Vice President and winner of the 
popular vote in the 2000 presidential race, addressed the 
delegates.  Instead of Gore’s speech, network television viewers 
on the East Coast were treated to reruns of situation comedies 
on ABC and CBS, and reality programming on Fox and NBC.159  
                                                          
 153. Id. 
 154. Campaign 2000 Final: How TV News Covered the General Election 
Campaign, MEDIA MONITOR, Nov./Dec. 2000.  
 155. Id.  
 156. See Editorial, Prime-time Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, July 15, 2004, at 
A10 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Ostrow, supra note 16; see also Jim Rutenberg, Network Anchors 
Hold Fast to Their Dwindling 15 Minutes, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2004, at P1.  
Jim Lehrer, who anchored extensive convention coverage on behalf of the 
Public Broadcasting Service, addressed the following complaint to the lead 
anchors of the ABC, CBS and NBC evening news programs: 
We’re about to elect a president…at a time when we have young 
people dying in our name overseas, we just had a report from the 9/11 
commission which says we are not safe as a nation, and one of these 
two groups of people is going to run our country.  The fact that you 
three networks decided it was not important enough to cover in prime 
time, the message that gives the American people is huge.  As a 
citizen, it bothers me. 
Id. 
 159. See, e.g., TV Guide (Metropolitan New York City Edition), July 26, 
2004. 
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CBS directed viewers interested in convention coverage to its 
website (www.cbs.com) while NBC directed viewers to its cable 
networks, MSNBC and CNBC.160  Thus, television viewers 
without broadband Internet connections, or cable or satellite 
television subscriptions, had very little access to live convention 
coverage and analysis. 
2. Political Broadcasting 
Consistent with congressional directives, the FCC requires 
broadcasters to provide “equal opportunities” (also known as 
“equal time”) to candidates for public office if their opponents 
buy commercial time or are provided airtime by a station.161  
This rule received attention in the days leading to the 
presidential election, when television station group owner 
Sinclair Broadcast Group ordered all sixty-two of its stations, 
many located in what were considered swing states (e.g., 
Florida and Ohio), to air “Stolen Honor: Wounds that Never 
Heal,” a documentary produced by a Bush family friend that 
was widely denounced as blatant anti-Kerry propaganda.162  
Sinclair reversed its decision, and aired what was considered a 
more balanced program, only after the company lost stock 
value and advertising as a result of negative attention.163       
In addition to the equal opportunities rule, broadcasters 
also must provide candidates for federal elective office 
“reasonable access”164 to advertising slots and charge 
candidates the “lowest unit charge of the station” for the “same 
class and amount of time for the same period” during the forty-
five days preceding a primary election and sixty days preceding 
a general or special election.165 
Although broadcasters do not air much locally-oriented 
political programming, they do air and profit enormously from 
the large quantity of political advertising.  In the 2000 election, 
broadcasters earned $600 million in political ad revenues from 
candidates and political parties.  In 1996, that figure was $400 
                                                          
 160. See Ostrow, supra note 16. 
 161. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000); FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 
C.F.R. §73.1941 (2004). 
 162.  See Paul Farhi, Sinclair Stations to Air Anti-Kerry Documentary, 
WASH. POSTL, Oct. 11, 2004, at A07.  
 163. See Marjorie Heins and Adam H. Morse, A Question of Fair Air Play, 
LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at 68. 
 164. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1944 (2004). 
 165. See id. § 73.1942. 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
38 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.  [Vol. 6:1 
 
million.166  A number of advocates for regulatory reform have 
argued in favor of having Congress require commercial 
television broadcasters to provide free blocks of prime time for 
use by federal political candidates to introduce themselves and 
explain their positions.167  The broadcast lobby defeated those 
efforts by invoking First Amendment concerns.168 
3. Children’s Educational Programming 
The Children’s Television Act of 1990 and the 
Commission’s implementing regulations require that 
broadcasters serve the “educational and informational needs of 
children.”169  They also require that advertising on 
programming directed at children be limited to 12 minutes per 
hour during weekdays and 10.5 minutes during weekends.170  
In addition, the FCC encourages, but does not require, 
television broadcasters to air three hours of educational 
children’s programming per week.171 
Although the three-hour weekly children’s educational 
programming guideline is the only quantified public interest 
“expectation” imposed upon broadcasters, here too the 
                                                          
 166. Jeff Cohen, T.V. Industry Wields Power in D.C., BALTIMORE SUN, May 
4, 1997 at 6F.  Former Senator and presidential candidate Bill Bradley 
bemoaned the expense of political advertising by saying: “Today’s Senate 
campaigns function as collection agencies for broadcasters.  You simply 
transfer money from contributors to television stations.”  Id. 
 167. See, e.g., Comments of Alliance for Better Campaigns, et al., Public 
Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-390, at 1 
(filed Mar. 27, 2000) (“A free time requirement would ensure that citizens 
have access to the information they need to choose their representatives while 
also furthering the broadcasters’ longstanding, but oft-neglected, obligation to 
serve the public interest”). 
 168. See, e.g., Comments of the Nat’l Assoc. of Broadcasters, Public Interest 
Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-390, at 20-30 (filed 
Apr. 25, 2000).  
 169. See Children’s Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 103(a)(2) (1994).; 
FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.671(2004).  In enacting the 
Children’s Television Act, Congress noted that “market forces have not worked 
to increase the educational and information programming available to 
children.”  S. REP. NO. 101-227, at 9 (1989). 
 170. See 47 U.S.C. § 102(b); FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 
73.670. 
 171. See Children’s Television Order, supra note 18, at 10,721; 47 C.F.R. § 
73.671 (2004). The Commission also adopted a more precise definition of what 
would qualify as children’s educational and informational programming:  “any 
television programming that furthers the educational and informational needs 
of children 16 years of age and under in any respect, including children’s 
intellectual/cognitive or social/emotional needs.”  Id. at 10,698 
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broadcasters have emphasized profit over service.  After the 
three-hour educational programming guideline was introduced 
in 1996, the Wall Street Journal reported that advertising 
agencies, which are always looking for ways to target children, 
viewed it as a “marketing bonanza.”172  In fact, children 
represent one of the most hotly contested television audiences, 
considering that industry studies show that children can 
influence upwards of $500 billion per year in family 
purchases.173 
Although the FCC’s new children’s educational 
programming guidelines were a boon for advertisers, they have 
resulted in little programming benefit for children.  In fact, the 
New York Times reported in 1997 that instead of creating new 
educational children’s programming, many broadcasters simply 
reclassified some of their existing Saturday morning children’s 
entertainment fare as educational programming.174 
4. Obscenity and Indecency 
Relying on Congressional mandates and the public trustee 
doctrine, the FCC’s rules prohibit broadcasters from airing 
“obscene” programming, and require that “indecent” 
programming be restricted to between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 
a.m.175  Indecency is defined as “language or material that, in 
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community broadcast standards for 
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or 
activities.”176 
                                                          
 172. Sally Goll Beatty, White House Pact on TV for Kids May Prove a 
Marketing Bonanza, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1996, at B10. 
 173. See Kim Campbell & Kent Davis-Packard, How Kids Get to Say, I  
Want It, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 18, 2000, at 1; see also Gary 
Ruskin, Why They Whine: How Corporations Prey on Our Children, 
MOTHERING MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 1999 (quoting Mike Searles, president of 
Kids-R-Us children’s stores, characterizing the children’s advertising 
philosophy as “if you own this child at an early age, you can own this child for 
years to come”), available at http://www.mediaawareness.ca/english/resources/ 
articles/advertising_marketing/corp_pray_child.cfm. 
 174. Lawrie Mifflin, Can You Spell ‘Compliance,’ Boys and Girls? Networks 
Go Along, but Just Barely, With New Federal Rules on Children’s Shows, N. Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, at C13. 
 175. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2004); 47 
U.S.C. § 303 (2000); see also Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 
654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding the Constitutionality of the indecency 
restrictions). 
 176. Action for Children’s Television, 58 F.3d at 657. 
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Here too, the FCC has assumed a strikingly permissive 
enforcement attitude, only reverting to a more aggressive 
regulatory stance when subjected to public scrutiny.  In an 
October 2003 decision, the FCC’s enforcement bureau 
determined that NBC did not violate the rule when Bono, the 
lead singer of the Irish rock band U2, uttered “f—-ing brilliant” 
during an acceptance speech at the 2003 Golden Globe Awards.  
The FCC determined that Bono’s use and NBC’s uncensored 
broadcast of the word was not indecent because it was 
“adjectival” and did not describe a sexual function.177  After 
enduring weeks of ridicule in the print media and on the 
Internet, the FCC reversed its decision and ruled that the 
expletive indeed was indecent.178  No such reversal was 
possible in the matter of the exposure of singer Janet Jackson’s 
right breast at the end of her televised Super Bowl 2003 half-
time performance.  Although Jackson claimed the exposure was 
inadvertent and attributable to a “wardrobe malfunction,” the 
incident – on one of the most watched programs of the year – 
generated a firestorm of public protest, and provided elected 
officials and political candidates entering an election year with 
an irresistible opportunity to speak in support of family values 
and decency on the airwaves.179  Indeed, on September 22, 
2004, the FCC proposed that Viacom, Inc., pay $550,000 in 
fines for the Super Bowl stunt.180 
5. The “Huge Giveaway” - The Transition to Digital Television 
The most controversial aspect of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act involved its provisions concerning the 
national transition to digital television (DTV).181  Since 1941, 
                                                          
 177. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their 
Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,859, 19,861 
(2003) (Memorandum Opinion and Order); see also Frank Ahrens, FCC 
Chairman Seeks Reversal on Profanity, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2004, at E1. 
 178. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their 
Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4978 (2004) 
(Memorandum Opinion and Order). 
 179. See Bill McConnell, Get Ready to Rumble, BROADCASTING AND CABLE 
MAGAZINE, July 5, 2004, at 3; Bill McConnell, Set for a Showdown, 
BROADCASTING AND CABLE MAGAZINE, July 26, 2004, at 24. 
 180. Press Release, FCC, FCC Proposes Statutory Maximum Fine of 
$550,000 Against Viacom-Owned CBS Affiliates for Apparent Violation of 
Indecency Rules During Broadcast of Super Bowl Halftime Show (Sept. 22, 
2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
252384A1.doc. 
 181. DTV has become synonymous with “Advanced Television” or ATV, 
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the nation’s broadcasters have reached their viewers by means 
of analog signals formatted according to a standard developed 
by the National Television System Committee (NTSC).182  In 
response to broadcast industry concerns that the existing 
analog television system was becoming obsolete, the FCC 
issued a Notice of Inquiry in 1987.183  Upon execution of the 
inquiry, the FCC identified a new advanced broadcasting 
standard known as “High Definition Television” (HDTV).  High 
Definition Television is also referred to as Enhanced Digital 
Television or “EDTV,” and both fall under the category of 
digital television technology, or “DTV”184 
The FCC touted DTV as a “quantum leap” in broadcasting 
technology.185  Whereas traditional television has limited 
capacity or “bandwidth” and is prone to signal attenuation due 
to terrain and harsh weather, DTV uses a digital signal, 
consisting of binary code that has tremendous capacity.186  In 
the same amount of radio frequency spectrum allotted to one 
standard analog broadcast channel – 6 MHz – DTV can 
transmit a picture with resolution quality rivaling 35-
millimeter film and sound quality equivalent to digital audio 
formats, such as compact discs and Internet mp3 song files.187  
Digital Television is also able to multicast and datacast within 
the same 6 MHz television “channel.”  Using compression 
technology, a broadcaster is able to multicast several 
“subchannels” along with its main station signal, with quality 
                                                          
which initially referred to a number of television technologies, analog and 
digital, designed to take the place of analog television.  For an excellent 
overview of the terminology and technology involved in the DTV transition, see 
Daniel P. Graham, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital Age, 1 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 97, 99-100 (2003). 
 182. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, MM Docket No. 87-268, 2 F.C.C.R. 5125, para. 5 
(1987) (Notice of Inquiry). 
 183. See id. at ¶ 2;  see also FCC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ADVANCED 
TELEVISION SERVICE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATION 2-3 (Nov. 28, 1995). 
 184. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, 6520 n.1 (1988); Public Interest 
Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 14 F.C.C.R 21,633, 21,634 para. 3 
(1999). 
 185. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,542 para. 11 (1995). 
 186. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 6 F.C.C.R. 7024 (1991). 
 187. See id. at 7024 para. 1, n.1. 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
42 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.  [Vol. 6:1 
 
superior to that of traditional broadcasting.188  For example, a 
broadcaster could simultaneously air a syndicated talk show on 
its main station channel and a children’s cartoon program, an 
old movie, an “infomercial,” and a stream of CD-quality music 
on four of its subchannels.189 
Because the language of DTV is the same as that of 
personal computers and computing devices, DTV will allow the 
integration of new services.  In addition to airing a main 
station signal and individual “subchannels,” the DTV spectrum 
broadcasts data (“datacast”), such as information about 
advertised products, Internet links, sports and weather 
information, and stock market information.190  The FCC 
characterized this capacity in its 1996 report: 
Utilizing [HDTV], broadcasters can transmit three, four, five, or more 
such program streams simultaneously.  [HDTV] allows for the 
broadcast of literally dozens of CD-quality audio signals.  It permits 
the rapid delivery of large amounts of data; an entire edition of the 
local daily newspaper could be sent, for example, in less than two 
seconds.  Other material, whether it be telephone directories, sports 
information, stock market updates, information requested concerning 
certain products featured in commercials, computer software 
distribution, interactive education materials, or virtually any other 
type of information access can also be provided.  It allows 
broadcasters to send video, voice and data simultaneously and to 
provide a range of services dynamically, switching easily and quickly 
from one type of service to another.191 
At the beginning of its DTV proceeding, the FCC proposed 
that broadcasters “be given the opportunity to implement 
[HDTV]”192 in order to offer Americans “programs with 
                                                          
 188. See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 14 F.C.C. 
21,633, 21,634 para. 3 (1999) (“DTV holds the promise of reinventing free, 
over-the-air television by offering broadcasters new and valuable business 
opportunities and providing consumers new and valuable services”). 
 189. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,774-75 para. 5 (1996). 
 190. Id.; see also Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the 
Existing Television Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,820-21 para. 29 
(1997) (explaining that DTV broadcasters are able to offer non-broadcast 
“ancillary and supplementary” services by means of excess capacity in their 
DTV channel, such as pay-per-view programming, computer software 
distribution services, private data transmissions teletext services, “and any 
other services that do not interfere with the required free service”); NICHOLAS 
NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 52-53 (1995). 
 191. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,774-75 para. 5 (1996). 
 192. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, para. 4 (1992). 
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significantly improved video and audio quality.”193  This 
requirement would have limited the ability of broadcasters to 
exploit the multicast and datacasting capabilities of their new 
digital channels.  In response to industry lobbying, the FCC 
later withdrew the requirement for a minimum amount of high 
definition programming.  Instead, the FCC declared that 
broadcasters would be required to air at least one free, over-
the-air signal with “resolution . . . comparable to or better than 
that of today’s service.”194  The FCC reasoned that allowing 
broadcasters the flexibility to multi- and datacast and offer 
priced ancillary and supplementary services would provide 
broadcasters “the opportunity to develop additional revenue 
streams from innovative digital services.”195  The FCC 
concluded that this revenue “will help broadcast television . . . 
remain a strong presence in the video programming market 
that will, in turn, help support a free programming service.”196  
The concern was less about offering “pretty pictures” and more 
about encouraging broadcasters to optimize all technical 
capabilities of the new digital spectrum.197  The FCC reached 
the following conclusion: 
We do not know what consumers may demand and support.  Since 
broadcasters have incentives to discover the preferences of consumers 
and adapt their service offerings accordingly, we believe it is prudent 
to leave the choice up to broadcasters so that they may respond to the 
demands of the marketplace.  A requirement now could stifle 
innovation as it would rest on a priori assumptions as to what 
services viewers would prefer.  Broadcasters can best stimulate 
consumers’ interest in digital services if able to offer the most 
attractive programs, whatever form those may take....  Further, 
allowing broadcasters flexibility as to the services they provide will 
allow them to offer a mix of services that can promote increased 
consumer acceptance of digital television, which, in turn, will increase 
broadcasters’ profits, which, in turn, will increase incentives to 
proceed faster with the transition.198 
In exchange for greater freedom in the use of their new 
digital channels, the 1996 Act requires broadcasters to pay the 
federal government a fee of five percent of gross revenues 
                                                          
 193. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, para. 1 (1988). 
 194. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,820 para. 28 (1997). 
 195. Id. at para. 29. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,826 para. 42. 
 198. Id. 
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received from their provision of any ancillary and 
supplementary services.199 
6. The High Price of “Free” Over-the-Air Television 
Unlike the adoptions of the color image and stereo sound 
standards, which did not render older television sets obsolete, 
the transition to DTV will require all viewers to either 
purchase new digital television sets or a “set-top converter 
box.”200 To facilitate the transition of American broadcasting 
from analog to digital format, the 1996 Telecom Act provided 
broadcasters with an additional 6 MHz “channel” of spectrum 
to use for DTV service.  These new digital channels are 
“located” in a higher frequency band that allows broadcasters 
to transmit significantly more information in a 6 MHz-wide 
channel. 
Television broadcasters were required to begin 
simulcasting fifty percent of the video programming on their 
standard analog signal on their DTV channel by April 1, 2003, 
seventy-five percent by April 1, 2004, and one hundred percent 
by April 1, 2005.201  “Simulcasting” describes “the broadcast of 
one program over two channels to the same area at the same 
time.”202 
The simulcasting requirements during the transition 
period were intended to encourage viewers to adopt DTV 
technology and phase out viewers’ dependence on the standard 
analog channel for programming not yet available on the DTV 
channel.203  December 31, 2006 is currently the deadline for full 
DTV transition and termination of NTSC analog 
broadcasting.204  However, Congress provided that the FCC 
could extend the deadline for individual stations.205  To receive 
an extension, eighty-five percent of a station’s viewers must be 
unable to receive its digital signal either by means of a digital 
television set or a converter box or through a cable or satellite 
                                                          
 199. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(e) (2000); Fees for Ancillary or Supplementary 
Use of Digital Television Spectrum Pursuant to Section 336(e)(1) of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 3259, 3267 para. 20 (1998). 
 200. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 5 F.C.C.R. 5627, para. 8, n.1 (1990). 
 201. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.624(f)(i)-(iii) (2004). 
 202. 5 F.C.C.R.  at para. 8, n. 1. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(A) (2000). 
 205. See id. § 309(j)(14)(B). 
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television provider.206  On December 31, 2006, or when a 
broadcaster’s digital signal has achieved eighty-five percent 
market penetration, whichever is later, broadcasters must 
surrender their former NTSC channels to the FCC, and the 
FCC will then auction the spectrum for non broadcast uses.207  
When the surrender of NTSC channels occur, it is possible that 
as many as fifteen percent of viewers will not have access to a 
DTV television, a set-top converter or a cable or DBS 
subscription.  Therefore, they will have no access to “free” 
television broadcasts. 
7. The Public Trustee Doctrine in the Digital Landscape 
When the FCC initiated the transition from analog to 
digital television, it emphasized that “although many aspects of 
the business and technology of broadcasting may be different, 
broadcasters will remain trustees of the public’s airwaves.”208  
The FCC clarified that it limited the eligibility for DTV 
channels to existing broadcasters because broadcasters would 
continue to have an “obligation to serve the public interest.”209  
It declared: “[w]e remain committed to enforcing our statutory 
mandate to ensure that broadcasters serve the public 
interest.”210 
Congress’s decision to grant the additional 6 MHz channel 
to broadcasters for digital exploitation was hotly contested.211  
Many commentators insisted broadcasters should have paid 
fair market value for the new channels.212  For example, 
                                                          
 206. See id. § 309(j)(14)(B). 
 207. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, para. 66 (1992) (stating “[t]he more swiftly ATV 
receiver penetration increases, the more rapidly we will be able to reclaim one 
6 MHz channel”). 
 208. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,829-30 paras. 49, 50 (1997) (“As we 
authorize digital service . . . broadcaster licensees and the public are on notice 
that existing public interest requirements continue to apply to all broadcast 
licensees.  Broadcasters and the public are also on notice that the Commission 
may adopt new public interest rules for digital television.”). 
 209. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Television Broadcast Service, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,545-56 para. 33 (1995). 
 210. Id. at 10,546 para. 34. 
 211. See Michael Calabrese, The Great Airwaves Robbery, New America 
Foundation Public Assets Program, Spectrum Series no. 2, Nov. 2001, p. 1; 
Taylor, supra note 21, at 20; Joel Brinkley,  FCC Approves 2d Channels for 
High-Definition Television, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1997, at D1; see Farhi, supra 
note 22, at F1. 
 212. See Neil Hickey, What’s at Stake in the Spectrum War? Only Billions 
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conservative commentator William Safire, who is known for his 
defense of the free market, called Congress’s grant of the new 
spectrum to television broadcasters for free, without any 
auction proceeding and without any additional public interest 
commitments from broadcasters, a “rip-off on a scale vaster 
than dreamed of by yesteryear’s robber barons.”213  Congress 
required the FCC to auction licenses for a number of new 
digital, nonbroadcasting services, such as cellular and paging 
services, which generated $20 billion dollars for the United 
States Treasury.214 
Media and academic commentators estimated the value of 
the digital spectrum “handout” at between $12.5 billion and 
$365 billion.215  Some commentators argued that giving 
broadcasters an additional 6 MHz for digital broadcasting was 
excessive216 because a 6 MHz digital “channel” offers many 
times the bandwidth of a 6 MHz analog channel.  Digital 
compression technology creates a broadband pipeline capable of 
                                                          
of Dollars and the Future of Television, 35 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 39, 40 
(1996).  Another commentator called it the “lobbying coup of the decade.” 
Taylor, supra note 21, at 20. 
 213. Taylor, supra note 21, at 20. 
 214. See Graham, supra note 181, at 97, 112 (citing Press Release, Federal 
Communications Commission, FCC Hits $20 Billion Mark in Total Auction 
Revenues, at 
http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News_Releases/nrwl6015.txt)). 
 215. See The Third of a Trillion Giveaway, CENTER FOR DIGITAL 
DEMOCRACY, Sept. 18, 2001, at www.democraticmedia.org (last visited Nov. 
27, 2004); Paul Farhi, Broadcast Executives Say Dole Vented Anger at Them, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at F1; Romesh Ratnesar, A Bandwidth Bonanza: 
How the Networks Plan to Make Even More from a $70 Billion Handout, TIME, 
Sept. 1, 1997, at 60; Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New 
Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. 
L. REV. 1687, 1728 (1997); Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2560; Taylor, 
supra note 21, at 20. 
 216. See e.g., Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the 
Existing Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,813-14 para. 10 (1997) 
(citing comments by the Media Access Project, arguing the FCC should only 
allocate broadcasters enough spectrum to broadcast one high definition digital 
television signal which is considerably less than 6 MHz of spectrum allocated); 
see also Graham, supra note 181, at 111 (quoting the Office of Communication, 
Inc. of the United Church of Christ et. al.).  
Now broadcasters want to build a new and improved business on 
more rent-free property while still holding their original allocation 
and not committing to the date they are going to give any of it back.  
This is a great deal for broadcasters.  But is it a good deal for the 
public who will have to reinvest billions of dollars in television 
receivers in order to gain access to the new business, Advanced 
Television?   
Id. 
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transmitting multiple, separate television signals and services 
on a 6 MHz channel.217  Moreover, broadcasters are not 
required to utilize the new digital spectrum to transmit high 
definition signals.  Instead, Congress and the FCC allowed 
broadcasters to use the spectrum according to marketplace 
demands, thereby allowing broadcasters to generate revenue 
from a spectrum that would otherwise be used to broadcast 
DTV.218 
Broadcasters called the “rip off” argument a “myth.”219  
They argued because their analog channels would be returned 
after the digital transition period, the additional 6 MHz of 
spectrum was a “loan.”220  Belo, an owner of 18 major market 
television stations across the country, argued the DTV 
transition imposes “immense financial burdens”221 on 
broadcasters, because after the transition broadcasters “will be 
in the same position they were prior to the transition – they 
each will have one 6 MHz television channel.”222  This industry 
argument ignores the rather obvious fact that comparing 6 
MHz of digital spectrum with 6 MHz of analog spectrum is like 
comparing 6 square miles of Upstate New York farmland with 
6 square miles of Midtown Manhattan real estate.  The latter is 
significantly more lucrative and can accommodate many more 
profitable uses than the former.  Broadcasters’ complaints 
about the financial burden of acquiring and maintaining new 
digital transmission equipment, estimated at between $1 
million to $30 million per station,223 overlook the significant 
profit-making benefits they will reap from the new digital 
capabilities of multicasting, datacasting and subscription 
services. 
By codifying the DTV transition plan in the 1996 Telecom 
                                                          
 217. Id. 
 218. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,821 para. 29 (1997). 
 219. Comments of Belo, Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast 
Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at iv (filed Mar. 27, 2000). 
 220. Id. at 18-19 (reasoning that “the second channels . . . are merely being 
loaned to broadcasters so that they may simulcast analog and digital 
programming while viewers upgrade to digital television sets.  Without this 
approach, stations would be forced to switch to digital transmission overnight, 
leaving millions of viewers with dark and silent television sets the next day”). 
 221. Id. at iv (estimating the total cost of the DTV conversion at $17 
billion). 
 222. Id. at 19. 
 223. See Graham, supra note 181, at 113 (citing JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING 
TELEVISION: THE BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF TELEVISION 204 (1997)). 
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Act, Congress affirmed that broadcasters remain public 
trustees after the transition to DTV: “Nothing in this section 
shall be construed as relieving a television broadcasting station 
from its obligation to serve the public interest, convenience and 
necessity.”224  Accordingly, the FCC declared that 
“[b]roadcasters and the public are also on notice that the 
Commission may adopt new public interest rules for digital 
television.”225 
8. The Gore Commission 
In 1997, conscious of public discord concerning the grant of 
digital spectrum to broadcasters, President Bill Clinton 
established the Presidents’ Advisory Committee on the Public 
Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, 226 
popularly known as the “Gore Commission” because Vice 
President Gore supervised it.227  The twenty-two-member 
commission represented “the commercial and noncommercial 
broadcasting industry, computer industries, producers, 
academic institutions, public interest organizations, and the 
advertising community.”228  Its final report recognized that the 
conversion to digital television “invites a broad reassessment of 
established programming practices, competitive strategies, and 
regulatory requirements, including the public interest 
obligations, that have always been considered fundamental to 
broadcast television in this country.”229  The Gore Commission 
called the public interest standard the “golden thread that has 
run through more than seven decades of broadcasting,”230 and 
made ten recommendations for additional public interest 
obligations digital broadcasters should assume in exchange for 
                                                          
 224. 47 U.S.C. § 336(d) (2000) (“In the Commission’s review of any 
application for renewal of a broadcast license for a television station that 
provides ancillary or supplementary services, the television licensee shall 
establish that all of its program services on the existing or advanced television 
spectrum are in the public interest.”). 
 225. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing 
Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,830 para. 50 (1997). 
 226. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,065, 12,065 (Mar. 13, 1997). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST 
OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL 
BROADCAST FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC 
INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS 3 (Dec. 18, 
1998), available at www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.pdf. 
 230. Id. at 2. 
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the benefit of the new digital channel.  Most notable of these 
recommendations were mandatory public affairs programming 
requirements,231 free airtime for political candidates to present 
and defend their positions,232 the donation of datacasting 
services (such as voting and public hearings information, public 
safety and health announcements, and educational and local 
public affairs programming) to community and educational 
institutions,233 and the creation of a public broadcasting “trust 
fund” to ensure the development of quality digital public 
programming, while providing permanent funding that would 
remove public broadcasting out of the political arena.234 
9. The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry on DTV Public Interest 
Obligations 
On June 3, 1999, “People for Better TV,” a broad coalition 
of public interest organizations, medical and educational 
associations, and other groups filed a petition for rulemaking 
and notice of inquiry with the FCC.235  The coalition asserted 
that “the advent of digital broadcasting requires the 
Commission to consider public interest obligations anew, and 
clarify whether existing guidelines apply.”236  It urged the FCC 
to open a proceeding to “articulate a digital public interest 
standard that matches in scope and effectiveness the 
magnificent capability of the digital television technology . . . 
.”237  Specifically, it requested that the Commission consider 
adopting all of the Gore Commission’s recommendations “as a 
starting point”238 and that it reinstitute the public interest 
programming requirements enumerated in the 1960 
Programming Policy Statement.239 
                                                          
 231. Id. at 48. 
 232. Id. at 59 (proposing that “the television broadcasting industry to 
provide 5 minutes each night for candidate-centered discourse in the 30 days 
before an election . . . .  Stations would choose the candidate and races, 
Federal, State and local, in the election that deserved more attention”). 
 233. Id. at 52-54. 
 234. FINAL REPORT, supra note 229, at 50. 
 235. Petition by People for Better TV for Rulemaking and Notice of 
Inquiry, Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket 
No. 99-360 (filed June 3, 1999).   
 236. Id. at 7.  
 237. Id. at 22.  
 238. Id. at 17. 
 239. Id. at 17-18.  It also requested that the Commission place special 
emphasis on services to the disabled and non-English speakers, public access 
opportunities to multicast subchannels, privacy protection and rate regulation 
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The FCC released a notice of inquiry on December 20, 
1999.240  Several months later, then-FCC Chairman William 
Kennard received a joint letter from Senators Byrd, 
Brownback, Lieberman, and McCain expressing their concern 
about the content of contemporary television broadcasting and 
urging the Commission to demand higher programming 
standards from broadcast licensees:241 
[T]he time has come for the Commission to engage in a broad 
reexamination of the public interest standard, and the license 
renewal process, to determine if in fact the broadcasters are serving 
‘the public interest, convenience, and necessity,’ and whether the 
standard of service we expect of broadcasters should be clarified.242 
In addition to the Senators’ letter, the FCC received 
comments from a variety of broadcasters and individuals and 
public sector organizations.  Predictably, many of the public 
interest advocates agreed with, and added to, the initial 
demands presented by People for Better TV in its initial 
petition,243 while the broadcast commentators argued 
                                                          
for pay-per-view programming. Id. at 20. 
 240. See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, 15 F.C.C.R. 
22,946 (1999) (Notice of Inquiry). 
 241. BILL KENNARD, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
OBLIGATIONS OF TELEVISION BROADCASTERS AS THEY TRANSITION TO DIGITAL 
TELEVISION (2001) (quoting a Letter from Hon. John McCain, Chairman (R-
Ariz.), Senate Commerce Committee; Hon. Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.), Ranking 
Minority Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee; Hon. Robert C. 
Byrd (D-W. Va.), Ranking Minority Member, Senate Appropriations 
Committee; Hon. Sam Brownback (D-Kan.), Member, Senate Commerce 
Committee to William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC (May 25, 2000) 
[hereinafter McCain letter]). 
 242. KENNARD, supra note 241. (quoting the McCain letter).  Referring to 
the broadcast industry’s continuing resistance to concrete and expanded public 
interest requirements, the Senators wrote: 
The denials and excuses we routinely hear today from the industry 
raise serious questions about the commitment of many broadcasters 
to serving the public interest, as they are obligated to do by law.  We 
must remember that broadcasters are trustees of a public resource 
worth billions of dollars, which they get access to for free, in return 
for a pledge to act as responsible stewards of the airwaves.  The 
license they receive is a legally-binding contract, an especially 
important one given television’s immense influence on our children 
and our culture.  And much to our dismay, the evidence presented in 
this letter strongly suggests that many licensees, along with their 
network parents, are breaching this public trust, and harming rather 
than serving the public interest. 
Id. 
 243. See, e.g., Comments of the Benton Found., Public Interest Obligations 
of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 27, 2000) 
(requesting that the FCC adopt clearer public interest requirements based on 
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vehemently against any change to the existing public interest 
requirements.244  The National Association of Broadcasters 
(NAB), the largest national trade association for broadcasters, 
argued that that the imposition of any new public interest 
requirements would be “premature” given that digital 
broadcasting is still in its infancy and has not had the time to 
develop.245 
Four years later, the Notice of Inquiry proceeding is still 
pending.  Its only tangible byproduct was a January 18, 2001 
Report to Congress from then-FCC Chairman Bill Kennard “on 
the Public Interest Obligations of Television Broadcasters as 
They Transition to Digital Television.”246  This unenforceable 
Report “attempts to distill a number of broad principles for 
broadcasters that, if followed, would go a long way toward 
                                                          
a “Viewers’ Bill of Rights,” demanding more localism in programming, 
treatment of public affairs and children’s educational television, and balanced 
coverage of controversial issues in the community); Comments of The Alliance 
for Better Campaigns et al., Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast 
Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 27, 2000) (requesting that FCC 
require broadcasters to provide “more in-depth discussion of [political] 
campaign issues by providing free air time for candidates on their stations”); 
Reply Comments of United Church of Christ et al., Public Interest Obligations 
of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Apr. 25, 2000) 
(requesting adoption of “quantifiable public interest obligations for digital 
licensees”); Comments of Children Now, Public Interest Obligations of TV 
Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 24, 2000) (arguing, 
inter alia, for the modification of the current requirement for three hours of 
educational and informational children’s television by making the quantitative 
minimum a proportion of all programming aired on all multicast streams). 
 244. See Comments of CBS Corp., supra note 24 (“Although these proposals 
are advanced in the name of the ‘public interest,’ in many cases they are little 
more than recycled versions of the regulatory policies of another era, properly 
abandoned by the Commission as unnecessary years ago.”); Comments of Belo, 
supra note 219 (insisting that the FCC has no authority to promulgate 
additional public interest programming requirements and that any additional 
guidelines should be developed by broadcasters themselves and applied 
voluntarily). 
 245. Comments of Nat’l Assoc. of Broadcasters, Public Interest Obligations 
of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 3 (filed Mar. 27, 2000) 
(“Rather than prematurely adopting such rules, the Commission should at this 
time be more concerned with insuring a successful and expeditious digital 
transition.”)  And Belo, a large station group owner, argued that the transition 
itself would provide adequate compensation to the American public: “When the 
DTV transition is complete, the public will receive very substantial benefits in 
the form of free over-the-air services with greatly improved signal quality (e.g., 
HDTV) and expanded programming choices (through SDTV multiplexing).  In 
other words, the transition to DTV, in and of itself, serves the public interest.”  
Comments of Belo, supra note 219, at 19. 
 246. See KENNARD, supra note 241. 
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serving the public interest.”247  The Report’s “principles” 
harkened back to the pre-1980s public interest requirements.  
They include broadcasters’ responsibility “to air programming 
responsive to the issues of concern to their communities,”248 
their interest in “air[ing] local public affairs programming daily 
in addition to news coverage,”249 cognizant of the distinction 
between public affairs programming and news programming,250 
and the importance of  “us[ing] good journalistic practices in 
covering local issues of public concern so as to present 
conflicting viewpoints and give persons attacked a reasonable 
right of reply.”251 
II.  WHY THE BROADCAST PUBLIC TRUSTEE DOCTRINE 
FAILED 
A.  FIRST AMENDMENT CONTRADICTIONS 
Reflecting on the FCC’s tortuous history of interpreting 
and enforcing the 1934 Communications Act’s  “public interest” 
standard, former FCC Commissioner Ervin Duggan remarked 
that “successive regimes at the FCC have oscillated wildly 
between enthusiasm for the public interest standard and 
distaste for it.”252 Critics of the standard have called it “vague 
to the point of vacuousness, providing neither guidance nor 
constraint on the regulatory agency’s action.”253 
Although the FCC’s seven decades-old struggle to define 
the public interest standard can be attributed in part to the 
shifts in political winds and regulatory philosophies, as well as 
                                                          
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. (implicitly citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.1810(d)(1)(iii) (repealed 1984) 
(defining “news programming” as “dealing with current local, national and 
international events, including weather and stock reports, and commentary, 
analysis, or sports news when they are an integral part of a news program.”)). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Ervin S. Duggan, Congressman Tauzin’s interesting idea, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 20, 1997, at S18; see also Erwin G. Krasnow & 
Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The Search for the Holy 
Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 607 (1998) (“If the history of this elusive 
regulatory standard makes anything clear, it is the fact that just what 
constitutes service in the ‘public interest’ has encompassed different things at 
different times.”). 
 253. GLEN O. ROBINSON, “Title I, The Federal Communications Act: An 
Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose,” in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 at 3, 14 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989). 
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the vagueness of its legislative origins, the fundamental cause 
of the FCC’s difficulty and the doctrine’s failure is its inherent 
tension with the First Amendment and the anti-censorship 
provision of the Communications Act of 1934.  Although the 
Communications Act delegates to the FCC the authority to 
issue licenses for use of public spectrum “consistent with the 
public interest,”254 it also has a strongly worded censorship 
prohibition: 
Nothing in this [Act] shall be understood or construed to give the 
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications 
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or 
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which 
shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication.255 
In 1973, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress 
essentially required the FCC to “walk a ‘tightrope’ to preserve 
the First Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its 
successor, the Communications Act,” while ensuring that 
broadcasters operate in the “public interest.”256 
At its essence then, this tension is one between two 
conflicting interpretations of the First Amendment.  On the one 
hand, there is the perspective that the First Amendment is the 
notion of the “free marketplace of ideas” that must be protected 
from all government restriction and influence.  In his dissent in 
the 1919 Abrams v. United States case,257 Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote that “the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”258  In other words, the unencumbered exchange of 
conflicting ideas comes closest to yielding truth and the 
common good. 
A related but somewhat conflicting free speech theory is 
associated with James Madison, one of the Constitution’s 
principal authors and a champion of the Bill of Rights.  The 
Madisonian view of the First Amendment values free speech as 
a means to civil enfranchisement, political and economic 
equality, and democratic empowerment.259  To Madison, the 
First Amendment was at the core of American democracy.  It 
                                                          
 254. 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a) (2000). 
 255. § 326 (2000). 
 256. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 117 (1973). 
 257. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
    258.    Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 259. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 46 (James Madison). 
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was intended to create and perpetuate an educated, informed 
and empowered electorate and a responsive democratic 
government.260 
In contrast to the Holmesian view, the Madisonian 
perspective was not principally interested in keeping the 
“marketplace of ideas” free from government interference, but 
was concerned with ensuring that all voices were present and 
heard in the marketplace.261  Justice Louis Brandeis expressed 
a Madisonian view of the First Amendment in his opinion in 
Whitney v. California,262 where he posited “the greatest menace 
to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a 
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle 
of the American government.”263 
In addition, as Professor Cass Sunstein has observed, the 
Holmesian “free marketplace of ideas” perspective presumes 
that all viable ideas have access to the marketplace and to 
public consideration.264  The Madisonian perspective does not 
so presume, and instead posits that government has a role in 
facilitating the availability of public fora in which individuals 
can meet to share their ideas in matters of democratic concern. 
Madison’s conception of the First Amendment lies at the 
heart of the broadcast public trustee doctrine.  The Gore 
Commission characterized the purpose of American broadcast 
regulation as realizing Madison’s ideal: 
From the beginning, broadcast regulation in the public interest has 
sought to meet certain basic needs of American politics and culture, 
over and above what the marketplace may or may not provide.  It has 
sought to cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic 
dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population, and 
more robust, culturally inclusive communities.265 
And FCC Commissioners continue to justify their actions 
by characterizing “free over-the-air television” as having a 
                                                          
 260. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, 
at xvii (1995).   
 261. Id.  See also Ronald W. Adelman, The First Amendment and the 
Metaphor of Free Trade, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1125, 1132-37 (1996) (discussing the 
conflict between the Madisonian and Hlmesian perspectives). 
 262.  274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).    
 263. Id. at 375 .  For an excellent discussion of Justice Brandeis’s free 
speech views, see Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic 
Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 653 (1988). 
 264. See Sunstein, supra note 260. 
 265. See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 7, at 
21.  
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“special and critical role in our communities and in the nation’s 
marketplace of ideas.”266 
The Supreme Court has addressed the tension between the 
free speech rights of broadcasters and the interests of audience 
members and the government in a number of cases.  In FCC v. 
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court called the 
public interest standard the “touchstone for the exercise of the 
Commission’s authority.”267  While recognizing the standard as 
necessarily broad and imprecise, the Court characterized it “as 
concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field 
of delegated authority permit”268 and as “a supple instrument 
for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress 
has charged to carry out its legislative policy.”269 
One month later, in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,270 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “no person is to have 
anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the 
granting of a license.”271  In holding that economic injury to an 
existing station is not an element the FCC must consider in 
evaluating an application for a new station, it declared that “it 
is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against 
competition but to protect the public.”272  The Court warned, 
however, that “[t]he Commission is given no supervisory control 
of the programs, of business management or of policy.”273 
The Supreme Court addressed the first broad attack on the 
constitutionality of the public trustee doctrine in National 
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,274 in which broadcasters 
challenged the constitutionality of the FCC’s “chain 
broadcasting” regulations, which had prohibited certain 
                                                          
 266. Reallocation and Service Rules for the 698-746 MHz Spectrum Band, 
17 F.C.C.R. 1022, 1124 (2002) (Report and Order) (Separate Statement of 
Commissioner Michael J. Copps); see also Review of the Commission’s 
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, para. 179 (2003) 
(Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (recognizing the 
relevance of television ownership limits in “protect[ing] the public’s First 
Amendment interest in a robust marketplace of ideas”). 
 267. 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
270.  309 U.S. 470 (1940).  
 271. Id. at 475. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
274.  319 U.S. 190 (1934).  
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practices between radio networks and their affiliate stations.275  
The networks argued that the FCC’s authority was limited to 
that of a signal interference traffic cop, that the public interest 
standard was unconstitutionally vague, and that the 
regulations violated their free speech rights.276  In upholding 
the regulations, the Court articulated a spirited defense of the 
public trustee doctrine and its resulting FCC public interest 
regulations.  Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter 
wrote: 
The [1934 Communications] Act itself establishes that the 
Commission’s powers are not limited to the engineering and technical 
aspects of regulation of radio communication.  Yet we are asked to 
regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave 
lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other.  But the 
Act does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the 
traffic.  It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining the 
composition of that traffic.277 
Justice Frankfurter then went on to dispose of the 
networks’ First Amendment argument by articulating what has 
become known as the “scarcity rationale”: 
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited 
facilities of radio.  Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently 
is not available to all.  That is its unique characteristic, and that is 
why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental 
regulation.  Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it 
must be denied.278 
The Court also ruled that the public interest standard was 
not unconstitutionally vague, but was sufficiently broad to 
prevent “stereotyp[ing] the powers of the Commission to 
specific details in regulating a field of enterprise the dominant 
characteristic of which was the rapid pace of its unfolding.”279 
                                                          
 275. Id. at 193-94 (prohibited practices included exclusive affiliation and 
territorial exclusivity agreements and dual network operation). 
 276. See id. at 209. 
 277. Id. at 215-16. 
 278. Id. at 226. 
The question here is simply whether the Commission, by announcing 
that it will refuse licenses to persons who engage in specified network 
practices . . . is thereby denying such persons the constitutional right 
of free speech.  The right of free speech does not include, however, the 
right to use the facilities of radio without a license. . . .Denial of a 
station license on that ground [public interest] . . . is not a denial of 
free speech. 
Id. at 226-27. 
 279. Id. at 219. 
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1. Does Red Lion Still Roar? 
Perhaps the strongest Supreme Court language in support 
of the public trustee doctrine is found in Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co., Inc. v. FCC280 decision, where the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine and the related 
political editorializing and political attack rules.  As noted 
above, the fairness doctrine required licensees to “cover vitally 
important controversial issues of interest in their communities” 
and “provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of 
contrasting viewpoints on those controversial issues of public 
importance that are covered.”281 
In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the FCC’s rules 
and declared that broadcasters enjoy limited First Amendment 
rights because of the scarcity of the public spectrum they are 
permitted to use as a means of reaching their audience.282  
Specifically, the Court stated that “[w]here there are 
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than 
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an 
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable 
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”283  
The Court asserted that the purpose of the First Amendment is 
“to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth 
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance 
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the 
Government itself or a private licensee.”284  The Court reasoned 
that this purpose, coupled with the scarcity rationale, made the 
First Amendment interests of audience members more 
important than those of broadcasters: “It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which 
                                                          
 280. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 281. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, supra note 118, at 5043 n.1; see 
also The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the 
Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 1-
3 (1974).  The related personal attack and political editorial rules required 
that when “an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like 
personal qualities of an identified person or group” in the course of covering an 
issue of public importance, or “[w]here a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses 
or (ii) opposes a legally qualified candidate or candidates,” the broadcaster was 
required to provide the attacked or opposed parties a “reasonable opportunity” 
to respond on the air. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 373-75 (citing 47 C.F.R §§ 73.123, 
73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (repealed)). 
 282. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 390. 
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is paramount.”285 
The Red Lion articulation of the scarcity rationale has 
weathered withering criticism from scholars, regulators, 
judges, and broadcasters themselves.286  Critics have attacked 
it by characterizing scarcity in different ways.  Judge Robert 
Bork, for example, questioned the validity of the distinction 
between spectrum scarcity and the scarcity of other means of 
communication.  In 1986, he wrote that the constitutional “line 
drawn between the print media and the broadcast media,” 
which is justified by the scarcity of broadcast spectrum, “is a 
distinction without a difference.”287  He reasoned: 
It is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce but it is 
unclear why that fact justifies content regulation of broadcasting in a 
way that would be intolerable if applied to the editorial process of the 
print media.  All economic goods are scarce, not least the newsprint, 
ink, delivery trucks, computers, and other resources that go into the 
production and dissemination of print journalism . . . .  Since scarcity 
is a universal fact, it can hardly explain regulation in one context and 
not another.288 
The conflict in Judge Bork’s reasoning is in how scarcity is 
interpreted.  Broadcasters have interpreted scarcity as 
referring to the number and diversity of media sources 
available to viewers and listeners.  In other words, they point to 
                                                          
 285. Id. In discussing the Constitutional foundations of broadcasters’ roles 
as public trustees, the Court wrote: 
[A]s far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed 
stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused.  A license 
permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to 
be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to 
the exclusion of fellow citizens.  There is nothing in the First 
Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a 
licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as 
a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices 
which are representative of his community and which would 
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. 
Id. at 389. 
 286. See, e.g., THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., 
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 5-32 (1994); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 200-09 (1987); Fowler 
& Brenner, supra note 51, at 221-226 (Mark S. Fowler is the former FCC 
Chairman); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the 
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990); Logan, Jr., supra note 215 
(author is an FCC Attorney); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of 
Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1007-20 (1989).  But cf., Hundt, 
supra note 123, 542-43. 
 287. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 
508 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (footnotes omitted). 
 288. Id. 
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overall numerical source scarcity as opposed to the Supreme 
Court’s notion of allocational or license scarcity.  Those who 
argue that Red Lion is obsolete tend to make arguments based 
on numerical source scarcity – specifically, the notion that 
broadcast speech regulation is no longer constitutionally 
legitimate because citizens now have many nonbroadcast as 
well as broadcast “channels” through which to receive and 
express information.  For example, in arguing against the 
imposition of any new public interest requirements, CBS stated 
that in light of high levels of subscribership to cable and DBS 
services with dozens, if not hundreds of channels; access to the 
Internet; the use of videotape; and DVD recorders and players, 
“spectrum scarcity is a wholly theoretical construct, bearing no 
relation to the reality of the modern media marketplace.”289  
The National Association of Broadcasters similarly argues that 
“[n]ot only has the number of broadcast facilities exploded” 
since Red Lion was decided, “but the vast increase in the 
number and variety of nonbroadcast outlets (including cable, 
Direct Broadcast Satellite and the Internet) makes the idea of 
‘scarcity’ of media voices seem almost quaint.”290 
These attacks on the scarcity principle misconstrue the 
meaning of scarcity as defined by the Supreme Court in Red 
Lion.291  The Red Lion Court focused on allocational and not 
overall numerical scarcity.  The notion that spectrum scarcity 
is no different than the scarcity of newsprint or ink or delivery 
trucks ignores the fact that broadcast spectrum is inherently 
scarce because “there [is] room for only a few”292 broadcast 
licensees in each community and the demand for those licenses 
greatly outpace the supply of spectrum.293  As the Red Lion 
                                                          
 289. Comments of CBS Corp., supra note 24, at 26. 
 290. Comments of Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, supra note 245, at 12-13. 
 291. For an excellent analysis of the various permutations of the scarcity 
rationales advanced in broadcast regulation, see Matthew L. Spitzer, The 
Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U L. REV. 990, 1007-20 
(1989); see also Graham, supra note 181, at 129-34.   
 292. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 388. 
 293. Henry Geller addressed the broadcasters’ arguments about the 
“explosion” of the number of broadcast stations since Red Lion was decided by 
writing: 
The scarcity relied upon in Red Lion is that many more people want 
to broadcast than there are available frequencies or channels.  That 
same scarcity indisputably exists today.  Red Lion was a radio case, 
and in 1969 when it was decided, there were roughly 7,000 stations.  
It is ludicrous to argue that the public trustee scheme is 
constitutional at 7,000 but unconstitutional at 11,500 (the number of 
stations broadcasting today). 
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Court made clear, “only a tiny fraction of those with resources 
and intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at the same 
time if intelligible communication is to be had.”294  The 
imbalance between overwhelming broadcast license demand 
and extremely limited supply is still in place today. 
The use of broadcast spectrum is “rivalous,” meaning that 
its medium is of fixed capacity and prone to interference if 
speakers are not “channeled” and restricted in their activities.  
Newsprint, by contrast, is nonrivalous.  Anyone wishing to be a 
newspaper publisher may be one.  The same can be said with 
Internet content.  Anyone who wishes to “webcast” a program 
or publish a document on the Internet may do so with a 
personal computer and an Internet connection.  And although 
there are economic constraints to entry into newspaper and 
Internet publishing (e.g., the cost of newsprint, ink, the PC, 
etc.), there are similar economic barriers to entry into 
broadcasting (e.g., purchase of technical equipment, 
construction and powering of a transmitter, hiring of talent, 
etc.).  The core distinction between broadcasting and other 
media is that the means by which broadcasters speak are 
publicly owned, whereas the media used by newspaper 
publishers, cable companies, and other competitors are not.295  
Moreover, the broadcast industry itself perpetuated the 
inherent scarcity of television licenses by successfully 
pressuring Congress to limit the eligibility for digital television 
broadcast licenses solely to existing analog broadcast 
licensees.296 
In contesting the continuing validity of the Red Lion 
scarcity rationale, broadcasters have cited a footnote in the 
1984 FCC v. League of Women Voters of California297 decision, 
in which the Supreme Court invalidated section 399 of the 
Public Broadcasting Act, which prohibited the editorializing of 
any noncommercial (public) television station receiving federal 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting funds.  Footnote eleven of 
the Court’s decision noted that “spectrum scarcity has come 
                                                          
Geller, supra note 20. 
 294. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 388. 
 295. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 
(1974) (striking down Florida’s right of reply statute, requiring newspapers to 
allow a right of reply to political candidates it criticized, because it infringed 
upon the editors’ free speech and press rights). 
 296. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1) (2000). 
 297. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).  
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under increasing criticism in recent years.”298  It acknowledged 
FCC Chairman Mark Fowler’s assertion that the advent of new 
technologies like cable and satellite television had rendered the 
scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation obsolete.299  The 
Court concluded, however, that it was not ready to “reconsider 
[its] longstanding approach without some signal from Congress 
or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so 
far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation 
may be required.”300 
Broadcasters have argued that this footnote represents a 
significant weakening of the scarcity rationale in the eyes of 
the Supreme Court.301  They have noted that in the FCC’s 1987 
Syracuse Peace Council302 decision, where it repealed the 
fairness doctrine, a majority of the Commission, at the height of 
its deregulatory program, appeared to adopt a number of the 
arguments against the scarcity rationale by noting that “in 
recent years . . . there [has] been an explosive growth in both 
the number and types of outlets providing information to the 
public,” and that because of that growth, “the Supreme Court’s 
apparent concern that listeners and viewers have access to 
diverse sources of information has now been allayed.”303  That 
characterization, broadcasters argue, is the “signal” the 
Supreme Court was waiting for to invalidate the scarcity 
rationale. 
Despite broadcasters’ hopes that Red Lion had been 
declawed (or at least tamed), both the Supreme Court and 
Congress have continued to rely upon it.  In enacting the 
Children’s Television Act of 1990,304 the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,305 and the 
                                                          
 298. Id. at 376 n.11. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. See, e.g., Comments of CBS Corp., supra note 24, at 16 n.23; 
Comments of Nat’l Assoc. of Broadcasters, supra note 245, at 13 n.30. 
 302.  Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, supra note 118, at 5053. 
 303. Id. at 5053.  But see Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and 
Political Editorial Rules, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,973, 19,973 (2000) (“[W]e take this 
opportunity to make clear that much of the discussion in Syracuse Peace 
Council accompanying the Commission's repeal of the fairness doctrine has 
been repudiated.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 304. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(a)-(b) (2000) (explaining that the Commission 
shall prescribe the nature of services rendered by licenses stations); S. REP. 
NO. 101-227, at 16 (1989) (describing how broadcasters serve as public 
trustees). 
 305. See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (2000) (requiring DBS operators to reserve four 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
62 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.  [Vol. 6:1 
 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress utilized the Red 
Lion scarcity rationale and the public trustee doctrine, at times 
expressly and at other times impliedly. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed the 
Red Lion rationale as it addressed new controversies.  In FCC 
v. Pacifica Foundation,306 the Supreme Court affirmed the 
FCC’s indecency policy as it applied to a New York radio 
station’s airing of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue.307  
In his opinion for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens cited 
Red Lion stating that “of all forms of communication, it is 
broadcasting that has received the most limited First 
Amendment protection.”308  Similarly, in Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC,309 the Court upheld the FCC’s “must 
carry” rules, which require cable systems to carry the broadcast 
television stations in their service areas.310  The Court reasoned 
that “must-carry” rules are constitutional, because cable 
systems are natural monopolies creating bottleneck conditions 
that prevent many cable subscribers from accessing their local 
television stations.311  The Court refused to extend Red Lion to 
cable systems, reasoning that “[t]he broadcast cases are 
inapposite in the present context because cable television does 
not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the 
broadcast medium.”312 
More recently, the Court refused to apply the Red Lion 
principle to the Internet, reinforcing the particular scarcity of 
broadcast spectrum.  Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens 
reasoned in Reno v. ACLU313 that “the Internet can hardly be 
considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity.  It provides 
relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all 
kinds. . . . [O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level 
                                                          
to seven percent of their channel capacity for noncommercial educational 
programming). 
 306. 438 U.S. 726 (1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).  
 307. See id. 
 308. Id. at 748. 
 309. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).  
 310. See id. at 636-61. 
 311. See id. at 649; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-862, at 50 (1992), reprinted in 
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1232; S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1133-34 (stating that “[t]he purpose of this legislation 
is to promote competition in the multichannel video marketplace[,] . . . provide 
protection for consumers against monopoly rates and poor customer service, 
[and limit] the cable operators’ and programmers’ market power”). 
 312. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 638-39. 
 313.  521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this 
medium.”314 
Despite the prevailing constitutionality of the scarcity 
rationale and the public trustee doctrine it supports, the FCC 
has lacked the will to walk the First Amendment “tightrope.”  
Since the early 1980s, the FCC has generally abandoned any 
attempts at passing judgment on the subjective content of 
broadcaster speech.  For example, in the case of the children’s 
educational television rules, which is the only one of the 
remaining public interest rules to have a quantitative 
requirement (of these three hours per week), the Commission 
ordinarily relies on the good faith judgment of broadcasters as 
to whether programming meets children’s educational and 
informational needs.315  In essence, although the FCC 
putatively requires a three-hour children’s educational 
programming commitment, it defers to broadcasters’ “good 
faith” characterizations of what programming satisfies the 
Commission’s criterion.316  Reed Hundt, FCC chairman in the 
                                                          
 314. Id. at 870 (ruling, in a 7-2 decision, that the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996 was an unconstitutional restriction of free speech).  Moreover, in a 
December 2003 decision, the Court cited Red Lion in reasoning that the FCC’s 
rules requiring broadcast stations to maintain certain public records on 
programming and political advertising “seem likely to help the FCC determine 
whether broadcasters are carrying out their ‘obligations to afford reasonable 
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public 
importance,’ and whether broadcasters are too heavily favoring entertainment, 
and discriminating against broadcasts devoted to public affairs.” McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 240-41 (2003).  The Court rejected arguments that the 
provisions at issue in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act violated the First 
Amendment.  See id. at 242-43.  The Court also cited Red Lion as support for 
its statement that “the FCC’s regulatory authority is broad.” Id. at 237. 
 315. See Children’s Television Order, supra note 18, at 10,701. 
 316. In defending this deferential approach to children’s television 
regulation, former FCC Commissioner James Quello wrote about the difficulty 
of discerning between programming that satisfies public interest requirements 
from programming that does not: 
Aside from the fact that this proposal is unconstitutional, as a 
practical matter, do you feel comfortable having the government 
decide what qualifies as educational television?  I can just see a 
future Public Notice announcing that “The Commission will be 
meeting next Tuesday to discuss the educational merits of “Yogi 
Bear.”  Also on the agenda, ‘Whether the television version of Catcher 
in the Rye is appropriate for kids.”  You see my point – these are 
decisions you should be making – not the United States government. 
James Quello, The Push for More Government Is On, and This Time It’s About 
Government in Your Living Room, available at http://www.cni.org/Hforums/ 
roundtable/1996-01/0083.html (posted from James Quello’s website Jan. 15, 
1996). 
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Clinton Administration, has vociferously supported the 
imposition of stricter public interest broadcasting requirements 
on television licensees, but has also articulated deep frustration 
with the doctrine and its inherent First Amendment tensions.  
In a 1995 speech, he said, “[e]ither our rules actually require 
something unknowable of broadcasters, in which case they 
should be rejected as constitutionally intolerable, or they 
actually require nothing of broadcasters, in which case they are 
a meaningless hoax on the American public.”317 
In the current edition of the FCC’s The Public and 
Broadcasting,318 its brochure on broadcasting regulation for the 
general public, the agency makes plain its abdication of content 
regulation and reliance on the judgment of individual 
broadcasters.  Under the heading, “The FCC and Freedom of 
Speech,” the brochure states, “[t]he First Amendment and 
federal law generally prohibit us from censoring broadcast 
material and from interfering with freedom of expression in 
broadcasting.  Individual radio and TV stations are responsible 
for selecting everything they broadcast and for determining 
how they can best serve their communities.”319  Essentially, 
therefore, although the Supreme Court continues to uphold the 
Red Lion scarcity rationale against constitutional attack, the 
FCC has exerted a much more cautious and “hands off” 
approach to content regulation.  It is no wonder, then, that the 
agency has never successfully elucidated and enforced the 
public interest standard. 
B.  THE FALLACY OF TELEVISION AS A “FREE MARKETPLACE OF 
IDEAS” 
Considering its track record, there is little dispute that 
Congress’ reliance on the public trustee doctrine to promote a 
“marketplace of ideas” was misplaced.  The “marketplace of 
ideas” metaphor, upon which the public trustee doctrine is 
rooted, commands that “public discussion is a political duty” 
and recognizes “that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert 
people.”320  In discussing the importance of public deliberation 
                                                          
 317. Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigm for Broadcast Regulation, 15 J.L. & 
COM. 527, 538 (1996). 
 318.  FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THE PUBLIC AND 
BROADCASTING, available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/decdoc/ 
public_and_broadcasting.html (June 1999). 
 319. Id. 
 320. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
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in democratic self-government, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn 
observes that because citizens of a democracy are their own 
sovereigns, they must have access to “the unhindered flow of 
accurate information” and the fora in which to debate, in order 
to make the wisest decisions.321  Commercial television, 
however, neither provides citizens with an “unhindered flow of 
accurate information,” nor a forum in which to deliberate. 
The first reason why television is a poor conduit for 
engendering true democratic deliberation is that it is too 
passive.  Inertia, not democratic participation, is what modern 
commercial television seems to best promote.  Television, by 
design, is not interactive.  The “vision” that it transmits is 
mediated and narrow.322  Television can be isolating to 
viewers,323 and it can distort the “reality” it claims to transmit.  
Few observers of American media and politics are unaware of 
the dissonance between televised and in-person performances.  
A recent and blatant example of the distorting nature of 
television is the so-called “scream speech” delivered by then-
Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean after his loss 
in the Iowa caucuses on January 19, 2004.  The footage, aired 
repeatedly on broadcast and cable news programs, showed 
what appeared to be a shrieking Dean, prompting 
commentators to call his performance a “meltdown” and stark 
evidence of his lack of presidential temperament.324  What 
television did not capture, however, was that inside of the 
ballroom, the crowd noise was so high that Dean’s voice could 
barely be heard.325  Dean’s “meltdown” speech was aired 
repeatedly on every major television news program, but only 
one television reporter – Diane Sawyer, the co-host of ABC’s 
Good Morning America – explained that although Governor 
Dean’s animated, high-volume performance appeared 
                                                          
concurring). 
 321. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 19 (1960). 
 322. See JERRY MANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF 
TELEVISION 24 (1978). 
 323. See id. at 168 (“Television isolates people from the environment, from 
each other, and from their own senses.”). 
 324. See, e.g., Al Kamen, A Meltdown in History, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 
2004, at A25; A Sweet Effort to Get Young People to Vote, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2004, at A17. 
 325. See Tim Graham, Media-Powered Howard, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Jan. 
30, 2004, at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/tgraham200401300919.asp (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2004). 
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appropriate to those in the room with him, the televised version 
of the speech made him sound frenzied (he was using a 
handheld “unidirectional” microphone designed to mask the 
noise of the crowd in the room).326  Videotapes from news crews 
using their own omnidirectional camera-mounted microphones 
demonstrated that Dean’s voice could barely be heard over the 
crowd’s noise.327  The televised version of reality – the “scream” 
footage – became the reality of the Dean campaign, and the 
campaign failed to regain its footing.328 
In addition to often distorting the “realities” it depicts, 
television is prone to presenting artificially narrow and 
strictured perspectives on complex subjects.  Far from 
presenting a diversity of conflicting ideas and philosophies, 
television presents whatever perspective producers think will 
attract the most viewers and, by extension, advertising.  And 
although the fairness doctrine required broadcasters to present 
opposing views on controversial subjects of public importance, 
the doctrine has not been enforced since 1987.329  The death of 
the fairness doctrine, in fact, has led to the birth of broadcast 
networks like News Corporation’s (i.e., Rupert Murdoch’s) Fox 
Television Network, which is known for programming that is 
heavily slanted toward conservative and specifically 
Republican-party positions.330 
C.  COMMODIFICATION OF VIEWERS 
The public trustee doctrine has failed to create its intended 
“free marketplace of ideas” over the airwaves not only because 
of its inherent First Amendment contradictions, but also 
because of the core commercial nature of television.  In fact, the 
only real marketplace commercial television promotes is that of 
                                                          
 326. See id. 
 327. See id. 
 328. See JOE TRIPPI, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED: 
DEMOCRACY, THE INTERNET, AND THE OVERTHROW OF EVERYTHING 184-85 
(2004). 
 329. See cases cited supra note 103; sources cited supra note 118. 
 330. See A.O. Scott, Tallyho! Spin, Flag Waving and Shouting to Catch a 
Fox, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at E1 (reporting on success of “Outfoxed” 
documentary, distributed via Internet and DVD, which purports to document 
politically biased coverage on Fox News Channel and in news programming on 
the Fox Television Network); Chris Vognar, Point of View Explored: ‘Outfoxed’ 
Documents Fox News Strategy on War Coverage, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 
23, 2004, at 7B. 
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viewers for advertisers.331  Despite the seven decades of 
congressional and FCC rhetoric perpetuating the legal fiction of 
public trusteeship in broadcasting, broadcasters – most of them 
publicly traded entities – are, in fact, comprised of 
businesspeople accountable primarily to shareholders and 
advertisers.332 
Although mythologized as fiduciaries of the ephemeral 
“public interest,” broadcasters in reality are required to operate 
as fiduciaries for their shareholders.  And although the public 
interest standard in the 1934 Communications Act, as 
amended, remains vague and essentially unenforced, the law of 
corporate fiduciary duty is well-settled in requiring that public 
corporations pursue and sustain the highest returns possible on 
their shareholders’ investments and operate the corporation for 
the exclusive benefit of shareholders.333  Actions by a 
broadcaster in the public interest, and that are above and 
beyond the perfunctory showing required to earn renewal of the 
station’s license, would likely be a violation of those fiduciary 
duties.334  This service of two gods – the public interest and the 
bottom line – would not be problematic for broadcasters if the 
public interest and shareholder interests were the same.335  But 
                                                          
 331. See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 499, 514 (2000) (characterizing “eyeballs as the commodity” in 
commercial television). 
 332. See generally Peter Marks, Networks Cede Political Coverage to Cable, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, at A18.  In reflecting on commercial television’s 
public trustee status, CBS News anchor Dan Rather said, “We have a public 
responsibility beyond delivering stockholder value.  In some ways, we have 
abrogated that civic trust.”  Id. 
 333. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (stating 
that a “business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for 
that end.”); Milton Friedman, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-36 (1982) 
(positing that it is impossible for a corporation to act generally in the public’s 
interest and still fulfill its fiduciary duties to shareholders). 
 334. Prof. Ronald J. Krotoszynski deftly makes this argument in The 
Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of Broadcast Television 
Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2116 (1997) (stating that “[a]t 
most, an executive could pursue public interest objectives to the extent 
necessary to avoid placing the station’s license in jeopardy.”). 
 335. My colleague, Professor Shelby Green, notes, however, that the law 
does not require corporate directors to make business decisions on the basis of 
profit maximization alone, but permits them to take public trustee 
considerations into account in exercising their business judgment.  See Shelby 
D. Green, Defending the “Time Culture”: The Public and Private Interests of 
Media Corporations, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 391, 406-08 (1991) (citing 
Pennsylvania’s business corporation statute, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
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they are not. 
At the advent of broadcasting, many broadcast stations 
were operated as community-based, “mom-and-pop” 
businesses.336  Today, most broadcast stations are merely profit 
centers within vast publicly traded conglomerates, whose 
primary mission is to sell advertising.337  As economists Bruce 
M. Owen and Steven S. Wildman wrote in their book Video 
Economics, “[a]dvertising is central to broadcast networks 
because the economic forces favoring mass consumption of 
media messages are reinforced by the simultaneous production 
of audiences for sale to advertisers as a by-product.”338 
Advertising is a very lucrative product.  The annual pre-
tax profit margins at some of the nation’s better run television 
stations can top fifty percent, leading industry analysts to 
describe owning a television station as “owning a money 
machine.”339  Advertising time on commercial broadcast 
television increased by over twenty percent between 1991 and 
2000,340 with some thirty-minute programs in 2001 devoting a 
full nine minutes to commercial advertising.341  The demand for 
television advertising time is so great, and the sale of such time 
so lucrative, that broadcasters have applied digital compression 
technology to shorten programming blocks in order to shoehorn 
additional commercials into highly rated fare.342  In recent 
years, broadcasters have relied on “product placement” 
advertising, where advertisers pay for the conspicuous 
placement of their product in key scenes or the manipulation 
                                                          
1721(c) (Purdon 1990), which was the first of many state corporations statutes 
authorizing directors to consider factors other than stockholder returns in 
making business decisions). 
 336. See Sallie Hofmeister, Is Free TV Worth Saving in a 500-Channel 
World?, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A1. 
 337. See generally id. 
 338. See MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 2, at 19 (discussing  the television 
marketplace and stating that “the sponsors and advertisers are its real public; 
the viewers are the ‘product’ it can ‘deliver’; and programs are merely the bait, 
the means to obtain the product.”);  BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, 
VIDEO ECONOMICS 151 (1992); Christine Y. Chen, The Bad Boys of Radio, 
FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2003, at 119 (quoting Clear Channel CEO Lowry Mays as 
saying, “[w]e’re not in the business of providing well-researched music.  We’re 
simply in the business of selling our customers products.”). 
 339. See Paul Taylor, Too Little Time: How Broadcasters Betray the Public 
Interest They’re Supposed to Serve, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 2000, at 8. 
 340. See id. at 10. 
 341. See Louis Chunovic, TV Clutter Reaches All-Time High, ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA, Mar. 11, 2002, at 1. 
 342. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 146. 
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and consumption of their products by key personalities.343  
Most recently, advertisers and television executives have 
managed to churn more advertising revenue from already 
heavily commercialized programming, and capture viewers who 
tend to “channel surf” or fast-forward through commercial 
blocks, by “digitally embedding” product trademarks and logos 
in televised scenes.  For example, Major League Baseball 
broadcasts have featured digitally inserted product billboards 
behind home plate during baseball games (including the World 
Series), and CBS’s coverage of New Years Eve 2000 featured 
digitally inserted billboards, covering up real billboards for 
competitor NBC and other corporations.344  In addition, 
program-length commercials, more commonly known as 
“infomercials,” have proliferated the television airwaves, 
generating $14 billion via TV sales in 2001.345 
Because advertising, not public interest programming, is 
the true currency of the broadcasting realm,346 advertisers 
                                                          
 343. For example, the regular consumption of Coca-Cola® by actors on the 
Warner Brothers’ Network’s “Young American” series cost the soda company 
$25 million.  Coca-Cola paid the same sum for prominent product placement in 
the 2002 Fox “American Idol” series.  See Dan Bronson, Figured Out, 
HOLLYWOOD REP., Apr. 28, 2003, 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_
id=1875575 (subscription required, last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 344. Michael McCarthy, Ads Show Up in Unexpected Places: Line Between 
Reality, Marketing Gets Fuzzy, USA TODAY, Mar. 23, 2001, at 1B.  
Broadcasters have begun digitally inserting products and logos in reruns of 
highly rated programs such as Law & Order.  See Stuart Elliott, Advertising: 
Reruns May Become a Testing Ground for Digital Insertion of Sponsor’s 
Products and Images, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2001, at C6; David Goetzl, TBS 
Tries Virtual Advertising: Network to Sell Product Placement Deals for Reruns 
of ‘Law & Order’, ADVERTISING AGE, May 21, 2001, at 8. 
 345. See Michael Schneider,’Wild’ Infomercial Struts Its Stuff: ‘Girls Gone 
Wild’ Reinvigorates Frequently-Maligned Ad Format, VARIETY, Dec. 9, 2002, at 
32. 
 346. The Supreme Court acknowledged the centrality of advertising in 
requiring cable systems to carry local television stations on their basic service 
tiers in its 1994 TurnerI decision, where it reasoned: 
By preventing cable operators from refusing carriage to broadcast 
television stations, the must-carry rules ensure that broadcast 
television stations will retain a large enough potential audience to 
earn necessary advertising revenue – or, in the case of noncommercial 
broadcasters, sufficient viewer contributions – to maintain their 
continued operation.  In so doing, the provisions are designed to 
guarantee the survival of a medium that has become a vital part of 
the Nation’s communication system, and to ensure that every 
individual with a television set can obtain access to free television 
programming. 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994). 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
70 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.  [Vol. 6:1 
 
wield extraordinary influence over broadcasters and their 
programming.  Advertisers want the programs they sponsor to 
surround their commercials with non-controversial and upbeat 
programming that maximizes viewership and builds goodwill in 
their products.347  They buy commercial time on the programs 
with the highest ratings, and avoid placing advertising on 
programs that take controversial social positions.348 
Before tobacco companies were pressured by the Federal 
government to voluntarily cease television advertising in 1971, 
tobacco manufacturers used television as a primary means for 
promoting cigarette smoking.349  Philip Morris’s advertising 
agreement with CBS and Desilu Productions, the producers of 
the celebrated “I Love Lucy” comedy, is known as the first 
major deal involving product placement.  The program’s 
original opening sequence featured stick figures of Lucille Ball 
and Desi Arnaz climbing on a huge pack of Philip Morris 
cigarettes.350  Desi Arnaz regularly appeared in scenes in a 
smoking jacket and storylines often featured both stars 
conspicuously smoking cigarettes.  Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Company, an original competitor to Philip Morris, 
instructed the television producers carrying its advertising that 
“[t]obacco products should not be used in a derogatory or 
harmful way.  And no reference or gesture of disgust, 
dissatisfaction or distaste be made in connection with them.”351  
                                                          
 347. For example, Procter & Gamble, a preeminent television advertiser 
whose Ivory soap and Tide detergent commercials airing during radio and 
television dramas beginning in the 1940s spurred the phenomenon of “soap 
operas,” is credited for setting the precedent for insisting on strict content 
controls in the programming surrounding its commercials.  See generally, 
ALECIA SWASY, SOAP OPERA: THE INSIDE STORY OF PROCTER & GAMBLE 
(1993). 
 348. See, e.g., Green supra note 335, at 402 n.35 (providing examples of 
advertisers pulling commercials from socially controversial programming); 
Sunstein supra note 331, at 515. 
 349. In 1969, the FCC threatened to ban cigarette advertising on television 
and radio and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposed new rules 
requiring television and radio tobacco advertising to feature prominent health 
warnings.  See Clara Sue Ross, Pushing Puffing Post-Posadas, 56 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1461, 1461 (1988).  In reaction to those proposals, and especially the 
threat of broadcasting health warnings, the tobacco industry voluntarily 
acceded to a ban on radio and television advertising.  See id. at 1461-62; H.R. 
REP. NO. 98-805 (1984) (addressing how to properly communicate the health 
consequences of smoking). 
 350. See Liz Doup, Smoke Signals Stories, S. FLA. SUN – SENTINEL, June 
30, 2003, at 1D. 
 351. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 240 (2004). 
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Although television broadcasters rarely aired news or 
documentary programming concerning the deleterious health 
consequences of smoking before smoking advertising was 
barred from television in 1971, they were much more willing to 
air such programming once they were no longer dependent on 
tobacco advertising.352 
Because advertising, not programming, is the commercial 
broadcasters’ product, broadcasters make programming 
decisions primarily with an eye toward optimizing viewership 
and, correlatively, increasing the bottom line.  It is little 
surprise, then, that public interest programming is scarce and 
typically relegated to the least desirable blocks in the broadcast 
schedule, if it is aired at all. 
1. Consolidation of the Broadcast Industry 
Another reason why television broadcasting has failed to 
create a free marketplace of ideas is that it is no longer a 
locally oriented medium.  Localism in programming always has 
been a core component of the public trustee doctrine.353  
Congress and the FCC have repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of broadcast licensees serving their local 
communities.354  They believed that locally oriented 
programming would promote political engagement, build 
communities, and protect local health and safety.355  The 
original system of broadcast license grants to local broadcasting 
stations also served an important political function for the 
members of Congress who voted it into existence, creating jobs 
and a means of advertising for local constituents.356  During the 
first fifty years of broadcast regulation, Congress and the FCC 
also valued diversity in station ownership, consistent with the 
                                                          
 352. Id. at 251. 
 353. For an excellent treatment of the nexus between the public trustee 
doctrine and localism and the effects of ownership concentration, see Victoria 
F. Phillips, On Media Consolidation, the Public Interest, and Angels Earning 
Wings, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 613 (2004). 
 354. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2000) (authorizing the FCC to issue licenses 
throughout “the several [s]tates and communities”). 
 355. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast 
Stations and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in 
Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,287-
291 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) (discussing the 
importance of localism in station ownership rules).   
 356.  See STEPHEN G.  BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATORY POLICY 533 (5th ed. 2002).  
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notion articulated in 1945 by Justice Hugo Black that the First 
Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”357 
The demise of local and national television station 
ownership caps, and the outright elimination of longstanding 
prohibitions on the common ownership of a television station 
and other media outlets in the same city have come with 
sweeping broadcast regulation.358  As a result, commercial 
television broadcasting has become one of the most 
consolidated industries in the nation.  Consolidation has 
resulted in a sharp reduction of locally oriented public interest 
programming,359 as well as ownership of television stations by 
women and minorities.360 
The five major American commercial television networks 
each are part of a multimedia conglomerate with integrated 
television, radio, cable, Internet, motion picture, and publishing 
properties.361  Together, these corporations – Viacom, Inc., 
                                                          
 357. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
 358.  See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2004) (discussing multiple 
ownership rules). 
 359. See generally William R. Davie & Jung-Sook Lee, Television News 
Technology: Do More Sources Mean Less Diversity?, J. BROADCASTING & 
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 453 (1993); Petros Iosifides, Diversity Versus 
Concentration in the Deregulated Mass Media, 76 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. 
Q., 152 (1999); Harvey J. Levin, Program Duplication, Diversity, and Effective 
Viewer Choices: Some Empirical Findings, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 81 (1971). 
 360. See generally FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 
FEMALE/MINORITY BROADCAST OWNERSHIP DATA 2003, (providing a summary 
of data regarding female and minority ownership), at 
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/data.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).  At the 
same time, observers have complained about the stereotyping or outright 
absence of minorities in television news and entertainment programming. See, 
e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of 
Color by the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming, 
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 293 (2003); Greg Braxton, NAACP Will Fight Network TV 
Lineups, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1999, at A1; Steve Johnson, Getting Color on 
Television: African-Americans on TV: A History of Talent, Ambition and 
Frustration, CHI. TRIB. TEMPO, Feb. 1, 2002, at 1. 
 361. For example, General Electric, Inc., through its affiliate, the National 
Broadcasting Company, Inc., delivers network television services, operates 
television stations, and provides cable, Internet and multimedia programming 
and distribution services. See GENERAL ELECTRIC, INC., SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION FORM 10-K: ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 
13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2003  (filed March 1, 2004) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054504000013/frm10k.h
tm. 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
2004] CHANGING CHANNELS 73 
 
General Electric Co., Walt Disney Co. (ABC), News Corp., and 
Time Warner, Inc. – earned $255 billion in 2003 revenues.362  
The five corporations control seventy-five percent of all 
primetime viewing on broadcast and cable television.363  Far 
from competing antagonistically, the five firms engage in 
extensive joint ventures across media.364  For instance, “News 
Corporation shares a financial interest with its ‘competitors’ in 
sixty-three cable systems, magazines, recording companies, and 
satellite channels in the United States and abroad.”365 
For large broadcast station group owners, acquiring 
additional stations has an immediate positive impact on the 
bottom line.  The more viewers and wider geographic footprint 
a broadcaster can claim, the higher the rates it can charge for 
advertising.366  With more stations in its portfolio, a group 
owner can economize on programming by re-airing the same 
content across the country and largely ignoring or giving short 
shrift to local viewing needs.  For example, station group owner 
Sinclair Broadcasting, which owns sixty-two television stations 
across the country, implemented what it calls “Central 
Casting,” whereby one team of anchors, commentators and 
weathercasters broadcast one standard evening news broadcast 
to all sixty-two of Sinclair’s television stations.367  Moreover, 
individual media conglomerates owning dozens of stations and 
integrated with multiple distribution channels (for example, 
television, radio, motion pictures, DVD sales, publishing, etc.), 
have tended to develop television programming that can be 
repackaged and reused in all of its media properties.368  In 
1990, the four major commercial broadcast networks (ABC, 
                                                          
 362. See Center for Public Integrity: Investigative Journalism in the Public 
Interest, Media Tracker, at http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
telecom/industry.aspx?act=broadcast (last visited Nov. 18, 2004). 
 363. See Tom Wolzien & Mark Mackenzie, Returning Oligopoly of Media 
Content Threatens Cable’s Power, WEEKLY NOTES (Bernstein Research, New 
York, N.Y.), Feb. 7, 2003, at 3. 
 364. See Ted Turner, My Beef with Big Media, WASH. MONTHLY, 
July/August 2004, at 30, 35 ( “These big companies are not antagonistic; they 
do billions of dollars in business with each other.  They don’t compete; they 
cooperate to inhibit competition.”). 
 365. Bagdikian, supra note 351, at 9.  Similarly, Time Warner has twenty-
two major joint ventures with other major media corporations.  Id. at 31. 
 366. See Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2562 (2003). 
 367. See Jim Rutenberg & Micheline Maynard, TV News That Looks Local, 
Even If It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2003, at C1. 
 368. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 351, at 3 (explaining that “owners prefer 
stories and programs that can be used everywhere and anywhere”). 
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CBS, Fox, and NBC) owned, in whole or in part, only 12.5 
percent of the new programming they aired.  In 2000, that 
figure was 56.3 percent, and in 2002 it was 77.5 percent.369 
The life-and-death risks of media consolidation and 
ownership concentration were evidenced vividly in the radio 
industry in January 2002.  Clear Channel Communications 
(Clear Channel) owns all six of the commercial radio stations in 
the Minot, North Dakota market.370  Clear Channel dominates 
the national radio industry, owning 1,240 radio stations in 292 
markets across the country.371  It airs the same prerecorded 
programming across entire regions and eschews local 
programming altogether.372  In early 2002, a hazardous 
chemical spill occurred in North Dakota.373  Attempts by 
emergency response personnel to engage the local radio 
stations in broadcasting warnings to local residents were futile.  
All six of the stations were operated by remote control, and 
were airing prerecorded satellite feeds from Clear Channel 
headquarters in San Antonio, Texas.374  Corporate 
consolidation has also resulted in programming decisions that 
some critics have contested as influenced inappropriately by 
corporate headquarters.  After commentator Bob Costas 
referred to China’s “problems with human rights” and 
“property rights disputes” during NBC Sports coverage of the 
1996 Olympic Summer Games in Atlanta, Georgia, NBC issued 
a surprisingly humble apology to the Chinese government after 
it demanded one.375  Critics questioned whether NBC would 
have been so contrite if its parent company, General Electric, 
                                                          
 369. See Turner, supra 364, at 32.  Turner states that: 
Today, the only way for media companies to survive is to own 
everything up and down the media chain – from broadcast and cable 
networks to the sitcoms, movies, and news broadcasts you see on 
those stations; to the production studios that make them; to the cable, 
satellite, and broadcast systems that bring the programs to your 
television set . . . Big media today wants to own the faucet, pipeline, 
water, and the reservoir.  The rain clouds come next. 
Id. at 33-34. 
 370. See Jennifer Lee, On Minot, N.D., Radio, A Single Corporate Voice, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at C7. 
 371. See generally MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 20; Katy Bachman, 
Fighting Through the Static, MEDIAWEEK, May 5, 2003, at 20, 20; Rutenberg 
& Maynard, supra note 367. 
 372. See  Bachman, supra note 371, at 24. 
 373. See id. at 22. 
 374. See id. 
   375. See NBC Apologizes to China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at B8. 
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were not actively investing hundreds of millions of dollars in 
the lighting, plastics and medical equipment markets in the 
Chinese mainland.376 
Despite the manifestly negative impact of media ownership 
concentration on public interest programming, the FCC in late 
2002 opened a rulemaking proceeding proposing the further 
relaxation of the ownership rules.377  Especially controversial 
were the FCC’s proposals to liberalize the local and national 
television station ownership caps and to eliminate the 
prohibition on the common ownership of a television station 
and newspaper in the same city.378 
Although the major networks’ news operations failed to 
give substantial coverage to the FCC’s proposals,379 public 
television stations aired extensive critical pieces on the 
controversy380 and several activists launched grassroots 
campaigns to motivate citizens to protest the proposals.381  
Despite its limited airplay, the FCC’s notice resulted in the 
filing of nearly 800,000 opposition comments in the form of e-
mails and postcards,382 99.9 percent of which were opposed to 
                                                          
 376. See id; Editorial, A Gutless Apology, AUGUSTA CHRON., Aug. 27, 1996, 
4A.  Similarly, in late 1998, ABC News planned to air an exposé on 
questionable hiring practices at Disney World.  See Trudy Lieberman, You 
Can’t Report What You Don’t Pursue,  COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 
2000, at 44, 45.  The resort allegedly had failed to perform criminal 
background checks on employees and had hired convicted pedophiles to work 
at its park.  See id.  Shortly before the segment was due to air, Disney 
chairman Michael Eisner, told National Public Radio that he thought it would 
be “inappropriate,” stating, “ABC News knows that I would prefer them not to 
cover [Disney].”  Id.  Following that interview, ABC News pulled the Disney 
World exposé from its lineup. See generally id. 
 377. See generally Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 17 F.C.C.R. 18,503 
(2002). 
 378. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2003) (discussing multiple ownership rules). 
 379. See William Safire, Big Media’s Silence, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at 
A33 (explaining that “[m]ost network newscasts dutifully covered the 
scandalous story as briefly and coolly as possible, failing to disclose how much 
it meant to their parent companies, which were lobbying furiously for gobble-
up rights.”). 
 380. For example, Bill Moyers’ Now covered the media consolidation issue 
extensively.  See, e.g., NOW WITH BILL MOYERS, at 
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/mediaconsol.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); 
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_bmjfcc.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2004); http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/bigmedia.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2004). 
 381. See Eric Boehlert, Congress to Big Media: Not So Fast, SALON, July 
23, 2003, available at http://www.salon.com/news/feature 
/2003/07/23/fcc/print.html. 
 382. See id. 
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increased media consolidation.383  While some of these e-mails 
likely were duplicates, the response is still telling 
On June 2, 2003, the FCC decided in a strict party-line 
vote to allow one company to own television stations that would 
reach a maximum of 45 percent of the national television 
audience, up from 35 percent.384  It also weakened the 
newspaper-television cross-ownership rule and liberalized the 
cap on the common ownership of radio and television stations 
in the same market.385 
Spurred by the unprecedented groundswell of interest in 
the FCC’s decision, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), chairman of 
the Senate Commerce Committee, called a hearing on the 
FCC’s decision a mere two days after it was released.  At that 
hearing, FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell remarked that the 
preexisting media ownership restrictions were made obsolete 
by the existence today of hundreds of cable networks and the 
Internet.386 
Congress and the courts heard the public’s outcry against 
the FCC’s Consolidation order.  Both the Senate and the House 
of Representatives voted to block the Order, and restored the 
                                                          
 383. See Media Ownership Rules and FCC Reauthorization: Hearing Before 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (2003) 
(statement of Michael J. Copps, FCC Commissioner). 
 384. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast 
Stations and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in 
Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, Report and Order, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 46,286, 46,353 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). 
 385. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast 
Stations and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in 
Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,348-
354 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). 
 386. See Media Ownership Rules: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation (2003) (statement of Michael K. 
Powell, FCC Chairman) (stating, “Here is what we learned about the media 
marketplace.  It is marked by abundance.  For example, we found the number 
of outlets and the number of independent owners have risen dramatically over 
the course of the last 40 years.”).  Commissioner Michael J. Copps later 
explained: 
I strongly dissented to this decision.  I dissented on grounds of 
substance.  I dissented on grounds of process.  I dissented because I 
believe the Commission’s actions empower America’s new Media Elite 
with unacceptable levels of influence over the ideas and information 
upon which our society and our democracy so heavily depend. 
Media Ownership Rules and FCC Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (2003) (statement of 
Michael J. Copps, FCC Commissioner). 
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national audience-reach cap.387  On June 24, 2004, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit invalidated the FCC’s elimination 
of the ban on one entity’s owning both a broadcast station and a 
newspaper in the same market, as well as its loosening of the 
caps on the common ownership of same-market television and 
radio stations.388 
That Congress and the courts have reversed the broadcast 
industry’s victory in getting the FCC to dilute the ownership 
restrictions was not so much an indication of the weakening 
political power of the industry, but a result of the broadcasters’ 
internal disagreement about whether the caps should be 
liberalized.  Viewing additional stations as an opportunity to 
extend their advertising reach, the networks and other large 
station group owners (like Gannett, Paxson and Tribune) 
lobbied intensively in favor of the loosened rules.389  The 
smaller group owners and independent stations opposed the 
new rules, fearing an increase in the power and leverage of the 
networks.390 
D. THE POLITICAL POWER AND INFLUENCE OF BROADCASTERS 
Although the First Amendment and economic 
contradictions inherent in the public trust doctrine explain why 
the doctrine has been weak and difficult to enforce since its 
inception, they do not explain why Congress and the FCC have 
for so long done nothing to replace the public trustee model 
with a means to better compensate Americans for the 
broadcasters exploitation of public spectrum.  Why is it, in 
other words, that instead of taking broadcasters to task, 
Congress and the FCC have essentially joined the broadcasters 
                                                          
 387. See Stephen Labaton, FCC Media Rule Blocked in House in a 400-to-
21 Vote: Move to Limit Reach of Networks Sets Up Face-Off with Bush, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 2003, at A1; Stephen Labaton, Senators Take Steps to 
Reinstate Limits on Media Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at A1. 
 388. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (2004).  The Court 
held that the FCC failed to properly justify its new rules and, specifically, 
failed to properly account for the effect of further media consolidation on 
diversity and localism: 
The Commission’s derivation of new Cross-Media Limits, and its 
modification of the numerical limits on both television and radio 
station ownership in local markets, all have the same essential flaw: 
an unjustified assumption that media outlets of the same type make 
an equal contribution to diversity and competition in local markets. 
Id. at 435. 
 389. See generally id. 
 390. See generally id. 
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in espousing the value and importance of the public trustee 
doctrine while doing very little to articulate and enforce specific 
public interest programming standards? 
The unique and overwhelming influence of the 
broadcasting industry has enabled it to perpetuate the public 
trusteeship for such a long period despite its obvious 
dysfunction.  Understanding the nature and peculiarity of 
broadcasters’ political power is important in reforming the 
extant regulatory regime. 
The “Captured” FCC 
Independent regulatory agencies like the FCC391 are 
required to act within the limits of the authority delegated to 
them by Congress, but are generally outside of the influence of 
the President and other executive branch officials.392  Following 
the birth of the ubiquitous American administrative state393 
during the New Deal era394 and the resulting dormancy of the 
                                                          
 391. Independent regulatory agencies are typically modeled after the first 
modern administrative agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, which 
was created in 1887.  See Marshall J. Breger & Gary Edles, Established by 
Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1128 (2000); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in 
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1194-95 (1986). 
 392. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-96 (1988); Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935); Peter L. Strauss, The 
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 586-91 (1984) (examining the limited president power 
in nominating agency officials and otherwise influencing agency decision 
making). 
 393. For an excellent overview of the history of the American regulatory 
state, see Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The 
Federal Aviation Administration, ‘Agency Capture,’ and Airline Security, 10 
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 385 (2002); see also Rabin, supra note 
391 (noting that the ICC was created to remedy perceived discriminatory 
practices among railroad companies). 
 394. Before the New Deal and its programs intended to stimulate the 
economy out of the Great Depression, agency power and influence were 
limited, as a result of narrow Congressional delegations of authority as well as 
restrictive court interpretations of agency authority.  See A.A. Berle, Jr., The 
Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARV. L. REV. 430, 441-42 
(1917); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1513 (1992).  The New Deal spurred the 
creation of numerous agencies aimed at alleviating poverty and resulted in the 
birth of the ubiquitous American administrative state.  See RICHARD J. 
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 32 (3d ed. 1999).  In 
particular: 
The banking system came under federal control, the 1933 and 1934 
Securities Acts regulated stock exchanges and the sale of securities, 
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nondelegation doctrine,395 the courts have deferred to Congress’ 
judgment in delegating increasingly broad and general 
authority to expert agencies.396  In 1989, Justice Blackmun 
noted in Mistretta v. United States that the Court’s 
permissiveness in reviewing Congressional delegations of 
authority was “driven by a practical understanding that in our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and 
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.”397  It is no wonder that the FCC’s expansive 
                                                          
the National Industrial Recovery Act established a minimum wage 
and set maximum hours for workers and the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) regulated the relations between labor unions 
and management. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  In response to the mushrooming agencies and 
their burgeoning authority, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure 
Act in 1946 as a means of standardizing agency procedural safeguards.  See 
generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2000).  Administrative agencies increased in 
number, size and authority throughout the twentieth century, reaching 
another heyday in the 1960s and 1970s spurred in part by President Johnson’s 
“Great Society” initiatives, See SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY’S POOR 
LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY  3-13 (1969); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET 
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 33-34 (3d ed. 1999) (detailing the 
creation between 1960 and 1980 of the Departments of Energy, Education and 
Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration, and the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, and the increase in authority and size of the Food and 
Drug Administration). 
 395. The Constitution states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. As 
a result, the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot delegate its power to 
legislate to administrative agencies by means of statutes with vague or 
indeterminate standards.  See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ( “That 
Congress cannot delegate legislative power . . . is a principle universally 
recognized”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (declaring the 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) void as an attempted delegation of 
legislative power to the President); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (declaring the provision of NIRA concerning “codes 
of fair competition” an unconstitutionally vague delegation of authority). 
 396. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some 
Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 427-30 (1989) (outlining the shift 
from comprehensive congressional policymaking to widespread delegation of 
authority to agencies). 
 397. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (upholding 
Congress’s broad delegation of authority to the United States Sentencing 
Commission); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).  
Reviewing courts defer to agency interpretations of vague language in 
enabling statutes, even if those interpretations are abstract and questionable, 
so long as they are “reasonable.”  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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authority to regulate communications in furtherance of “the 
public interest,” therefore, has survived since the agency’s 
creation in 1934.398 
As American administrative agencies increased in number, 
size, and authority, observers began to question the influence of 
the regulated entities on the work of the regulators.  Agency 
“capture,” which has been referred to as a government 
“pathology,”399 typically occurs when regulated entities, such as 
corporations and entire industries, “succeed, through lobbying 
or other influential devices, in replacing what would otherwise 
be the public-policy agenda of the agency with its own private 
and self-serving agenda.”400  The result is “subsidizing private 
interests at the expense of public good.”401 
The concept of capture was first articulated by Marver 
                                                          
 398. Although the courts have grown tolerant of Congress’ sweeping 
delegations of legislative authority, a number of scholars and other observers 
have expressed alarm at the constitutionality of “permit[ting] unelected 
administrators to define fundamental regulatory policies” when “agencies exist 
outside traditional conceptions of our tripartite national government.”  
Seidenfeld, supra note 394.  Although these scholars posit that agencies may 
have too much unfettered authority, others contend that agencies empowered 
with broad delegations of rulemaking authority actually may further the 
democratic principle of deliberative decision making by involving regulated 
entities and interested citizens in the process of making law.  See, e.g., 
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979); Christopher 
Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 
DUKE L. J. 561, 588-99 (discussing the role of broadly empowered 
administrative agencies in “sound governance.”); James O. Freedman, 
Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REV., 307, 
307-09 (1976); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1279-80 (1984); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration 
and Public Deliberations: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L. J. 1617, 1631-41 
(1985) (discussing role of agencies in fomenting public discussion and 
involvement in administrative lawmaking); Seidenfeld, supra note 394, at 
1515 (“[O]n the whole, civic republicanism is consistent with broad delegations 
of political decision making authority to officials with greater expertise and 
fewer immediate political pressures than directly elected officials or 
legislators.”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671-87 (1975) (discussing the 
importance of delegation of political decisions to administrative agencies as 
means of achieving regulatory efficiency and avoiding political impasses); 
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). 
 399. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997). 
 400. Niles, supra note 393, at 390. 
 401. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1986). 
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Bernstein,402 who observed that in an agency’s “life cycle,” the 
“early stages of the cycle are characterized by vigorous and 
independent regulation” but that in later stages “the agency 
often becomes closely identified with and dependent upon the 
industry it is charged with regulating.”403 
Capture theorists have posited that agency capture is a 
prevalent condition404 of federal government because so many 
regulated industries have large lobbying operations in 
Washington, that give them the ability to monitor regulators’ 
activities, participate actively in rulemaking and inquiry 
proceedings,405 and seduce regulators by easing their 
workloads, by, for example, providing them extensive industry 
information that the regulators lack the resources and will to 
acquire objectively.406  Professor Mark Seidenfeld explains that 
“[a] regulated entity frequently is a large corporation with 
resources to appeal agency decisions at every level.”407  He also 
observes that “regulated entities and special interest groups 
often contribute significantly to political campaigns.”408 
Capture theorists have also pointed to the infamous 
“golden revolving door,” shuttling key staff between 
employment positions with the regulators and regulatees, as a 
condition for capture.409  Professors Jerry Mashaw and David 
Harfst note that once an agency is captured by the industry it 
regulates, “the regulatory scheme is maintained in the interest 
of the regulated industry by bureaucrats who look to both 
                                                          
 402. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION 79-97 (1955). 
 403. Merrill, supra note 399, at 1060.  Professor Richard Stewart described 
agency capture as the overrepresentation of client interests in the process of 
agency decision that results in persistent bias in favor of such interests.  See 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1682-83 (1975). 
 404. Professor Thomas W. Merrill writes that by the late 1960s, “agency 
capture had come to be regarded as something more akin to the universal 
condition of the administrative state.”  Merrill, supra note 399, at 1060. 
 405. Professor Mark C. Niles posits that the APA’s requirements for notice-
and-comment rulemakings and hearings in advance of certain agency actions, 
intended to foster transparency and deliberative democracy, afford multiple 
avenues for well-funded regulated entities to exert “hyper-influence” in agency 
dealings and ultimately “capture” the agency.  See Niles, supra note 393, at 
388-89. 
 406. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and 
Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 464 (1999). 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Niles, supra note 393, at 399. 
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Congress and to the industry for their rewards.”410  According 
to Mashaw and Harfst, these rewards include “social and 
business relations and the prospects of further career 
opportunities in the private sector.”411 
Observers have identified a number of federal agencies 
that appear to have been captured by the entities they regulate.  
It has been argued, for example, that the FAA was captured by 
the airline industry,412 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by 
nuclear power companies,413 the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service by meat and 
processed foods industries,414 and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms by the National Rifle Association (NRA), 
the gun lobby.415 
There is little doubt that the FCC has been “captured” by 
the broadcast industry.  The broadcasters’ largest trade 
association, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), 
has been called a “lobbying juggernaut in Washington” with 
“legendary clout” that wins legislative and regulatory victories 
by “steamrolling the opposition.”416  Senator John McCain (R-
Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, which 
oversees the FCC and other federal telecommunications 
agencies, has described the broadcast lobby as “one of the most 
powerful influences here in Washington”417 comparing them to 
“locusts.”418 
The NAB has annual revenues of $56 million,419 making it 
one of the richest trade lobbies in Washington.  It spent over $7 
                                                          
 410. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO 
SAFETY 16 (1990), quoted in Niles, supra note 393, at 395. 
 411. Id. 
 412. See generally Niles, supra note 393. 
 413. See Seidenfeld, supra note 406, at 464-65. 
 414. See Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA’s Struggle to Pass Food 
Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 142, 142 (1998). 
 415. See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A 
Comparative Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000). 
 416. Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2560. 
 417. Alicia Mundy, Big John Takes Charge, MEDIAWEEK, Dec. 16, 1996, at 
17, 20. 
 418. Id. (speaking of the broadcasters’ reaction to “the first notice of the 
word auction.”); see also Dan Carney, HDTV: Don’t Blame the FCC for Tuning 
Out, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 5, 2001, at 52 (characterizing the broadcasting 
industry as “accustomed to getting its way in Washington.”). 
 419. See Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2561 (noting that much of its 
revenues are generated by its annual convention in Las Vegas, attended by 
90,000 industry participants). 
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million in Washington lobbying expenses in 2002.420  Its 
contributions to federal political candidates are lavish.421  At 
the height of the deliberations on the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, when Congress was deciding whether broadcasters 
should pay for or agree to additional public interest obligations 
in exchange for their digital spectrum, the broadcast industry 
targeted the largest of its contributions to the chairmen of the 
Senate and House telecommunications subcommittees, Sen. 
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) (receiving $515,499) and Rep. Jack 
Fields (R-Tex.) (receiving $221,228).422  The fifty largest media 
firms spent $111 million in lobbying in the four years after the 
1996 Telecom Act.423  In light of this generosity with political 
dollars, few doubt the veracity of NAB president Edward O. 
Fritts’s boast that “no one has more sway with members of 
Congress than the local broadcaster.”424 
The NAB’s generosity also extends to the FCC regulators 
themselves.  In May 2003, the Center for Public Integrity 
released a report finding that between May 1995 and February 
2003, the FCC officials had accepted nearly $2.8 million in 
airfare, lodging and entertainment expenses.  The vast 
majority of these funds were provided by the broadcast and 
telecommunications entities which are regulated by the FCC.425  
                                                          
 420. See id. 
 421. In the 2002 election cycle, radio and television stations (not including 
the networks and entities that own them) donated $5,417,845 to federal 
campaigns and political parties.  See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, TV/Radio 
Stations: Long-Term Contribution Trends, available at www.opensecrets.org.  
Media conglomerate Viacom alone made $1 million in donations to 
Congressional campaigns in 2002. Robert W. McChesney and John Nichols, 
Media Democracy’s Moment, THE NATION, Feb. 6, 2003, at 16, 16 (reporting 
that media corporations contributed roughly $75 million to congressional 
candidates between 1993 and 2000). 
 422. See Arthur E. Rowse, A Lobby the Media Won’t Touch; The Media 
Lobby Itself, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1998, at 8, 11. 
 423. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 55 (citing the Center for Public 
Integrity). 
 424. Taylor, supra note 21, at 20. 
 425. See Bob Williams & Morgan Jindrich, Ctr. for Public Integrity, On the 
Road Again – and Again: FCC Officials Rack Up $2.8 Million Travel Tab With 
Industries They Regulate, (May 22, 2003), at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=15 see also Bob 
Herbert, Editorial, Cozy With the FCC, N. Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at A35.  For 
its 2003 annual convention, the NAB paid $26,309 to fly in, lodge and feed 17 
FCC officials, including all five of the commissioners.  See Bob Williams & 
John Dunbar, Ctr. for Public Integrity, FCC Plans to Nix Industry-Paid 
Travel, WELL CONNECTED, Sept. 2, 2003 (noting that FCC Chairman Michael 
Powell had initiated a review of the FCC’s travel budgeting to “substantially 
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In 1999, Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-La.), then chairman of the House 
Commerce Committee, the committee that oversees the FCC, 
accepted an all-expense paid ($18,910) trip to Paris, France for 
him and his wife, courtesy of Time Warner and Instinet.426  
Also notable is that Tauzin’s daughter, Kimberly Tauzin, 
served as a key lobbyist at the NAB during the 1990s.427 
The broadcast industry’s largesse in providing free travel 
to its FCC regulators appears to have had the (intended) effect 
of giving industry lobbyists unusually unfettered, closed-door 
access to these policymakers.  In advance of the FCC’s 
controversial June 2, 2003 vote to relax or altogether eliminate 
certain longstanding media ownership caps, key FCC 
regulators met seventy-one times with broadcast industry 
lobbyists and senior executives in closed-door meetings to 
discuss the proposals.428 
The “Captured” Congress 
The term “agency capture” does not properly describe the 
extent of the broadcast industry’s influence in Washington, 
considering that Congress itself is so beholden to broadcast 
interests that its link to broadcasters has been characterized as 
that of an “umbilical cord.”429  Perhaps the most compelling 
evidence of broadcasters’ power on Capital Hill was their 
                                                          
reduce” reliance on industry funding), at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=62 . 
 426. Charles Lewis, Media Money, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 
2000, at 20-22. 
 427. Id. at 22. 
 428. See Bob Williams, Ctr. for Public Integrity, Behind Closed Doors: Top 
Broadcasters Met 71 Times with FCC Officials, WELL CONNECTED, May 29, 
2003, at  http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=83&sid=200. 
 429. See KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 89-90 (citing ROBERT 
MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE: THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON 
AMERICAN POLITICS 243 (1968)); see also BREYER, STEWART ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 533 (5th ed. 2002) (noting that 
from its inception the broadcast licensing regime “provided ‘pork barrel’ to 
local congressional districts; local television stations provided jobs for 
constituents and also provided a way for local merchants to advertise 
efficiently their local goods and services to local consumers”).  Interestingly, 
the symbiotic relationship between politicians and the media is much older 
than broadcasting.  Upon his assumption of the presidency in 1829, Andrew 
Jackson found “plush political appointments” for fifty-nine newspaper 
reporters assigned to cover Washington and earmarked $25,000 annually to 
lavish upon the editor of the Washington daily newspaper. MCCHESNEY, supra 
note 147, at 28, (citing  TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE 
NEWS MEDIA AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 26-32 (1998)). 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
2004] CHANGING CHANNELS 85 
 
reaction to then-Senator Bob Dole’s insistence that 
broadcasters pay fair market value or accept more extensive 
public interest obligations in exchange for their new digital 
channels by means of a spectrum auction.  Once Dole had 
recruited Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) to his effort to make 
broadcasters pay,430 the NAB launched a $9.5 million 
advertising campaign, by means of what they called “public 
service announcements,” urging viewers to tell their Members 
of Congress to save “free TV” and not impose a “tax on free 
television” that would force the cancellation of “your favorite 
shows.”431 
Facing a flurry of telephone calls, e-mail messages and 
letters from constituents alarmed by the NAB’s ads, Dole 
accused the broadcasters of misleading their viewers and 
“bullying Congress.”432  Despite his anger, he backed off his 
insistence on auctions and resigned on June 11, 1996 to run for 
President – an endeavor in which it pays to have broadcasters 
on your side.433  Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the 1996 
Telecom Act incorporating the free giveaway of digital 
spectrum to broadcasters, and Trent Lott (R-Miss.), the new 
Senate Majority Leader, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-
Ga.) sent a letter to the FCC directing it to grant the new 
digital channels to broadcasters without engaging in an 
auction.434  The NAB’s success in killing the spectrum auction 
concept and obtaining the new spectrum for free was such a 
significant lobbying coup that the usually sober National 
Journal called it “spectacular[].”435  Moreover, the DTV 
spectrum giveaway is but one of the NAB’s legislative successes 
in recent years.436 
                                                          
 430. Mundy, supra note 417, at 20 (statement of Senator John McCain) (“I 
want to see taxpayers get value from this resource, which the spectrum is.  It’s 
not visible like most natural resources, like an oil resource, or public land, a 
gold mine you can see or touch. And I agree that there is certainly some 
legitimacy to the argument that broadcasters want to make this transition to 
[digital TV], and need time to change over. But to get this absolutely free? . . . 
No way.”) (alteration in original). 
 431. Rowse, supra note 422, at 9. 
 432. Id. Senator McCain agreed, calling the NAB’s ads “an absolutely false 
scare tactic.”  Taylor, supra note 21, at 21. 
 433. See Mundy supra note 417, at 20 (“Logic says that in an election, you 
don’t go ticking off broadcasters if you can avoid it.”). 
 434. Rowse supra note 422, at 9; Taylor supra note 21 at 20. 
 435. Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2561. 
 436. Id. 
In recent years, the NAB has helped torpedo FCC efforts to encourage 
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The core of the influence that the broadcast industry holds 
over Congress is not money nor lobbying muscle, but exposure.  
Most Americans get their news from television.437  As most 
news programs cover at least some federal political stories, 
elected officials are keenly interested in getting favorable 
exposure on their constituents’ local television stations.  It is in 
their best political interests, therefore, to avoid offending the 
very broadcasters who report on their successes and failures in 
Washington, as well as their personal lives, to the voters and 
donors back home.438  This is particularly true given an elected 
official’s awareness that these broadcasters also have the power 
not to report on them at all.439 
The nourishment in the umbilical cord connecting 
broadcasters and Congress, however, flows in both directions.  
The broadcast lobby often lobbies Congress in order to persuade 
                                                          
low-power FM radio.  It has stymied attempts to provide free or 
deeply discounted airtime to politicians.  It has worked to allow 
greater consolidation within the radio industry.  It has maintained 
local broadcasters’ guaranteed placement on cable and satellite TV 
systems.  And it has worked to kill new taxes or user fees on 
broadcasting. 
Id. 
 437. See Sallie Hofmeister, Is Free TV Worth Saving in a 500 Channel 
World?, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A1. 
 438. Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 22, at 2562 (statement of former 
Congressman Henson Moore (R-La.))(“Obviously, the broadcasters report the 
news, so I think most people in elective politics listen to them.”); see also, 
KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 90 (“Broadcasters control a very important 
commodity to politicians – electronic media exposure.”)  As commentator Paul 
Taylor put it, broadcasters “hold the ticket to every congressman’s heart – 
access to the six o’clock news.”  Taylor, supra note 21, at 21.  Broadcasters 
“live in a world where image is a fragile commodity, where paranoia is a 
survival tool and where it’s taken as a given that if the station manager, the 
news director and the anchorman think you’re a helluva guy, that’s a very 
good thing.”  Id. 
 439. But it’s not just what broadcasters can say about elected officials that 
gives them power; it’s also what they do not say.  Congressman Barney Frank 
(D-MA) notes: 
We know they have enormous discretion over what goes on the air 
each night and what doesn’t.  It’s not that members of Congress fear 
out-and-out retribution.  It’s more subtle.  They worry that the station 
might decide to just ignore the shit out of them.  Now I happen to be 
at the stage in my career where if they never say another word about 
me, a blessing on their head.  But, for a lot of members, it can have a 
chilling effect. 
Taylor, supra note 21 at 21; see also Rowse, supra note 422, at 11 (“When you 
consider how reliant politicians are on the media for both access and campaign 
donations, it’s hardly surprising that, when it comes to personal contacts, 
nobody has a greater ability to open doors than newspaper publishers and 
broadcasters.”). 
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prominent members to do the broadcasters’ bidding at the FCC.  
Because the FCC is an independent regulatory agency outside 
of the protective layers of the executive branch, it is especially 
susceptible to congressional influence.440  Former FCC 
Commissioner Glen Robinson described it this way: “The chief 
purpose for lobbying Congress today is not so much to obtain 
legislation but rather to gain Congressional leverage to 
pressure the agency to take some particular action.”441 
Another contributor to the broadcast industry’s political 
influence is its selective coverage of itself.  The broadcast 
industry avoids drawing attention to its own dealings in 
Washington.  After the industry’s controversial but stealthy 
success in pressuring Congress to give it digital spectrum for 
free, Senator McCain remarked: “What troubles me is that the 
voters never got a clear picture of this giveaway on television. 
‘The Fleecing of America,’ ‘It’s Your Money,’ – where were 
they?”442 
No national television networks covered the “great 
spectrum giveaway” in their network news programs.443  Their 
                                                          
 440. KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 44, at 88-89.  Newton Minow, FCC 
Chairman in the Kennedy Administration, recounts that shortly after his 
confirmation, House Speaker Sam Rayburn put his arm around him and 
warned, “Just remember one thing, son.  Your agency is an arm of the 
Congress; you belong to us.  Remember that and you’ll be all right.”  Id. at 89 
(citing Newton N. Minow, Politics and the Regulatory Agencies, 68 COLUM. L. 
REV. 383, 384. (1968) (book review)). 
 441. KRASNOW ET. AL., supra note 44, at 89-90 (quoting Glen O. Robinson, 
The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory 
Watchdogs, 69 VA. L. REV. 169, 175 (1978)).  An unnamed FCC official called 
broadcast lobbyists “downright arrogant” when they demand specific favors 
from the Commission.  Instead of presenting their arguments dispassionately, 
“they come in with the attitude: ‘[i]f you don’t do what we want, we’ll kill you 
on the Hill.” Rowse, supra note 422, at 11; see also KRASNOW ET AL., supra 
note 44, at 90 (noting the "tense mutual interdependence" of Congress and 
broadcast lobbyists (quoting ROBERT MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE: THE 
INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON AMERICAN POLITICS 243 (1968))). 
 442. William Safire, Editorial, Broadcast Industry Abuses Power as it Seeks 
to Protect Itself, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 24, 1997, at  A14.  
Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt agreed: 
It’s bad enough that broadcasters are being given both digital and 
analog channels in perpetuity, without paying money or in-kind.  
Worse is that there have been no major televised discussions of the 
issues.  The number one missing piece in the puzzle is, why wasn’t 
this story about TV covered on TV? 
William Safire, Broadcast Lobby Triumphs, N. Y. TIMES, July 23, 1997, at 
A21. 
 443. Rowse, supra note 422, at 9 (“[T]he fact that congressional leaders 
could hand out such a treasure trove of public property without causing an 
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stunning lobbying achievement went largely without any public 
scrutiny.444  Newspapers largely failed to fill the silence, 
possibly because of their own significant interests in 
commercial television stations and the profit making potential 
they stood to gain as a result of the giveaway.445  Lack of 
coverage minimizes public outrage over favorable treatment for 
broadcasters, and keeps the public unaware and unmotivated 
to demand reform from their legislators in Washington.446 
Finally, as with other “captured” agencies, the FCC is 
legendary in Washington politicolegal circles for its “golden 
                                                          
uproar was due not so much to expert lobbying as to thin news coverage.”); see 
also Jeff Cohen, TV Industry Wields Power in DC, THE BALTIMORE SUN, May 
4, 1997 at 6F (characterizing the digital spectrum giveaway as “a rip-off that 
never got mentioned on any of the nightly network news segments”).  Cohen, 
director of media watchdog group, FAIR, says: “with vast influence over 
Congress – and confidence that its clout will be ignored by network reporters – 
the TV lobby is one of the key obstacles to political reform in our country.  It’s 
a mark of television’s power that this obstacle remains so shrouded.”  Id. 
 444. See e.g., Neil Hickey, What’s at Stake in the Spectrum War? Only 
Billions of Dollars and the Future of Television, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 
July/Aug. 1996, at 39, 40. 
A somnolent press…has failed ignominiously to report the story, 
either because most journalists simply don’t know about it, or don’t 
understand its importance, or think it’s too complex to convey or, in 
the case of TV people, are loath to roil the waters and inflame the 
public’s passions on an issue in whose outcome TV networks and 
stations have a huge monetary interest. 
Id. 
 445. The Washington Post owns six television stations, the New York 
Times eight television stations and Gannett, the publisher of USA Today and 
92 other newspapers across the country, owns 20 television stations.  Rowse, 
supra note 422, at 9.  A study involving 100 newspapers discovered that “every 
one whose owners got little TV revenue editorialized against the spectrum 
‘giveaway,’ whereas every one with high TV revenues editorialized in favor of 
giving broadcasters free use of spectrum.” Id. (quoting James H. Snider & 
Benjamin I. Page, The Political Power of TV Broadcasters: Covert Bias and 
Anticipated Reactions, (1997), available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/Pub_File_1237_1.pdf. 
 446. In fact, a Lake Snell Perry & Associates poll commissioned by the 
Benton Foundation in 1998 found that most Americans (71%) were unaware 
that broadcasters do not pay for their use of broadcast spectrum, and that 
most (56%) believed that broadcasters paid from hundreds of thousands to 
millions of dollars for their broadcast licenses. Comments of the Benton 
Found., Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket 
No. 99-360, at 4-5 (filed Mar. 27, 2000) (quoting data from Lake, Snell, Perry 
& Associates, Television in the Digital Age: A Report to the Project on Media 
Ownership and the Benton Foundation,  December 1998.) The poll found that 
most Americans surveyed (79%) favored a proposal to require digital 
broadcasters to pay 5% of their revenues to a fund subsidizing public 
television, and that 80% supported the imposition of specific, quantified public 
interest obligations in exchange for use of the spectrum. Id. at 5. 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
2004] CHANGING CHANNELS 89 
 
revolving door.”447  For example, the two premier 
communications law practices in Washington, are headed by 
two former FCC Chairmen, Charles D. Ferris448 and Richard 
Wiley.449  And there are numerous recent examples of 
prominent attorneys who left senior policymaking positions at 
the FCC for senior lobbyist jobs representing industry players 
before their former FCC colleagues.450 
III.  REDEMPTION: PAST PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND 
A NEW IDEA 
A.  PAST PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The dysfunction and obsolescence of the public trustee 
doctrine has elicited a great number of proposals for reform 
aimed at having television broadcasters finally “pay their debt” 
to the American people.  As detailed above, Senator Bob Dole 
led a number of his colleagues in demanding the replacement of 
the public trustee doctrine with the requirement that 
                                                          
 447. See Niles, supra note 393, at 399. 
 448. FCC chairman between 1977 and 1981, now a name partner at Mintz, 
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC, and with whom I worked at 
Mintz Levin between 1994 and 1996. 
 449. FCC general counsel, commissioner and chairman between 1970 and 
1977; founding partner of Wiley, Rein & Fielding. 
 450. On December 15, 2003, Marsha J. MacBride, former FCC chief of staff 
under chairman Michael Powell started her position as the executive vice 
president for legal and regulatory affairs at the NAB.  Ted Hearn, MacBride 
Joins NAB’s Legal Staff, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Dec. 15, 2003, at 24 (“In her 
new role, MacBride will steer the NAB’s lobbying efforts at the FCC, 
essentially seeking favorable regulatory rulings from old colleagues for 
thousands of radio and television stations.”). In late 2002, longtime 
telecommunications lawyer and lobbyist Nancy Victory left her firm to become 
President Bush’s senior communications policy advisor as Administrator of the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).  
Following her appointment, industry lobbyists threw a lavish, $480 per 
person, party to celebrate her appointment.  Ten days later, she pressured the 
FCC to side with the lobbyists in a spectrum dispute.   Lobbyists Held Party 
for Bush Telecommunications Official, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at A19; 
Editorial, Cozying Up, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2003, at A20. On September 15, 
2002, Dorothy Attwood, former chief of the FCC’s Wireline Competition 
Bureau, left her FCC job to become the senior vice president for federal 
regulatory strategy for SBC Communications, “helping the telecom giant work 
to reshape the rules she helped draft.” Phone Booth Revolving Door, 
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Mar. 1, 2003, at 7. Gene Kimmelman of the 
Consumers Union remarked, “to actually set foot in the place that soon after 
you leave a top policy role, it’s just stunning.  She’s just symptomatic of the 
whole captured-agency problem.” Id. at 8. 
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commercial broadcasters pay fair market value for their digital 
channels.451  Their arguments could not, however, withstand 
the formidable political influence of the broadcast lobby, and 
the 1996 Telecom Act passed with the free digital license “give-
away” provisions intact. 
Others have argued that in light of the lucrative 
opportunities provided broadcasters by means of the DTV 
transition, the FCC should demand more public interest “quid” 
for the digital spectrum “quo.”  For example, the proposals of 
the Gore Commission and a number of advocacy organizations 
participating in the FCC’s proceedings on the digital TV public 
interest obligations, such as the Media Access Project, 
advocated more quantifiable and specific public interest 
obligations.  They urged the FCC to require broadcasters to use 
the expansive capacity and capabilities of their new digital 
channels to air a minimum amount of public affairs, 
educational and children’s television.452 They also suggested 
that the FCC require that broadcasters play a central role in 
campaign finance reform by providing free airtime to political 
candidates in advance of elections.453 
In April 2004, a coalition of media watchdog organizations 
petitioned the FCC to adopt new “public interest processing 
guidelines,” to be enforced during the review of broadcast 
station license renewal applications.454  The coalition’s 
proposed guidelines include a minimum of three hours per 
week on the broadcaster’s primary digital programming signal 
                                                          
 451. See supra notes 430-435 and accompanying text. 
 452. See, e.g., Comments of the Media Access Project, Public Interest 
Obligations of TV Broadcast Licenses, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 27, 
2000); Comments of Benton Found., Public Interest Obligations of TV 
Broadcast Licenses, MM Docket No. 99-360 (filed Mar. 27, 2000).. 
 453. See, e.g., Media Access Project, Promoting Civic Discourse and 
Protecting Free Speech in Broadcast Media, (2004), at 
www.mediaaccess.org/programs/civicdisc. 
 454. See ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, BENTON FOUND., CTR. FOR 
CREATIVE VOICES IN MEDIA, CTR. FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, COMMON CAUSE, 
INST. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION OF  GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., MEDIA 
ACCESS PROJECT, NEW AM. FOUND., & OFFICE OF COMMUNICATION OF THE 
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS PROPOSED 
PROCESSING GUIDELINES (April 7, 2004 ) (petition submitted to the Federal 
Communications Committee), available at 
www.ourairwaves.org/docs/index.php?DocID=56.   The coalition proposes that 
broadcast license renewal applicants whose applications document compliance 
with all of the proposed guidelines “will receive staff level approval” within the 
FCC, whereas failure to comply with the guidelines would result in referral of 
the application to the full Commission for review.  Id. at 2. 
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of “local civic or electoral affairs programming” that is 
“designed to provide the public with information about local 
issues.”455 
To the extent that various proposals, old and new, for 
increased public interest programming are valiant attempts to 
revive the public trustee doctrine, they deserve serious 
Congressional and FCC consideration.  Unfortunately, as 
demonstrated above, the chances for Congress and the FCC to 
adopt heightened public interest requirements are remote at 
best.  Even if new, strict public interest guidelines were 
adopted, their enforcement would still be in the hands of an 
agency unwilling to enforce judgments about the nature and 
purpose of broadcast content. 
More extreme proposals to replace our current regime with 
one more akin to the British model – in which the state 
provides significant programming and operating subsidies to 
government-controlled broadcasters, financed by “license” fees 
for radio and television receivers456 – have not received any 
substantial attention since the NAB succeeded at quashing 
such proposals during the initial regulatory debates of the late 
1920s and early 1930s.457  The BBC model itself has withered 
under persistent attacks by British commentators who 
characterize it as paternalistic and elitist.458  British media 
critic Ien Ang claimed that to the BBC governors, “public 
service broadcasting” was nothing but “enlightened cultural 
dictatorship, in which a single set of standards and tastes was 
                                                          
 455. “Local civic programming includes broadcasts of interviews with or 
statements by elected or appointed officials and relevant experts on issues of 
importance to the community, government meetings, legislative sessions, 
conferences featuring elected officials, and substantive discussions of civic 
issues of interest to local communities or groups.”  Id. at 2.  In addition, the 
proposed guidelines include a requirement that broadcasters who are affiliates 
of a national network (i.e., ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox, UPN and WB) must transmit 
“independently produced programming,” defined as programming produced 
“by an entity not owned or controlled by an owner of a national television 
network,” for at least 25 percent of the primary channel’s prime time schedule.  
Id. at 4.  The proposal also includes reporting requirements. Id. 
 456. For an excellent description of the British model see STARR, supra note 
34, at 340-41. 
 457. MCCHESNEY, supra note 147 at 40-41. 
 458. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. BAKER AND GEORGE DESSART, DOWN THE TUBE: 
AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN TELEVISION 46 (1998) 
(quoting a Labour Member of Parliament as dismissing the BBC as “run very 
largely by people who do not know the working class point of view, do not 
understand the working class point of view, but are seeking evidently to mould 
the working class.”) 
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imposed on the entire national audience.”459 
Henry Geller, a highly respected television industry 
analyst and former FCC General Counsel, proposed the more 
moderate idea of an annual “spectrum usage fee” of up to three 
percent of a broadcast licensee’s gross advertising revenues, 
that the government would use to increase funding for the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), the entity 
chartered by Congress in 1967 to administer and fund public 
television programming.460  The CPB would utilize the cross-
subsidy to fund more and better quality public affairs, 
educational and cultural fare on public television stations.461 
Geller’s idea is compelling in light of the persistent 
underfunding of American public television stations,462 the 
difficulties public broadcasters had in upgrading their facilities 
to the digital format,463 and because public broadcasters – as 
not-for-profit organizations – generally do not have the same 
profit making pressures as their commercial brethren.  Instead, 
they tend to have organizational missions that are more 
aligned with the public interest aspirations of the public 
trustee doctrine. 
Although the Geller proposal would be a significant 
improvement on the status quo, a number of important 
concerns counsel against its adoption.  First, it would not 
                                                          
 459. IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING THE AUDIENCE 109 (1991) (“What 
[BBC Chief] Reith strived for was the creation of a common national culture: 
the BBC’s self-conception was that of a ‘national church’ to whose authority all 
citizens must be subjected.”).   Interestingly, American novelist and 
philosopher Ayn Rand criticized the American broadcasting regulation model 
as suffering from a similar elitism as that afflicting the BBC.  She called the 
public interest standard “the intellectual knife of collectivism’s sacrificial 
guillotine…. a blank check on totalitarian power over the broadcasting 
industry, granted to whatever bureaucrats happened to be appointed to the 
[Federal Communications] Commission.”  AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE 
UNKNOWN IDEAL 126 (1967). 
 460. Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 362-66 (1998). 
 461. See HENRY GELLER & TIM WATTS, THE FIVE PERCENT SOLUTION: A 
SPECTRUM FEE TO REPLACE THE ‘PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS’ OF 
BROADCASTERS (New Am. Found. Spectrum Series Working Paper #3, 2002), 
available at http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/ 
Pub_File_844_1.PDF. 
 462. See generally Monroe E. Price, Public Broadcasting and the Crisis of 
Corporate Governance, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417 (1999). 
 463. See Geneva Collins, Public TV Seeks ‘Flexibility’ In Money-Making 
Uses of DTV, CURRENT, Feb. 22, 1999, available at 
www.current.org/dtv/dtv903a.html. 
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counter the possibility that Congress would simply use the 
commercial-to-public television cross-subsidy as an excuse to 
reduce federal funding for the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting, resulting in little or no net increase in funding 
for public television.  This is an especially realistic possibility 
considering that certain members of Congress continue to insist 
that Congress cease funding public television.464  Second, it still 
would not guarantee the provision of locally oriented, 
responsive public interest programming to the American 
public.  The FCC would be no less restrained by the First 
Amendment in prescribing the quantity and characteristics of 
public interest programming on public television stations as it 
is in requiring such content from commercial licensees. 
In addition, although public broadcasters have a better 
track record in providing public interest programming, critics 
have bemoaned the structure of the American public television 
industry as too beholden to Congressional whims, political 
appointees at the CPB and other government funding sources.  
Public television producer and industry expert Roger P. Smith, 
in fact, complains that “[o]ur state television acts in the 
interest of and selectively promulgates ideas that contribute to 
the perceived interest of a cadre of occupants of elective 
office.”465  The Geller proposal, if implemented, may help 
alleviate the chilling Congressional influence on public 
television broadcasters, but it may also exacerbate the problem 
by allowing public television broadcasters to rely more on 
publicly administered funds and less on the contributions of 
their viewers.466  Moreover, public broadcasting, like the BBC, 
                                                          
 464. See, e.g., Karen Everhart Bedford, What to Kill First? The Right 
nominates CPB — to Save Tax Money and "Privatize the Left", CURRENT, Jan. 
16, 1995, available at http://www.current.org/mo501.html. 
 465. ROGER P. SMITH, THE OTHER FACE OF PUBLIC TV: CENSORING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 9 ( 2002).  He writes: 
All the programs you watch on public TV must meet the approval of 
gatekeepers in the United States Congress and the Executive Branch 
of the Federal Government. . . . Billed as ‘yours’ on its station breaks, 
public TV is yours the way a Stealth bomber is yours. . . it’s paid for 
largely with your tax money and made in your name according to the 
decisions of a few dozen men whose inclinations have led them to 
pursue public office as your representatives. 
Id. 
 466. On the other hand, public television’s dependence on the generosity of 
viewers and corporate donors has resulted in what some have described as a 
vulnerability to commercial exploitation and control.  See, e.g., Susan E. Linn 
and Alvin F. Poussaint, The Trouble with Teletubbies: The Commercialization 
of PBS, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, May-June 1999, at 18, available at 
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has endured criticism for being culturally elitist and exclusive 
in its programming decisions.467 
Finally, public television stations – like their commercial 
counterparts – are permitted to use the expansive capacity in 
their new digital channel for ancillary profit making uses, 
including leasing spectrum to paging companies, pay-per-view 
enterprises and other services.468  These new opportunities may 
help remedy the longstanding challenges public broadcasters 
have faced and that Geller addresses in his proposal. 
B.  PAYING THE OVERDUE DEBT: BROADCASTERS AS DIGITAL 
DIVIDE BRIDGE BUILDERS 
This article presents a novel approach to fixing the 
persistent problem of the public trustee doctrine.  Congress and 
the FCC should require commercial television broadcasters to 
assume an important role in making broadband469 Internet 
access available to more Americans, particularly those who do 
not currently have such access because they cannot afford it or 
because it is not offered in their communities.  Under this 
approach, broadcasters would not only be required to continue 
satisfying their minimal and constructively unenforced public 
interest programming requirements (for example, political 
broadcasting and children’s educational television) but would 
also be required to help bridge the “digital divide” with a 
                                                          
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleI
d=4581. 
 467. See, e.g., Editorial, Public Television and ‘Elitism', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 1995 at A20 (acknowledging and rejecting as “myth” public television’s 
reputation in some circles as an “elitist” enterprise). 
 468. See Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digital Television Capacity by 
Noncommercial Licensees: Before the Fed. Communications Comm., 14 
F.C.C.R. 3259 (2001) (Report and Order). 
 469. “Broadband” simply means a connection to the Internet allowing for 
much higher speed – and therefore capacity – for information to be delivered 
to the customer’s computer.  Whereas a broadband Internet connection’s speed 
is approximately 2 megabits per second (mbps), a “narrowband” Internet 
connection has a maximum speed of 56 kilobits per second (kbps).  See Enrico 
C. Soriano, et al., A Look at Key Issues Currently Shaping Broadband 
Deployment and Regulation, 21 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 1, 1 n.6  (July 
2004); see also Fed. Communications Comm., Broadband, at 
www.fcc.gov/broadband (last modified Mar. 3, 2003).  In practical terms, a 
broadband Internet connection can be as much as 100 times faster (and more 
capacious) than narrowband, allowing for the transmission of near-television 
quality video and audio programming, and the quick downloading of 
documents and other files.  Fed. Communications Comm., Broadband, at 
www.fcc.gov/broadband (last modified Mar. 3, 2003). 
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relatively small portion of the significant profits they realize in 
exploiting public spectrum. 
First articulated in the mid-1990s, the “digital divide” 
refers to the disparity in access to computers, the Internet and 
other high technology by, primarily, the poor, people of color, 
the undereducated, and the aged.470  Although Internet access 
of any kind (narrowband as well as broadband) has become 
more widespread across socioeconomic strata throughout the 
last five years, persistent gaps remain.  A study completed in 
August 2003 found that although Internet access rates had 
improved for most Americans, Internet access among African-
Americans (51%) still significantly trailed that of whites 
(64%).471  Another study completed in April 2003 by the Pew 
Internet and American Life Project found that although race 
remains a determinant of Internet access, the fundamental 
predictive factor is that of household income.472  In light of the 
relatively high cost of home PCs and monthly Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) subscriptions for even basic dial-up 
(narrowband) access,473 a household income above $50,000 
                                                          
 470. In discussing the “digital divide,” President Bill Clinton said:  “There 
is a growing digital divide between those who have access to the digital 
economy and the Internet and those who don’t, and the divide exists along the 
lines of education, income, region, and race.”  John Schwartz, U.S. Cities Race 
Gap In Use of Internet: Clinton Bemoans ‘Digital Divide’, WASH. POST, July 9, 
1999, at A1. 
 471. PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, AMERICA’S ONLINE PURSUITS: 
THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WHO’S ONLINE AND WHAT THEY DO 5 (Dec. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/ 
PIP_Online_Pursuits_Final.PDF.   In October 2000, the Department of 
Commerce released a report concluding that white (46.1%) and Asian 
American/Pacific Islander (56.8%) households had Internet access at a level 
more than double that of African-American (23.5%) and Latino (23.6%) 
households. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD 
DIGITAL INCLUSION: A REPORT ON AMERICANS’ ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY 
TOOLS, 12 (October 2000), available at 
http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf.  This report was the fourth in a series 
of annual reports.  Among households earning $75,000 and above annually, 
Internet access was at 77.7%, whereas only 12.7% of households with annual 
earnings of less than $15,000 per year had Internet access. Id. at 8. 
 472. AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET AND AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE EVER-
SHIFTING INTERNET POPULATION: A NEW LOOK AT INTERNET ACCESS AND THE 
DIGITAL DIVIDE 5 (Apr. 16, 2003) ("Independent of all other factors, having an 
income above $50,000 annually predicts internet use."),  available at 
www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=88. 
 473. In a December 2004 article, Consumer Reports estimated the cost of 
an Internet-ready personal computer with the bare requirements for 
acceptable Internet access as falling between $500 and $700.  Ratings: Desktop 
Computers, CONSUMER REPORTS, December 2004, at 
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annually is most predictive of Internet access.474  That study 
also noted that educational level and age were significant 
determinants as well, with less educated and older Americans 
less able, or less willing, to access the Internet.475 
Not all policymakers agree that the “digital divide” merits 
concern.  FCC Chairman Michael Powell, for example, 
dismissed the “so called digital divide” as “a Mercedes divide,” 
chiding: “I’d like to have one; I can’t afford one . . . .”476  
Although some dispute the severity and longevity of the digital 
divide, there is general consensus among lawmakers, 
educators, the telecommunications industry and its critics that 
the digital divide continues to exist.477 
None other than President George Bush has spoken in 
support of government initiatives seeking to expand access to 
broadband Internet service.  In a June 24, 2004 speech at the 
Department of Commerce, he set a goal to make broadband 
Internet access universally available in the United States by 
2007.478  Citing that the United States ranks tenth in the world 
in terms of per capita access to broadband Internet services, 
President Bush noted that “[t]he spread of broadband will not 
only help industry, it’ll help the quality of life of our 
citizens.”479  He noted that to achieve universal access, 
                                                          
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/content/display_report.jsp?FOLDER%3
C%3Efolder_id=516851&ASSORTMENT%3C%3East_id=333133&bmUID=110
1003920336.  A monthly subscription to a narrowband, dial-up ISP (such as 
AOL and MSN) is approximately $20.00.  Broadband Internet:  Worth the 
Switch?, CONSUMER REPORTS, September 2002, at 
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/content/display_report.jsp?FOLDER%3
C%3Efolder_id=334697&ASSORTMENT%3C%3East_id=333133&bmUID=110
1004274458.  By contrast, broadband connections cost approximately $35 to 
$40 per month, if available at all in a customer’s service area, and are 
typically provided by standard telephone companies using upgraded Digital 
Subscriber Line (DSL) wiring or cable television companies using cable 
modems.  See generally BROADBAND REPORTS.COM, 
www.broadbandreports.com. 
 474. Lenhart, supra note 472, at 5. 
 475. Id. at 8-9. 
 476. Stephen Labaton, New FCC Chief Would Curb Agency Reach, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at C1. 
 477. See President George Bush, Speech to U.S. Dept. of Commerce (June 
24, 2004) transcript available at http://www.multied.com/elections/2004/ 
2004mainelec/Bushspeeches/Technology.html. [hereinafter Bush Broadband 
Speech]; Allen S. Hammond, The Digital Divide in the New Millennium, 20 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 135-36 (2002). 
 478. See Editorial, Broadband Penetration, BALT. SUN, April 28, 2004, at 
18A. 
 479. See Bush Broadband Speech, supra note 477. 
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broadband Internet service must be deployed to the areas of the 
country where it is still unavailable, and it must be made more 
affordable.480  The campaign staff of the 2004 Democratic 
Presidential candidate, John Kerry, released a statement 
making a similar commitment to broadband Internet access.481  
Unfortunately, as noted by a number of observers, both the 
President and Senator Kerry failed to support their rhetoric 
with tangible proposals to reach the goal of universal service by 
2007.482 
1. The Internet as the True “Free Marketplace of Ideas” 
Having broadcasters subsidize access to the Internet for 
those poor or underserved households may help achieve, 
finally, the unmet aspirations of American broadcast regulation 
“to cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic 
dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population, 
and more robust, culturally inclusive communities.”483  With 
the Internet, Congress and broadcasters for the first time have 
the opportunity to help create the “free marketplace of ideas” 
envisioned by Justice Holmes, where ideas are traded and 
truth distilled without the encroachment and influence of 
government.  The Internet is the quintessential, egalitarian 
public forum.  Anyone with access to it can speak and be heard 
as well as hear (or read) the ideas of others, all with almost no 
government interference.484  Writer Declan McCullagh suggests 
that individuals should “[t]hink of the Internet as an unlimited 
expanse of public park, where soapboxes are available for free 
                                                          
 480. Id. 
 481. See Political Disconnect: Bush, Kerry Tout Broadband for All, But 
Critics Say Neither Has Concrete Plan for Achieving Critical Goal, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 26, 2004, at 1B 
 482. See id. The Kerry campaign suggested using public money to subsidize 
access to underserved areas as well as a tax credit for those providers who 
serve those areas.  Id.   In his speech before the Commerce Department, the 
President stated that a ban on taxing broadband access should help make it 
more affordable.  Bush Broadband Speech, supra note 477. 
 483. From the beginning, broadcast regulation in the public interest has 
sought to meet certain basic needs of American politics and culture, over and 
above what the marketplace may or may not provide.  See CHARTING THE 
DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 7, at 21. 
 484. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 24 (1999) (citing Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, Of 
Governance and Technology, INTER@CTIVE WEEKONLINE, October 5, 1998 
(“Some things never change about governing the Web. Most prominent is its 
innate ability to resist governance in almost any form”)) available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990922122310/www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/n
ews/0,4164,357750,00.html. 
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to anyone who wants one.”485  The problem, of course, is that 
McCullagh is half right.  He is right that once one has access to 
the Internet’s “public park,” one can climb on a soapbox and 
speak at no additional expense.  The problem, however, is that 
the park’s admission price is too steep for many Americans, and 
the park’s entrance gates are too far away for others.  While the 
advent of the Internet has lowered barriers among those who 
have access to it, it has exacerbated divisions between those 
who can afford the Internet – and the new digital era’s 
marketplace of ideas – and those who cannot. 
Notwithstanding barriers to access, the Internet has 
already proven itself to be a more useful tool for democratic 
interaction and deliberation than television.  Whereas 
television broadcasting is by definition passive, the Internet is 
fundamentally interactive and participatory.486  Whereas 
television provides narrow, homogenized content designed 
primarily to attract the greatest number of viewers (and 
advertising dollars), the Internet offers an almost limitless 
array of information streams and opportunities for active 
engagement.  The Internet has become America’s expansive 
public forum where diverse people meet, exchange ideas, trade 
goods and engage in many of the other activities traditionally 
performed in the “town square.”  As Justice Kennedy noted in 
1996, “[m]inds are not changed in the streets and parks as they 
once were.  To an increasing degree, the more significant 
interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur 
in mass and electronic media.”487  In 2004, those words are 
especially descriptive of the Internet. 
The Internet holds promise for the Madisonian view that 
political equality among all citizens is achieved only when all 
                                                          
 485. Declan McCullagh, Democracy Online Project, Testimony before 
Democracy Online Task Force (May 22, 2000), available at 
http://www.mccullagh.org/speeches/democracyonline.052200.html. 
 486. Lloyd Morrisett, the cofounder of the Children’s Television Workshop, 
acknowledges that “[b]roadcasting, as a technology, does not naturally 
stimulate discussion among the people who receive the broadcast.  Networked 
computers offer quite a different model.”  Lloyd Morrisett, Technologies of 
Freedom?, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA 28 (Henry Jenkins & David 
Thorburn, eds., 2003).  Media theorist George Gilder agrees. At the 1997 
Camden Conference on Telecommunications, he posited that the Internet is 
“inherently” democratic whereas television is inherently undemocratic. Doug 
Schuler, Reports of the Close Relationship between Democracy and the Internet 
May Have Been Exaggerated, in  DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA 72. 
 487. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 
801-03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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citizens have the ability to participate in democratic 
deliberation and debate.488 The Internet provides us with a 
relatively unrestricted and broad exchange of information.  It 
already is facilitating what Justice Holmes’s described as a 
“free trade in ideas”489 and the sort of “public discussion” that 
Justice Brandeis termed “a political duty.”490 Internet access, 
particularly by means of a broadband connection, allows users 
to watch Congressional floor debate and committee hearings 
and a panoply of public affairs programming, such as panel 
discussions on political campaigns and the war effort,491 gives 
users free access to hundreds of newspapers from around the 
United States and the world492 and access to federal and state 
agency filing, regulations, and open rulemaking proceedings 
(many of which accept comments from the public through the 
respective agency’s website).493  Congress and the executive 
branch, virtually all federal agencies, and many state and local 
governments have significant presences on the Internet, with 
web sites that provide citizens access to information involving 
important entitlement and public safety programs and the 
ability to file comments, complaints or concerns electronically 
with government agencies and elected representatives. 
Users can use the Internet to engage in political activism 
through advocacy sites aligned with their interests, and can 
view issue-specific programming and engage in pertinent 
“chats” on those sites.494  Users can obtain in-depth information 
                                                          
 488. It also is consistent with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which echoes the Madisonian perspective:  “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference or to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”  Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 19 
(1948) available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 
 489. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 490. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). Justice Brandeis 
warned that “the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.”  Id. 
 491. See, e.g., www.cspan.org (C-SPAN’s extensive video streaming and 
archived video feeds). 
 492. See, e.g., www.nytimes.com (N.Y. TIMES website); 
www.washingtonpost.com (WASH. POST website); www.timesonline.co.uk 
(LONDON TIMES website). 
 493. See, e.g., www.hhs.gov (Department of Health and Human Services); 
www.dol.gov (Department of Labor website). 
 494. See, e.g., www.hrc.org (Human Rights Campaign website); 
www.nrlc.org (National Right to Life Committee website); www.naral.org 
(National Abortion Rights Action League website); www.nrdc.org (Natural 
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about political candidates through their campaign websites, 
and also can see what kind of campaign contributions the 
candidates are receiving and from whom.495  Users could peruse 
thousands of “blogs” or “web logs,” which are websites 
maintained by individual writers and commentators on 
political,496 legal,497 cultural498 or other issues, or they could 
create their own “blog” and express their own views, including 
expressions of political dissent.499 
A.J. Liebling said that “freedom of the press is guaranteed 
only to those who own one.”500  Today, access to the Internet is 
tantamount to owning one’s own “press.”  Indeed, bloggers and 
their blogs are changing the face and definition of the modern 
press.501  Matt Drudge, the publisher of the online “Drudge 
Report,” is credited with breaking the story about President 
William J. Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky, scooping all 
of the mainstream press in the process.502  Professor Lawrence 
Lessig, a “blogger” himself,503 wrote that the Internet, and 
especially blogging and other interactive activity, has “turn[ed] 
                                                          
Resources Defense Council website); www.nra.org (National Rifle Association 
website). 
 495. See, e.g., www.fec.gov (Federal Elections Commission website). 
 496. See, e.g., www.andrewsullivan.com (renowned blog of conservative 
political writer and commentator Andrew Sullivan); www.dailykos.com 
(popular liberal political blog authored by Markos Moulitsaz Zuniga).  The 
“Daily Kos” site typically receives 4 million unique visits per month.  See 
Marlon Manuel, Boston E-Party, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 25, 2004, at 1E.  It 
has been credited with raising tens of thousands of dollars in a matter of days 
for key Congressional races.  See Farhad Manjoo, At The Speed of Blog, 
SALON.COM, July 23, 2004, at 
www.salon.com/tech/feature/2004/07/23/blog_money/index_np.html. 
 497. See, e.g., www.volokh.com (“The Volokh Conspiracy,” blog launched by 
law professor Eugene Volokh). 
 498. See, e.g. www.artsjournal.com/blogs/. 
 499. Although access to the great majority of blogs is free, a number of 
bloggers ask for donations and some of the more popular writers receive 
significant contributions in response, in some cases significantly higher sums 
than average salaries for reporters at major daily newspapers and television 
stations.  See Kathy Kiely, Freewheeling ‘Bloggers’ Are Rewriting the Rules of 
Journalism, USA TODAY, December 30, 2003, at 1A (noting that in 2002, 
Andrew Sullivan, a popular blogger, ran a “pledge drive” on his blog and 
claims to have raised nearly $100,000). 
 500. A.J. LIEBLING, THE PRESS 32 (2d rev. ed., 1975). 
 501. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
429, 471-72 (2002) (noting that the Internet is necessitating new 
interpretations of traditional notions associated with the freedom of the press.) 
 502. See Kiely, supra note 499, at 1A. 
 503. See http://www.lessig.org/blog/. 
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the audience into the speaker.”504 
The Internet enables people to meet who otherwise would 
not likely have crossed paths, both by means of “chat rooms” as 
well as by directing users to in-person, community meetings 
with likeminded people.505  It also has allowed socio-politically 
oppressed and isolated minorities to find one another and build 
mutually supportive communities through online fora.506 
The Internet’s effect on the American political process has 
been transformative, and promises to further revolutionize the 
way citizens, political candidates and elected officials engage in 
policy debates and conduct electoral politics.  Joe Trippi, 
campaign director for former Vermont Governor Howard 
Dean’s campaign for the 2004 Democratic nomination, calls the 
Internet “the last hope for democracy”507 and credits it with 
enabling the Dean campaign to amass 600,000 supporters and 
a $60 million campaign fund with little by way of traditional 
television and radio advertising.508  Trippi posits that the 
Internet “reversed some of the more insidious aspects of 
television” by “making people talk to each other again.”509  Gen. 
Wesley Clark, another candidate for the 2004 Democratic 
                                                          
 504. Quoted in TRIPPI, supra note 328, at 144.  “A well-structured blog 
inspires both reading and writing.  And by getting the audience to type, 
candidates get the audience committed.  Engagement replaces reception, 
which in turn leads to real space action.”  Id. 
 505. See, e.g., www.meetup.com (allows users to organize and attend 
affinity meetings in their communities). 
 506. See, e.g., Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free 
Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 162 (2003) 
(documenting how the Internet serves as an important tool for gay men and 
lesbians for political and community organizing, socializing, and for isolated 
individuals living in hostile surroundings, the creation of “a virtual community 
that constitutes an emotional lifeline”); see also Gallaudet University, Deaf 
Internet Resources, (listing extensive Deaf community online resources, 
including discussion groups, advocacy organizations, and assistive resources) 
available at  http://pr.gallaudet.edu/dir/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 507. TRIPPI, supra note 328, at 4. 
 508. Id. at xvii-xix. Trippi characterizes the Dean campaign as,  “the 
opening salvo in a revolution, the sound of hundreds of thousands of 
Americans turning off their televisions and embracing the only form of 
technology that has allowed them to be involved again, to gain control of a 
process that alienated them decades ago.”  Id. 
 509. Id. at 54 (emphasis in original).  David Winston, one of the creators of 
the successful conservative “townhall.com” website, sponsored by the Heritage 
Foundation, writes that “[w]ith the advent of the Internet, digital technology 
changed fundamentally from computing to communications.” David Winston, 
Digital Democracy and the New Age of Reason, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW 
MEDIA, supra note 485, at 135. 
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nomination, announced his candidacy only after being “drafted” 
by a web-based “Draft Clark” campaign.510  The candidate that 
defeated both Clark and Dean to become the Democratic 
nominee for president, Senator John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), used 
the Internet to disseminate detailed issue papers, organize 
volunteers, disseminate campaign propaganda, including 
campaign video and advertisements, and, most notably, raise 
$57 million online before his July 29, 2004, deadline for raising 
private contributions.511 
State and local electoral campaigns, which tend to get 
scant coverage on commercial television stations, also have 
turned to the Internet to disseminate campaign messages and 
attract and interact with donors and voters.  For example, after 
purchasing the least paid television and radio advertising of 
any of his opponents, Jesse Ventura surprised the nation by 
winning the 1999 Minnesota gubernatorial race, a victory 
credited to his campaign’s strategic use of the Internet and 
enlistment of “netizens” to fundraise and solicit votes on the 
web.512 
As noted earlier, Matt Drudge’s website broke the Clinton-
Lewinsky story.  In reaction to the ensuing political firestorm 
and the Congressional impeachment proceedings against then-
President Clinton, two concerned citizens launched a web site, 
www.MoveOn.org,513 which organized a grassroots effort to 
                                                          
 510. Id. 
 511. Paula Dwyer, The Amazing Money Machine, BUSINESSWEEK, August 
2, 2004, Kerry’s campaign raised $5.2 million through its website 
(www.johnkerry.com) on July 30, 2004 alone.  Glen Johnson, Money Belt 
Tightens on Kerry, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 2004, A17. available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/conventions/articles/2004/07/30/money_be
lt_tightens_on_kerry_1091167467. 
 512. See Henry Jenkins & David Thorburn, The Digital Revolution, the 
Informed Citizen, and the Culture of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW 
MEDIA, supra note 485, at 3.  Jenkins and Thorburn also point to the “Nader 
Traders” web-based program in the 2000 presidential election, where voters in 
predominantly democratic states like New York and Massachusetts were able 
to “swap votes” with Nader supporters in states, like Florida, where then-
candidate George W. Bush either was in the lead or in a competitive race with 
Vice President Al Gore.  A total of 15,000 vote swaps were effectuated, with 
1,400 Nader supporters in Florida voting for Gore pursuant to a “swap.”  Id. at 
4.  The vote-swapping plan elicited controversy, with some critics calling it the 
“Napsterization” of the American political system.  Id. 
 513. See MoveOn.org, What is MoveOn all About?, at 
http://www.moveon.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2004).  MoveOn.org 
describes itself as “a catalyst for a new kind of grassroots involvement, 
supporting busy but concerned citizens in finding their political voice.” Its 
identity statement includes the following: 
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oppose the impeachment proceedings and pressure Congress to 
“move on” to more important business.514  Within weeks of its 
launch, the site had 450,000 registered users.515  After the 
House of Representatives voted to impeach, the MoveOn.org 
organizers solicited contributions of money and volunteer hours 
to for candidates in 2000 running against those members of 
Congress who voted in favor of impeachment.  The site raised 
$13,000,000 and 700,000 volunteer hours in short order.516  The 
political establishment not only took notice.  It has been 
emulating MoveOn.org’s success, with many political 
candidates and special interest groups militating grassroots 
activists and raising significant sums of money from their 
highly interactive websites.517 
Internet political discussion boards and blogs also are 
credited for drawing attention to stories initially ignored by the 
broadcast media.  It was the Internet that publicized the 
questionable remarks of then-Senate Majority Leader Trent 
Lott (R-Miss.) at a birthday party for Republican Senator 
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.).518  While lauding Senator 
Thurmond’s career, Lott lamented that the nation would have 
been better off if his segregationist presidential campaign had 
prevailed in 1948.519  The mainstream media ignored the story 
for days until the Internet protests grew so heated that 
television network news programs and major newspapers 
finally led with the story, leading to Lott’s resignation from the 
position.520  The Internet also has transcended the dysfunction 
                                                          
With a system that today revolves around big money and big media, 
most citizens are left out.  When it becomes clear that our 
“representatives” don’t represent the public, the foundations of 
democracy are in peril….Our nationwide network of more than 
2,000,000 online activists is one of the most effective and responsive 
outlets for democratic participation available today. 
Id.; see also Gary Wolf, Weapons of Mass Mobilization, WIRED , Sept. 2004, at 
131 (detailing the political mobilizing and fundraising power of MoveOn.org). 
 514. See Roger Hurwitz, Who Needs Politics? Who Needs People? The 
Ironies of Democracy in Cyberspace, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA, supra 
note 485, at 109. 
 515. Id. 
 516. Id. 
 517. See Samantha M. Shapiro, The Dean Machine Marches On, WIRED , 
Sept. 2004, at 139. 
 518. See, e.g., Marlon Manuel, Boston E-Party, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 
25, 2004, at 1E; Aman Batheja, Web Journals Gaining Readers and Influence, 
FORT-WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, July 27, 2004. 
 519. Id. 
 520. See Conventioneering.com, NEW YORK TIMES, July 15, 2004, at A22. 
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of a mainstream media that will not shed light on its own 
questionable dealings with Congress and the FCC.  It was also 
MoveOn.org’s Internet activism that generated most of the 
750,000 complaints to Congress opposing the FCC’s June 2003 
decision to allow for more consolidation of the television 
industry.521  MoveOn.org generated a petition with 170,000 
“virtual” signatures urging the FCC to reverse its decision.522 
In addition to engaging in political activism and 
community affairs, those with Internet access in their homes 
can use the web to send e-mail, pursue an education,523 peruse 
employment ads and apply for work, control financial affairs by 
means of online banking and investment sites, shop, and 
                                                          
 521. See Frank Ahrens, FCC Plan to Alter Media Rules Spurs Growing 
Debate, WASH. POST, May 28, 2003, at A1; David D. Kirkpatrick, Media 
Deregulation Foes Make Murdoch Their Lightning Rod, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 
2003, at C6. 
 522. See Ahrens, supra note 521. 
 523. Educators have touted “Internet literacy” as an important educational 
tool, and one that must be incorporated into modern curricula. See Jessica L. 
Malman, Connecting Students to ‘The Net:’ Guiding Principles from State 
Constitutions, 7 GEO. J. POVER’ LAW & POL’Y 53, 57-59 (2000).  But cf. 
ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN, FOOLS GOLD: A CRITICAL LOOK AT COMPUTERS IN 
CHILDHOOD (Colleen Cordes & Edward Miller eds., 2001) (challenging the 
notion that computers are good for children by citing excessive computer 
dependence as the cause of children’s musculoskeletal and vision problems; 
obesity; emotional, social and creative underdevelopment; and plagiarism), 
available at 
http://www.allianceforchildhood.net/projects/computers/computers_reports_foo
ls_gold_contents.htm.   Politicians also have recognized the value of the 
Internet in education and to children (and to themselves).  President Bill 
Clinton touted the importance of connecting elementary and high schools to 
the Internet in his 1997 State of the Union Address, saying: 
[W]e must bring the power of the information age into all our schools.  
[I challenge] America to connect every classroom and library to the 
Internet by the year 2000, so that, for the first time in our history, 
children in the most isolated rural towns, the most comfortable 
suburbs, the poorest inner-city schools, will have the same access to 
the same universe of knowledge. 
President’s Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
Union, 33 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 136, 139 (Feb. 4, 1997).  President Clinton 
also touted the Internet as an equalizer, “bringing down barriers of race and 
gender, of income and age.”   Commencement Address at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 34 WKLY. COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1050 (June 5, 1998), reprinted in President Clinton, Digital Divide, 
Remarks by the President at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1998 
Commencement, TECH L. J. (June 5, 1998), available at  
http://www.techlawjournal.com/agencies/slc/80605clin.htm. 
Clinton stated that “until every student has the skills to tap the enormous 
resources of the Internet, . . . America will miss the full promise of the 
Information Age.”  Id. 
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perform research on any topic.  More importantly, the Internet 
has become a national resource for political engagement and 
debate, and access to all levels of government. 
Despite its impressive track record in bolstering 
democratic activities, by no means is the Internet a panacea for 
all that ails American democracy.  To the contrary, the 
migration of so much of American civic, cultural and 
commercial life to the Internet has ushered in a new set of 
concerns.  Professor Cass Sunstein warns that although the 
Internet offers the interactivity and virtually limitless choice of 
content that that television lacks, its ability to narrowcast very 
specialized content risks fragmenting and polarizing our 
society.524  Sunstein observes that the Internet enables users to 
create a virtual “Neighborhood Me,” in which all of the 
information and people they are exposed to are filtered to 
ensure a commonality of viewpoint and experience.525  A 
deliberative democracy functions best, however, when and 
where citizens are exposed to people different from themselves, 
in terms of ideas, experiences, backgrounds and outlooks.  He 
observes that, “[u]nplanned, unanticipated encounters are 
central to democracy itself.”526  These surprise, sometimes 
unwanted encounters with previously unknown and different 
people and opinions often broaden people’s perspectives and 
change minds.527  The danger of not having Internet “street 
corners” where we encounter and assimilate difference, is that 
our society will become so polarized and segmented that 
extremist forces, untempered and uninformed by the exposure 
to adversarial forces, would flourish.528 
Critics also note that the Internet has become just as or 
even more commercialized than television, with access to many 
                                                          
 524. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 8-9, 71-73 (2001). 
 525. See id. at 236. 
 526. See id. at 8.  “The role of street corners is one of exposing us to the 
unknown . . . confronting different ideas.”  Id. at 15.   Professor Sunstein’s 
warning finds ample support in the counsel of some of the best known 
democratic theorists.  John Stuart Mill, for example, wrote that: 
It is hardly possible to overstate the value, in the present state of 
human improvement, of placing human beings in contact with other 
persons dissimilar to those with which they are familiar. Such 
communication has always been, and is peculiarly in the present age, 
one of the primary sources of progress. 
John Stuart Mill, 3 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 594 (1848). 
 527. SUNSTEIN, supra note 524 at 35. 
 528. Id. at 8. 
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websites restricted only to those who pay for subscriptions.529  
Professor Lawrence Lessig has written extensively about how 
software code – the Internet’s infrastructure – has the power to 
restrict access to fora that should be open to all.  He warns that 
“[t]he world we are entering...is not a world where freedom is 
ensured.”530 
Moreover, the Internet can be a dangerous place, both for 
children as well as vulnerable adults.  Websites abound 
depicting pornography and violence, advocating hate against 
minorities, and victimizing visitors with fraudulent commercial 
schemes.531 
Professors Lessig and Sunstein’s and others’ concerns 
about the Internet are valid.  To be clear, the Internet is not a 
panacea for democracy.  Much of the Internet already is highly 
commercialized, and depending on its evolution, the Internet 
possibly could become more isolating and factionalizing, and 
more overrun with content that is pornographic or hate-
inciting.  What is also clear, however, is that democracy itself is 
not a cure-all for what ails society.  To the contrary, our 
traditional town squares often were loud, dirty and chaotic 
spaces, often dominated by commerce, and at times polluted by 
crime, hate-speech and peddlers of pornography and fraud.  In 
essence, although far from perfect, the Internet’s benefits far 
outweigh its dangers. 
2. Existing Models for Interindustry Cross-Subsidies 
Federal communications regulation has relied on universal 
access cross-subsidies, such as the television-to-Internet access 
subsidy proposed here, since the inception of the telephone.  
Alexander Graham Bell, the telephone’s inventor, himself 
expressed the importance of universal service and the notion 
                                                          
 529. Douglas Schuler, supra note 486, at 70 (noting an estimated 90 
percent of all Internet web pages are for financial gain).  “The future 
infrastructure will likely focus on entertainment and that which brings in the 
most revenue – sex, violence, special effects – and devote little attention to 
services that educate, inspire, or help bring communities together.”  Id.; see 
also, SUNSTEIN, supra note 524, at 18. 
 530. Lawrence Lessig, The Laws of Cyberspace (presented at the Taiwan 
Net ’98 conference, in Taipei, March, 1998), available at  
http:www.lessig.org/content/articles/works/laws_cyberspace.pdf. 
 531. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 361, 364-70 (1996) (documenting constitutional and other legal 
challenges involving pornography and violence on the Internet); Julie L. Henn, 
Targeting Transnational Internet Content Regulation, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 157 
(2003). 
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that “a telephone in every house would be considered 
indispensable.”532 
Section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934 states that 
the purpose of American telecommunications policy is “to make 
available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States . . 
. a rapid, efficient, nationwide and world-wide wire and radio 
communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable 
charges.”533  Initially, the FCC interpreted the 1934 Act’s 
universal service provision as requiring monopolist telephone 
companies to offset the additional expense of providing service 
to remote, rural and low-income customers by charging higher 
rates of corporate and residential customers in dense areas.534  
Over time, the FCC permitted telephone companies to 
subsidize less-profitable residential service with higher 
business rates, and local service with long distance rates.535 
Today, telecommunications providers are federally 
subsidized by means of a Universal Service Fund (USF) to 
provide “Lifeline Assistance” and “Link-Up America” discounts 
on initial telephone connections and monthly rates for low-
income households.536  The USF is administered by the quasi-
governmental Universal Service Administrative Company 
(USAC). 
USAC also administers the “E-Rate” program, enacted as 
Section 254 of the 1996 Telecom Act.537  One of the most recent 
                                                          
 532. ROBERT W. GARNET, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE: THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE BELL SYSTEM’S HORIZONTAL STRUCTURE, 1876-1909, at 12 (1985).  
Universal service programs have their origin in the United States Postal 
Service (USPS).  At the inception of the postal service, Congress opted to forgo 
authorizing postal service only to those routes that were self-supporting and 
instead funded the construction of post roads connecting the courthouses of all 
county seats in the nation. In seeking to serve the entire nation, the USPS 
essentially subsidized newer, money-losing routes with revenues from those 
that were urban and already well-traveled.  See STARR, supra note 34, at 88; 
see also RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL 
SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE 49 (1995). 
 533. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
 534. Christine M. Mason, Universal Service in the Schools: One Step Too 
Far?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 237, 239 (1997) (citing Barry D. Fraser, 
Telecommunications Competition Arrives: Is Universal Service Out of Order?, 
15 CAL. REG. L. REP. 1, 4 (1995)); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 21 n. 125 (1996). 
 535. Mason, supra note 534, at 239; see also Livia Solange West, 
Deregulating Telecommunications: The Conflict Between Competition and 
Universal Service, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 165-66 (1996). 
 536. Mason, supra note 534, at 239-40. 
 537. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000). 
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iterations of a universal service cross-subsidy in American 
telecommunications regulation, E-Rate requires “[e]very 
telecommunications carrier that provides interstate 
telecommunications services,” (primarily regional and long 
distance telephone companies) to subsidize a new universal 
service fund intended to provide deeply discounted Internet 
access, and other Internet-oriented telecommunications 
services, to elementary and high schools and libraries.538  At a 
hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee in October 
2003, FCC Chairman Michael Powell reported that as a result 
of the E-rate program, “[ninety-nine percent of America’s 
schools are connected to the Internet.”539 
Although it has been broadly perceived to be a success, the 
E-Rate program has also had its critics, some arguing that the 
placement of computers in a school building has not translated 
into an improvement of students’ technological literacy as 
compared to access to the Internet at home.540 
                                                          
 538. Id. § 254(d), (h).  The 1996 Act specifically directs the FCC to empanel 
a Federal-State Joint Board (Joint Board) to propose the various mechanisms 
necessary to collect and distribute the subsidy.  § 254(a)(1).  The Joint Board 
released a report on November 8, 1996, recommending that eligible schools 
and libraries receive discounts on Internet and telephone access, and internal 
connections, of between 20 and 90 percent, subject to an annual cap of $2.25 
billion.  Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Recommended Decision, 
12 F.C.C. R. 87, at ¶ 440 (1996) (Recommended Decision).  The FCC adopted 
the Joint Board’s recommendations, with minor modifications, on May 8, 1997.  
Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997) (Report 
and Order). 
 539. Michael K. Powell, FCC Chairman, Statement before Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (Oct. 30, 2003), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
24057A1.pdf. 
 540. Randy Bell, an education professor at the University of Virginia notes: 
One of the big myths out there is that students have good access to 
computers and high technology.  That’s not really true.  Most 
computers are in labs, not classrooms.  So even if a teacher has the 
inclination and ability to do creative things with computers, he or he 
doesn’t have good access. 
Kristen Loschert, Are You Ready? High Tech Teaching, NEA TODAY, Apr. 1, 
2003, at 10. 
The National Education Association notes that only one-third of teachers 
characterize themselves as “well-prepared” or “very well-prepared” to 
integrate the Internet and computers into instruction.  Id.   The NEA 
estimates that the average American elementary school student has little if 
any access to computers in his or her classroom, and typically develops 
computer literacy at home if his or her home is equipped with a computer and 
the Internet. Id.  Many of those children with no Internet access at home have 
no access to the Internet at all. 
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3. Options for Structuring a TV-to-Internet Cross-Subsidy 
Specific details on how a television-to-Internet cross-
subsidy should be configured would require extensive planning 
and negotiation among the FCC, television licensees and the 
trustees of the cross-subsidy funds, similar to the significant 
amount of planning invested in devising the E-Rate program.  
One obvious and streamlined option, however, would be to have 
the television cross-subsidy administered coextensively with 
the existing E-Rate and telephone Lifeline assistance programs 
already administered by the USAC.  Contributions could be 
assessed on a sliding scale, so as to not overburden small 
broadcast licensees, and could, for example, take the form of a 
three percent to five percent “tax” on each licensee’s annual 
advertising revenue.541 The USAC would then transmit the 
subsidies to residential Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for 
the funding of discounted rates for customers meeting certain 
income guidelines (similar to the Lifeline telephone program).  
Moreover, should President Bush’s proposal for a greatly 
increased government commitment to expand broadband 
Internet access to low income and underserved communities be 
implemented, a television cross-subsidy could be incorporated 
into that program.  Cross-subsidy proceeds could also be 
directed to programs being instituted now to expand broadband 
access to areas of the country that cannot access broadband 
Internet because of the need for upgraded infrastructure (i.e., 
high capacity coaxial or fiber optic cabling). 
A television-Internet cross-subsidy could also contribute to 
recent proposals for an Internet “information commons,” such 
as the “Digital Opportunity Investment Trust” proposed by 
Lawrence K. Grossman and Newton Minow, which would 
“[support] innovative and experimental ideas and techniques to 
enhance learning; broaden knowledge; encourage an informed 
citizenry and self-government; make available to all Americans 
the best of the nation’s arts, humanities, and culture; and teach 
the skills and disciplines needed in this information-based 
economy.”542 
                                                          
 541. This is similar to the public broadcasting cross-subsidy proposed by 
Henry Geller.  See Henry Geller, supra note 460, at 364-365. 
 542. NEWTON MINOW & LAWRENCE GROSSMAN, A DIGITAL GIFT TO THE 
NATION: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF THE DIGITAL AND INFORMATION AGE 5 
(2001); see also The Digital Promise Project, Creating the Digital Opportunity 
Investment Trust: A Proposal to Transform Learning and Training for the 21st 
Century, Report to Congress, (Oct. 2003), available at www.digitalpromise.org. 
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Public funding for expanded Internet access for the poor 
and underserved, as well as funding for initiatives such as the 
“information commons,” would be especially appropriate under 
the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine. The public forum 
doctrine provides that the government has an obligation to 
make public places available to the citizenry for purposes of 
self-expression and deliberation.543  Free speech and democratic 
deliberation among citizens from different walks of life and 
with diverging and conflicting opinions normally do not take 
place in private homes, but in the streets, sidewalks and town 
squares connecting those homes. 
The effect of the public forum doctrine has been to 
subsidize speech in public places by providing the public with 
those fora in which speech can flourish.544  Justice Roberts in 
Hague v. CIO,545 notes that “[w]herever the title of streets and 
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for 
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.”546 
As discussed above, it was this very interest in subsidizing 
a public forum for a “marketplace of ideas” that motivated 
Congress in 1934 to conceive of the public trustee doctrine in 
the first place.  Congress provides a constructive subsidy to 
broadcasters in not requiring them to pay for the public 
spectrum they utilize as their medium in exchange for their 
service to the public interest and the democratic needs of the 
polity in particular. 
As our traditional public fora are supplanted by Internet 
facsimiles such as discussion boards, chat rooms, web logs, and 
other interactive services, the open availability and fair 
regulation of those fora become critical to the preservation of 
our First Amendment values.547  A television-to-Internet cross-
subsidy, therefore, not only should support expanded access to 
                                                          
 543. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist 
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 399 (1990) (crediting 
Hague with elucidating the public forum doctrine); Harry Kalven, Jr., The 
Concept of the Public Forum¸1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12. 
 544. Balkin, supra note 543, at 402-03. 
 545.   307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 546. Id. at 515. 
 547. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 524.  For an excellent treatment on the 
application of the public forum doctrine to Internet spaces, see Noah D. Zatz, 
Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic 
Environment, 12 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 149 (1998). 
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broadband service by underserved and low income households, 
but it also should help underwrite government efforts to create 
“virtual” sidewalks and street corners that are open and free 
and not restricted by the corporate content controls and other 
restraints identified by Professors Lessig and Sunstein. 
4. The Viability of a Television-to-Internet Cross-Subsidy 
After decades of attempts to reform the public trustee 
doctrine have stalled or failed in the face of its First 
Amendment, political and economic complexities, a reasonable 
inquiry would be why and how a proposal to require 
broadcasters to subsidize Internet access would be viable and 
achievable.  What makes this proposal viable is that it avoids 
or counteracts some of the principal complications and resistors 
to reform of the existing public trustee regime. 
First, an Internet cross-subsidy avoids the First 
Amendment complications that have frustrated repeated 
attempts by public interest-minded FCC officials, members of 
Congress and public interest organizations to impose tangible 
public interest broadcasting requirements on commercial 
television licensees.  As in the case of other telecommunications 
cross-subsidies, such as the 1996 Telecom Act’s E-rate program, 
the payment of an Internet access subsidy would not implicate 
the broadcasters’ First Amendment rights. 
Second, much of the infrastructure for such a cross-subsidy 
is already in place within the Universal Service Administrative 
Company (USAC), the government agency responsible for 
collecting and distributing already existing and successful 
telephone and Internet cross-subsidies. 
Third, the manifest grassroots organizing power of the 
Internet itself may help a television-to-Internet cross-subsidy 
overcome the significant political power historically exerted by 
the troika of Congress, the FCC, and the broadcast lobby, 
against previous reform proposals.  Militated by Internet-
powered public interest organizations and supportive elected 
officials, the same “netizens” who have demonstrated such 
political muscle over the last several years may direct enough 
attention and political pressure to get this proposal adopted by 
Congress. 
Fourth, expanding the reach and scope of the Internet is in 
the broadcasters’ best interests.  Before the transition to the 
digital television format, TV stations’ analog signals were 
incompatible with the language of the Internet.  Now as players 
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in the digital media market, television broadcasters, both 
individual local stations and national networks, are uniquely 
positioned to exploit the reach and flexibility of the Internet.  
Many already have established expansive and lucrative 
services on the web, offering some of the digitally formatted 
content they air on their second DTV channels by means of 
websites.548  The future promises even more increasing 
convergence between television and other digital media.549  In 
much the same way that the quest for high ratings drives 
broadcasters’ efforts in maximizing the range of their 
transmitter antennae and in gaining signal carriage on area 
cable systems, so too do broadcasters seek the most attention to 
their Internet websites.  The broadcasters’ commercial 
interests in expanding the universe of potential “eyeballs” over 
the airwaves should translate readily into cyberspace. 
Finally, as commercial broadcasters continue to exploit 
their new digital spectrum as well as lucrative opportunities on 
the Internet, the disparity between the permissive regulatory 
regime overseeing broadcasters, which constructively 
subsidizes broadcasters in exchange for their public trusteeship 
of the nation’s airwaves, and the restrictive regulation imposed 
upon other digital telecommunications regulatees, will become 
increasingly stark and untenable.  The DTV transition, in fact, 
privileged broadcasters with a significant advantage over their 
new competitors in the digital industry.  In 1993, Congress 
instructed the FCC to auction nonbroadcast initial licenses for 
a variety of services, including paging, cellular, PCS and direct 
broadcast satellite.550  Auctions for these services began in July 
1994 and by 1996 had generated $20 billion in revenue for the 
                                                          
 548. Innovative products now in development to exploit the new merged 
TV/PC/Internet environment include interactive advertising, gaming, movies 
on demand, and information on demand (for example, the ability to browse 
player statistics while watching a sporting event).  Andrew F. Hamm, Next 
Virtual Game Center: Your TV Set, SAN JOSE BUS. J., Jan. 6, 2004, available at 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3890273/.  Television executives are especially 
interested in the ability to exploit interactivity in advertising, providing 
consumers with additional information, including an immediate purchase 
option, during commercial breaks.  One executive called interactivity “the holy 
grail of advertising.”  Id. (quoting John Roberts, vice president of interactive 
TV for the Game Show Network). 
 549. Ira Magaziner predicts:  “The Internet will be on television.  Broadcast 
television will be on personal computers.  Telephone calls will be able to be 
made from both of them.”  Ira Magaziner, Democracy and Cyberspace: First 
Principles, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA, supra note 485, at 113, 118. 
 550. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2000). 
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U.S. Treasury.551  The licensees for new PCS services alone 
paid in excess of $12 billion for their licenses, 552 which remain 
subject to certain public interest and renewal requirements.553  
Digital broadcasters will compete with these new licensees in 
an increasing array of fora without facing the burden of the 
high debt loads taken on by the non-broadcast licensees when 
they acquired their spectrum licenses.554  This disparity in 
treatment raises troubling regulatory consistency issues and 
may constitute a violation of constitutional equal protection 
guarantees.555 
                                                          
 551. FCC Press Release, FCC Hits $20 Billion Mark in Total Auction 
Revenues, (Apr. 5, 1996), at 
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News_Releases/1996/nrwl6015.txt. 
 552. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum 
Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 
536 (1998). 
 553. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)-(5) (2000) (requiring FCC to promulgate 
technical, construction and renewal requirements for auctioned licenses, 
consistent with “public interest, convenience and necessity”). 
 554. In addition to empowering the FCC to license nonbroadcast spectrum, 
existing digital broadcasters will eventually compete with newly licensed 
analog broadcasters.  In its Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress authorized 
the Commission to auction licenses for new commercial analog television and 
commercial radio stations.  Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 
111 Stat. 251 (Aug. 5, 1997) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)).  The FCC initiated 
a rulemaking proceeding and implemented a new broadcast license auctioning 
mechanism in late 1998, and has begun auctioning new broadcast licenses.  
See Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act – 
Competitive Bidding for Commercial Broadcast and Instructional Television 
Fixed Service Licenses; Reexamination of the Policy Statement on 
Comparative Broadcast Hearings; Proposals to Reform the Commission’s 
Comparative Hearing Process to Expedite Resolution of Cases, 13 F.C.C.R. 
15,920, ¶ 3 (1998) (First Report and Order) [hereinafter Broadcast Auction 
Order]; 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2)(B) (2000) (exempting “initial licenses or 
construction permits for digital television service given to existing terrestrial 
broadcast licensees to replace their analog television service licenses”).  
Television broadcasters already licensed in 1997 and converting to digital 
transmission were exempted from the spectrum auctions and will continue to 
use their spectrum for free.  § 309(j)(2)(B). 
 555. U.S. Const. amend. V.  The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits any state from denying “to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  The 
Fifth Amendment does not contain a similar equal protection clause, but the 
Supreme Court held in 1954 that such a clause could be inferred. Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).  The Supreme Court has said that the equal 
protection guarantee requires federal and state governments and their 
delegates to treat similarly situated persons and corporate entities similarly. 
Compare with FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316 (1993); 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (interpreting the 
equal protection clause as requiring that “all persons similarly situated should 
VARONA_A1 12/29/2004  1:45:38 PM 
114 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.  [Vol. 6:1 
 
CONCLUSION 
Few observers other than the broadcasters themselves 
disagree with the conclusion that after seven decades of 
existence, the public trusteeship model in television regulation 
has failed to achieve its intended purpose of enhancing our 
democracy with expansive public interest programming and a 
“free marketplace of ideas” on the public’s airwaves.  Congress 
viewed its free provision of radio frequency spectrum to 
broadcasters in a manner reminiscent of its 1862 allocation of 
federal lands to higher education institutions – the so-called 
“land grant” colleges.556  Those public lands were designated for 
use in the public’s interest, specifically the education of an 
informed citizenry, and they indeed have been utilized in 
satisfaction of that intent.  By contrast, television licensees 
have exploited the public spectrum entrusted to them not for 
the primary benefit of their viewing public, but for the interests 
of their advertisers and shareholders.  In reality, television 
broadcasters are much more analogous to mining companies 
that exploit federal lands for great private profit.  The 
difference, however, is that the miners pay significant rents to 
the United States Treasury for the privilege of mining public 
resources, whereas television broadcasters, cloaked in the 
mythology of public trustees, do not.557 
The result of this fundamental dysfunction of the broadcast 
public trustee doctrine has been the continued shortchanging of 
the American public and the unfair subsidization of television 
licensees who now compete in a digital environment against 
other FCC licensees who paid significant sums of money for 
their spectrum licenses.  Although public interest advocates 
and the public itself have proposed a variety of reforms 
                                                          
be treated alike.”). 
 556. See Morrill Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, § 1, 12 Stat. 503 (introduced 
by Justin Smith Morrill of Vermont).  The 1862 “Morrill Act” granted federal 
land to each state, resulting in the creation of such prominent institutions as 
Rutgers University, Pennsylvania State University, and the Universities of 
Vermont, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 557. Professor Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., put it this way: 
Giving commercial broadcasters licenses to use the public’s airwaves 
with the admonition that they must use the resource in the public 
interest is not much different from handing the national forests over 
to Georgia Pacific, Weyerhauser, and other paper companies and 
telling them to use the forests in the public interest. 
Krotoszynski, The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of 
Broadcast Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2109 (1997) 
(reviewing MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 2). 
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involving new public interest programming requirements, 
Congress and the FCC have failed to implement those reforms 
for the reasons detailed above.  At its essence, Congress’s 
construction of the public trustee doctrine is premised on 
irreconcilable contradictions that doomed it from the start. 
First, Congress depends on the FCC to elucidate and 
enforce the public trustee doctrine, but then prohibits the FCC 
from censoring broadcast speech or otherwise “interfer[ing] 
with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication.”558  Although the Supreme Court in Red Lion 
and its progeny has interpreted the public trustee doctrine as 
limiting the free speech rights of broadcasters, the FCC has 
opted against “walking the tightrope” between permissible and 
impermissible content regulation to elucidate and enforce 
public interest programming requirements. 
Second, there is little doubt, given the evidence presented 
above, that the agency’s reticence to apply stricter public 
interest requirements is exacerbated by the unique political 
influence of the broadcasters themselves.  With Members of 
Congress beholden to broadcasters for positive coverage 
immediately before and between elections, it is not surprising 
that the broadcast lobby has become one of the most obvious 
“textbook” examples of an industry “capturing” its regulators, 
and in this case, the Congress itself.  That the American public 
has not become more aware of the collusion between the 
broadcast industry and lawmakers itself is evidence of 
broadcasters’ power to set the national agenda and direct focus 
away from their own dealings. 
Third, Congress erred in expecting commercial 
broadcasters both to operate as public trustees in serving local 
public interest viewing needs and to run competitive 
commercial enterprises that optimize revenue for owners and 
shareholders.  Time has taught that broadcasters cannot serve 
the two gods of public interest programming and the 
maximization of advertising revenue. 
Fourth, the expectation that television would serve as a 
“free marketplace of ideas” proved to be illusory.  By definition, 
television offers a narrow and finite point of focus to a broad 
audience that cannot interact with it or with one another. 
These contradictions not only conspired to doom the public 
trustee doctrine from its inception, but they also have 
                                                          
 558. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000). 
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frustrated attempts to incorporate reforms in the broadcast 
regulatory regime.  For example, demands for quantified and 
strict public interest programming requirements have failed 
consistently in the face of the broadcasters’ appeals to the First 
Amendment, reinforced by their political influence.  Similarly, 
appeals to broadcasters themselves to voluntarily assume more 
public interest obligations also have failed, in light of the 
commercial pressures they face to air programming that 
attracts the biggest viewership and, consequently, the highest 
advertising revenue. 
The proposal to require commercial television broadcasters 
to subsidize broadband Internet access in underserved and 
underprivileged communities may be the most viable and 
effective option for reform because it circumvents many of the 
obstacles that have blocked past reform efforts.  For example, it 
does not implicate the broadcasters’ free speech rights.  It may 
militate the Internet’s own grassroots political influence to 
counterbalance the broadcasters’ lobbying muscle.  It is 
consistent with the public trustee doctrine’s purpose to have 
broadcast licensees promote a “free marketplace of ideas.”  And 
it is consistent with the broadcasters’ own interests, 
considering that the DTV transition has made them digital 
players themselves with significant and burgeoning presences 
on the web.  Maximizing access to and participation in the 
Internet “marketplace” may – at long last – satisfy both the 
broadcasters’ commercial interests as well as the interests of 
the American viewing public. 
